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A lthough dogm atics certain ly  is 
subject to a given criterion which is 
beyond all questioning, it is equally 
subject to the process of dialogue 
and discussion with the fathers and  
b r e t h r e n , a process which is also 
subordinate to the given criterion.
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Otto Weber’s dialogical Christology distinguishes itself in not only offering 
a framework that eliminates the problem of a one-sided emphasis on 
incamational Christology over that of the Cross, the ‘above* over that of the 
‘below’ by correlating both, but also as one in which there is an 
exemplification of the Christological discourse in its character of a continuous 
dialogue and critical engagement with predecessors and contemporaries; in 
which the particular or contextual finds continuity and critique in the 
universal, the cultural in the biblical, and one in which the concern to do 
justice to the inner dynamic in the Christian witness do not conceal the variety 
of its representation. Recent Christological discussions and debates show the 
recognition of the problem and shortcomings of a one-sided approach and the 
stress on one aspect against others. But few attempts seem to have been 
made to address the subject in a way that this is overcome and what belongs 
to the very nature of Christological discourse is exemplified. Hence the 
concern to do so in this attempt.
In order to set Otto Weber’s contribution in perspective, Chapter One 
examines the context and intention of his theology. This starts with a 
panorama of the theological trends in the German Protestantism of his 
upbringing; highlights on the theological crisis of the 1920s resulting from 
the experiences of the First World War and the emergence of dialectic 
theology; a process which culminated in Hitler’s rise to power and the re­
examination of the central question of the criterion of Christian witness and 
theology; the shift from the ontological question for theology to the 
relationship between revelation and history.
After a brief biographical sketch in Chapter two, there is an examination 
of Otto Weber’s background anthropology in Chapter Three. An undertaking 
that shows his concern to align the Christian acknowledgement of God’s 
Lordship in faith with the character of Christian conduct and experience. The 
over-riding thesis being that the person and event of Jesus Christ exemplifies 
what humanity really is before God.
In Chapter four is a preoccupation with Otto Weber’s Christology. The 
immediate concern is an outline of his aim, method and structure of 
representation. This involves an analysis of ‘above* and ‘below* approaches 
to Christology, the former exemplifying classical Christology* s concern to
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speak of the reality of God’s prior superiority and majesty. And yet the 
criticism that is directed to its exponents such as Karl Barth is whether 
adequate attention has been paid to the fact that God’s majesty is encountered 
solely in his condescension. Contemporary formulations of Christology 
exemplify the dominance of the latter. First with the quest of the historical 
Jesus school and with Wolfhart Pannenberg’s conception of Christology as 
an inquiry into what Jesus was, but also with Christologies of the Cross. 
But the criticism and adoption of the correlative approach by Weber is given 
by the fact that the event of Jesus Christ do*W  exemplify God as ‘solely 
above’ or ‘solely below’ but rather the God of man. Then there is the 
dialogical and discussive treatment of the Biblical witness to Jesus Christ, the 
examination of the whole question of Christ and history, and the Christology 
of the Church then and now. The basic thesis that emerges from these, and 
one which serves as a critique of traditional Christology right through to the 
contemporary period, is that what one encounters in Jesus Christ is not a 
central point in a system, a model of human possibilities as was the case 
during the enlightenment, or a source of a new self-understanding which 
dominated the nineteenth and twentieth century through existentialist 
philosophy, but the salvation event of Jesus Christ, God’s act of 
confrontation with the human creature.
Chapter five, which serves as the beginning of the second part of the 
thesis, therefore, examines the Christianization of Africa; the experience of 
missionary Christianity and theology, the challenge of emancipation spirit and 
the resultant quest for African theology in the diversity of its representation.
In Chapter Six is an examination of the emergent perspectives in Africa’s 
contemporary theology. This includes exposure to the challenge of 
indigenization and the question of appropriate methodology which unites both 
the witness and the theology of the Christian faith; and the treatment of the 
dominant themes that have come to characterise this particular perspective.
And it is within this context that the examination of that which is the 
centre of religious authority sets in perspective the treatment of the question 
of Christology in Chapter Seven. The insights gained from the two parts of 
the thesis are applied in a synthesized summary in Chapter Eight; the 
concluding reflection exemplifying the challenge of that greater dialogue; the 
confrontation and fellowship of God with us in Jesus the Christ. One where
it can be said, ‘It is no longer because of your w ords   we have heard for
ourselves, and we know that this is indeed the 
Saviour of the World’ (John 4: 42 - RSV).
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The Context and Intention 
of Otto Weber's Theology
1INTRODUCTION
Where it may have been anathema to speak of Christian theology in a 
pluralistic sense, today’s reality is quite the opposite. It is common-place to 
speak of theology in contextual, situational, confessional, and even in 
individual sense where the guiding thought is that of a given theologian or 
theologians. Where Africa is concerned, it is no longer an issue to ask 
whether there should be an African theology or Christology. The 
recognition of this as given has meant that the question is not whether there 
should be one, but whether one can speak of African theology or 
theologies? Confronted with situations as complex as this, the question that 
dominated my thinking as I set upon this research was to ask as to how one 
could still articulate the claims of the Christian faith and yet accept the above 
reality as given? What is it that is decisive for every theology if it is to 
remain Christian irrespective of the diversities of expression? Is it possible 
to speak of Jesus Christ in a particularistic way and still maintain that 
universal reality of his person and event? How was I to treat the decisive 
Christological question; who do you say that I am? This, and all other 
questions pointed me to the challenge that is inherent in Christian faith. For 
to speak of Jesus as the Christ is an act of response. It is an activity of 
acknowledgement and confession of his Person and work. The question I 
found confronting me is what I make of him in the reality of the above 
situation? What do I make of him even as I reckon with the particularity of 
my setting as an African Christian; from the particularity of my Christian 
experience, my community and Church, even as I reckon with the reality of 
his Universality and the historical heritage of the Christian witness?
As I set out to confront these questions, I was introduced by my
2teachers in Glasgow to Otto Weber, whose theology did not only represent 
that perspective of the Reformed tradition that I shared and eager to 
understand, but also one whose Christology represent that attempt at 
articulating the significance of Jesus for those within and without the 
Church amidst not too dissimilar situations as the one stated above. I 
selected his thought because of this and especially for the kind of 
perspective that exemplified Christological discourse in the nature of its 
character of dialogue and discussion with the fathers and the brethren; but 
all done in subjectivity to that given criterion that is beyond all questioning. 
This is demonstrated in the way he displays throughout his work those 
internal dialogues and discussion within Christian tradition such as between 
medieval dogmatics and reformers, Luther and Calvin, Pietism and 
Rationalism, and even those between Barth and Bultmann among others; all 
done without losing sight of the person and event of Jesus Christ as the 
start-point and terminus of dogmatics.
Since our stated intention is an attempt whose Christological 
construction is to pay particular reference to the thought of Otto Weber, as 
well as the perspective of Africa's Christian experience, it has been 
imperative to set out the background of the former as well as setting out 
similar backgrounds for the latter. In this exercise, attempts are made to 
show those factors that have given shape to the theological trends in the 
former's context (Weber's) as well as doing the same for the present 
theological trends in the continent of Africa. The question of appropriate 
methodology which unites both the witness and theology of the Christian 
faith is examined along with the dominant themes that characterise these
perspectives. And it is within this context that the decisive question of 
Christology is treated, the findings highlighted, and recommendations for 
contemporary orientation made.
It is hoped that the resultant insights from this attempt will in some way 
enrich the African and the world-wide church in her continuing task; 
which is not only that of knowing God the Redeemer, but experiencing 
transformation in her existence. For it is by doing so that the Christian 
church has the freedom to live in and for the one it serves. And the 
endeavour to write from a particular perspective such as the African will be 
an expression of that particularity of every Christian response within that 




OTTO WEBER’S THEOLOGICAL MILIEU
The most striking and dominant characteristic of Otto Weber’s theological 
undertaking is his constant appraisal of the history of the Church. By doing 
so, he sets himself in dialogue with the past, critically highlighting and 
discussing the chief elements of theology as he identified them at the most 
important stages of their development. This did not only offer him the 
opportunity of discussing the essential content of theology, but the 
understanding of how the various contexts and particular emphasis at the 
various stages of the said development had shaped its content, emphasis and 
direction.
Weber did not only seek to show that dogmatics begins with critical 
respect of what has gone before in employing a dialogic methodology, but, 
as he said, ‘this was to show that listening to the fathers and brethren, while 
doing so in bondage to the word of God, makes us free for contemporary 
questions.’*
Even so, his measure as a theologian cannot be evaluated in isolation 
from the context within which his theological formation took shape. Hence, 
the necessity of a brief outline of the setting, the main factors and theological 
questions which shaped the emphasis and methodology exemplified in his 
work.
5a) His background
Otto Webpr was born on June 4th, 1902, in Muhlhein-Koln to devout members of the 
Free Reformed Church congregation at Hessen. The setting was peitistic and 
conservative, best exemplified in the life of his mother, who has been documented 
by Katrin Mercker to have had more significant influence on his religious 
inclination than his father who was an engineer. Weber excelled himself as a 
keen and active member of the pupils bible study groups (Schulerbibelkreis) such 
that he was already involved in the leadership of it in his late teens.
Like many young people of his time, he set himself to study law at the
University. But when the time came in 1921, he finally opted for theology at the
Universify of Bonn. In the course of his second year (1922), as was the custom,
he wpnt tn Tubingen where he studied for one semester under Karl Heine and Adolf
&ch|frtter - both of conservative and pi€tistic persuasion in their theology, and
are not pH to have been of major influence on him - though he was no one's student 
*
per se .
He returned to Bonn in his second year where he did his second and final degree - 
specialising in reformed dogmatics and liturgies.2 After a year's assistantship 
in the parish, he entered the teaching ministry of the church on his appointment 
as a tutor at the Reformed Theological college at Elberfeld in 1928 where he 
subsequently became Principal in 1930.
* Observation made by Professor J. Smendt- Department of Old Testament Studies- 
Universify of Gottingen. Interviewed on 21/7/1988.
6With no documentation describing Weber's own account of his experience during the 
formative years of his University life, it does remain speculative to single out 
a particular trend of theology as having been influential on him, apart from the 
Conservative Evangelical persuasion which goes back to his early upbringing.
b) The Cross-Roads
It is imperative to note, however, that whichever trend arrracted Weber's 
attention, the context in which he entered the teaching ministry of the.Church 
was one of great challenges. It is the period referred to by Kenneth Latourette, 
as 'one of storm tossed protestantism in Germany.'3 For the events of this 
particular period were not only of critical challenge to the witness of the 
Christian faith, but the orientation of its theological articulation.
Obviously, there were various factors and a whole complex of circumstances that 
were at play before and during this period. But the major event that served as 
a turning point even in setting in their proper perspectives the events of the 
late 1920a and early 1930s, particularly in Germany and Europe in general was the 
catastrophic experience of the first world war. The devastating effect on the 
socio-political and spiritual life of the people was immeasurable. Indeed, it 
did not only transform the political map of Europe, but the destruction which it 
wrought, unparalleled in previous human history in its scale, hurled a black 
question mark against the confidence in the onward and upward progress of the so- 
called Christian civilization which had so strongly characterised liberal 
theology, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.4 In Alec Vidler's 
words,
7‘The tragic experience of being caught up in the 
irrationality and meaninglessness of war made people 
wonder whether life could really be explained in the easy, 
optimistic and evolutionary way that had come to be
generally accepted in the preceding period’^
Hence Alasdair Heron’s observation that this inevitably ‘forced the bitter 
question whether the advanced theological thought of the nineteenth century 
as a whole had not been far too unaware of the darker side of human nature, 
too optimistic about innate human capacity for good, too willing to take 
contemporary culture as its own high evaluation of itself, and over all too 
disposed to take God for granted, and to assume that he was somehow 
simply ‘given’ in what it regarded as the highest ethical, spiritual and 
religious values of mankind.*^
Inevitably, liberal theology in its various forms had little to say (if 
anything at all) in the face of these agonising questions especially as they 
were directed against the very foundation on which it had rooted itself as is 
exemplified in its general characteristic and trend since the eighteenth 
century.
As it has been well documented, the seventeenth and eighteenth century, 
commonly called the age of enlightenment saw the assertion of man’s 
autonomy as bearer of reason, through which he is capable of empirically 
controlling the world, explaining away all wonders and mysteries, and 
therefore asserting himself as central in the midst of reality.?
Consequently, this meant a direct challenge to the authoritative claims of
8Christian faith as the sole basis of interpreting reality and the very meaning 
and destiny of humanity. Illustrative of this is the challenge to the belief in 
the infallibility of scripture, the possibility of miracles and any inclinations of 
heteronomous necessity.^
Although there was an initial hesitation in responding to these challenges 
of the enlightenment, especially in Germany where Pietism was on the 
domain as a topical issue, the eighteenth century saw a new turning point. 
And what began initially as bridge building dialogue between theology and 
the new national movement was in no time a full blown activity in thorough 
going rationalism. This is especially reflected in both biblical and systematic 
scholarship of the said period.
In a brilliant study and summary of the thinking of the said period in 
biblical scholarship, especially the New Testament, Albert Schweitzer has 
demonstrated how rationalism and sceptical treatment of the subject was the 
n o r m . 9  In other words, the anthropological starting point by inclination had
a ,
everything explained in natural way befitting human logic. And so was 
Heinrich E.G. Paulus who had no place for miracles in the treatment of the 
Gospel accounts. On the contrary, he argued that the healing miracles as 
narrated could only be attributed to the Psychology and medicine known only 
to Jesus. 10
A further approach which did even raise the questions of the authenticity 
and reliability of the synoptic and the fourth Gospel’s accounts of the life and 
ministry of Jesus was David Friedrich Strauss, who argued that the source of
these materials was mythology. 1 1
In fact, Bruno Bauer even went further to assert that Jesus, as known 
today, was a creation of the gospel writers, clearly questioning the 
uniqueness and the very authoritative case of the Christian faith. 12
However, it was in Immanuel Kant that rationalism was shaken to its 
foundations. For he did not only expose the concealed dogmatism of the 
rationalist system, but stated clearly that pure reason, by its very nature is 
limited to the objects of possible experience, and only leads itself to the area 
of entangling in antimonies once it crosses over this b o u n d a r y .  13 This is 
especially true, as reason is restricted to experience and could not be said to 
provide any definitive and conclusive demonstration of what is beyond 
known reality. In Claude Welch’s words,
‘Theoretical knowledge, with its transcendental principles, 
is limited to phenomena, to objects as objects of experience. 
God, freedom, and immortality are not possible objects of our 
theoretical knowledge. ’ 14
Hence, the negation of reason as leading to all truth. In fact, this marked 
a turning point in matters of religion as Kant re-asserted faith as the basis of 
approaching G o d .  15 Even though, the axiom or basis of theological 
articulation became his ethicism as he saw ‘God in terms of the supreme 
good, the ultimate guarantee of the moral order in the universe’. 16 And 
Walter Kasper has argued that this should not be misunderstood as to 
suggest a subjectivistic ethic, but as an inter-subjective one as morality is 
linked to the reason shared by all free beings. 17 It has to be said, however, 
that there is certainly a continuity of the autonomistic spirit of the
10
enlightenment in the trend of his thought. Indeed his ethic or morality has 
its own autonomous justification in human freedom, and thus excludes any 
theoromous justification. 18 As Walter Kasper points out,
‘God does not serve as sanction for laws imposed from 
outside, but serves the perception that all duties arising 
from the free will are divine commandments .... our actions 
are not binding on us because they are God’s 
commandments, but we see them as God’s commandments
because we find them inwardly binding.*^
It was Friedrich Schleiermacher whose radical continuity of Kant brought 
about the independence of religion (Christianity) over against reason as well 
as against the ethical. Heron summarises his concern that religion is more 
than this by stating,
‘It has to do rather with the infinite, universal 
wholeness of all things, of all-embracing totality, 
which may or may not be labelled ‘God’, but which 
includes and enfolds everything within itself.’20
It is with this concern that he re-asserted the grounding of theology in 
historic Christianity.
And yet in doing so, he set the subjective orientation of locating the said 
Christian faith and its theological articulation within the context of ‘feeling’ 
or immediate self-consciousness which for him is the innermost realm of 
human existence. As it has been noted, this entailed the awareness of utter 
dependence which is always given along with the feeling of relative freedom 
and dependence, vis-a-vis the world.21 The ambiguity that surrounds this 
line of thought is even intensified in his analysis of doctrines which has led 
to the charge that there is no certainty as to whether what is said of God is in 
any sense true about him or only about our understanding of Him (God).^2
11
In fact, his depiction of Jesus in terms of his unique divine self- 
consciousness in his Christology seemed to express the ideal of human 
idealism, associated with Friedrich Hegel and F. S c h e l l i n g . 2 3
It was in the period of bourgeois self-justification culminating in Albrecht 
Ritschl’s re-assertion of Kant that the seeds of subjectivism and 
anthropological emphasis came to fruition. More so as he set to replace 
everything related to being with purely personal and ethical categories. And 
it is in his Christology that this line of thought is best exhibited, as he 
represents Jesus Christ in terms of value judgements, and therefore the 
‘moral ideal’ for the believing community. In Alistair McGrath’s words:
‘Jesus was the historical realization of the full human 
spiritual and moral potential. The historical manifestation 
of the human religious i d e a l . ’2 4
Indeed, Ernst Troeltsch sealed this trend when he rejected any claims of 
finality in Christian faith. And this is demonstrated in his treatment of what 
was held in uniqueness, as authoritative and final for Christian faith, as no 
different from the universal religious phenomena in h i s t o r y .25
What emerges in this general trend is an exemplification of a theological 
form set to define the dominant self-understanding both in biblical and 
systematic scholarship. Indeed, the notable major accomplishment derived 
from the proponents of the nationalist thought in the context of dogmatics is 
their ability to face the historical criticism of the bible, and the relativism of 
the general understanding of the world. This is seen in their attempt to 
express dogmatically what they felt was possible in view of the known facts
!!2
and the existing world understanding as Weber o b s e r v e s . 2 6  But it is clear 
that the said dogmatism did not sell out the Christian discourse, but rather 
subjected itself to the spirit of the modem age. Hence, Robert Ericksen’s 
charge that what emerges out of liberal theology is a tendency in both biblical 
and systematic scholarship to strip away the inessential, supernatural 
trappings of Christian faith, which is said to be alien and having been 
acquired in a naive, pre-scientific age.27
Consequently, the intended realisation of a purified core in Christian 
teaching only proved its inadequacy in its inability to hold both a negation of 
the authoritative base of the Christian proclamation and still be able to present 
it in a recognizable w a y .2 8
Indeed, the general characteristic of theological orientation as a whole is 
best illustrated by Richard Niebuhr’s depiction of its equivalent in the 
American’s liberal protestantism of his day. In his words:
‘The romantic conception of the Kingdom of God 
involved no discontinuities, no cries, no tragedies, or 
sacrifices, no loss of all things, no cross and resurrection.
In ethics it reconciled the interests of the individual with 
those of society by means of faith in natural identity of 
interests or in the benevolent, altruistic character of man.
In politics and economics it slurred over national and 
class divisions, seeing only the growth of unity and 
ignoring the increase of self-assertion and exploitation.
In religion it reconciled God and man by deifying the 
latter and humanizing the former.....
Christ the redeemer became Jesus the Teacher or 
spiritual genius in whom the religious capacities of 
mankind were fully developed ... evolution, growth, 
development, the culture of the religious life, the
13
nurture of the kindly sentiments, the extension of 
humanitarian ideals, and the progress of civilization 
took the place of the Christian revolution ....
A God without wrath brought men without sin into a 
Kingdom without judgement through the ministration 
of a Christ without a C r o s s ’2 9
Hence, the inevitable displacement of its standing in the face of the tragic 
experiences of the war and the subsequent pessimism which characterised the 
1920s, nourished even more by the political and economic crisis of the 
Weimar republic.
It is in the midst of this state of despair that the rise of various movements 
claiming to be exponents of a ‘positive Christianity* are to be understood.30 
And especially so in that they dominated the scene during the Church 
conflicts which characterised the proposed new plans of ecclesiastical 
alteration within the protestant church. One aspect that was held in unanimity 
was that the events marked a decisive end to theological trend of the 
nineteenth century. And it was only in seeing new ways that the Christian 
Church could be able to bear an effective witness of its calling.
A pioneering undertaking on the theological front was already under way 
amongst those theologians who came to be identified with dialectic theology. 
Taking the lead was Karl Barth who did not begin by attacking only the 
‘cultural protestantism’ exhibited in Germany, but the fundamental 
disposition of theological and ecclesiastical thinking of the time.31 Walter 
H. Horton has rightly stated that the ammunition for this undertaking had 
already been provided by Spren Kierkegaard, Rudolf Otto and Martin 
B u b e r .32 Decisive was the realisation which Horton has expressed so
14
forcefully that:
‘he found he could no longer do with honest conviction 
- explain God by identifying Him with any contemporary 
social movement or tendency, or with anything temporal 
or human. Hegel might do that, Utopian Socialists might 
do that, but Kierkegaard and current events had
conspired to remove the scales from Barth’s eyes he
learned to doubt whether the antitheses of human society 
were really leading on toward a glorious divine synthesis 
which would comprehend all tragic differences in some
equable and rational “both ... and” Human life.........
as he observed it, and as he found it magnificently 
analysed in Dostoievsky's novels, seemed to be an 
insoluble paradox, a question without an answer. Both the 
Christian Church and the Socialist Party seemed to be 
rushing to Perdition, rather than marching toward the 
Millenium. A God one could trust and hence reverence must 
be wholly beyond this. There must be as Kierkergaard 
said, ‘an infinite qualitative difference* between the 
temporal and the eternal.*33
In fact, it is this particular realisation that set the framework of his 
famous Romerbrief (commentary on the Epistle to the Romans) of 1918, 
where he stressed unreservedly that ‘God stands over and against man and 
everything human in an infinite qualitative distinction and is never identical 
with anything which we name, experience, conceive or worship as G o d . * 3 4  
And thus, ‘he remains God - the “Wholly other” even in our encounter with 
Him, where we as finite creatures of time and history are confronted by the 
one who is infinite and e t e r n a l . *35 As Paul Tillich points out, here was a 
‘re-statement of the paradoxical character of the absolute transcendence of 
God which we can never reach from our side, which we can never bring 
down to earth by our efforts or knowledge, which either comes to us or
n o t . * 3 6
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It was not only this publication of his Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans, but also his Christian Dogmatics in Outline which came later that 
served to exemplify this as the thrust of his new approach, bringing the 
issues he saw as critical for theology from this perspective to the public 
debate.
Xboeboration of this new stance came from Emil Brunner, Edward 
Thurneysen, Friedrich Gogarten (identified with dialectic theology) who 
reversed the Hegelian dialectic by affirming the ‘absolute contrast between 
God and men - the interplay of the “no” and “yes” of the word to man and 
the fact that no human speaking about God could directly or immediately 
contain the truth about him.’37 The underlined summary is that these 
dialectic theologians took up afresh one of the prominent motifs in the 
thought of the reformers that the kind of religion that man works out for 
himself is in the end idolatory, for its real object is not the Living God, but 
man’s own secret d i v i n i t y ' . 3 8 .  And since the thrust of the orientation of the 
nineteenth century theology was seen in this light, the logical consequence 
was, therefore, the inevitable negation of its standing.
It is worth noting, however, that the area of a common stance was on this 
recognition that theology could not continue along the direction of the 
nineteenth century and that the church should see only the Word of God 
which is the only basis of its freedom and obligation, as Weber has 
indicated.39 But, as we shall elaborate when discussing the question of 
revelation and existential interpretation, the positive aspects that could be said 
to facilitate the desired new orientation for theology proved more divisive
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than the negative aspects.
Even so, this decisive turning point had the thrust of its emphasis felt 
beyond the confines of those who were inclined to its orientation. For the 
standard bearers of orthodoxy, as conservative evangelicals were in 
Germany, this was more than an overdue awakening. And this was 
demonstrated by Otto Weber in a paper he gave to a movement of Calvinist 
students at Lunteren in the Netherlands in September, 1932.
Central to his analysis of the philosophy of life during the crisis period 
was that what was being experienced was the inevitable consequence of the 
enslaving spirit of modernism. And this is what he saw as inherent in the 
rationalist dogmatic tendencies of the enlightenment. Its underlying 
autonomistic tendency served to set man as lord of his life and destiny. And 
liberal theology’s orientation served to perpetuate this tendency rather than 
meet its rightful task of a critical function in relation to the daily witness and 
preaching of the church. In this regard, he was decisive in his view of the 
general trend of the said period and of theology in particular by emphatically 
stating,
‘The autonomistic (imperialistic) tendency of the nineteenth 
century was nothing but the other side of the basic
humanistic will (Grundwille)^
The implications for theology were, therefore, enormous. And like Karl 
Barth, he argued that it is only when there is a recognition of the said 
enslavement that a return to its rightful task could be realised. This entailed 
the indispensible demand for the recognition of the “Godness of God”, and 
the reality of his word in Jesus Christ. Unlike the liberal theology’s 
interpretation of Jesus in terms of the Spiritual Ideal, a heroic example or in
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terms of value judgements as Richard Niebuhr highlighted in our earlier 
indication, there had to be a recognition that in Jesus Christ is the perennially 
contemporary event of the encounter of time with eternity, the intersection of 
finite by the infinite, by which everything human and creaturely is 
contradicted in its self-enclosedness and opened up to the reality of God.^l
And if theology had to meet its constant challenge and demand for setting 
the stage and process through which the church, standing in her old truths, 
enters into apprehension of the new social and intellectual movement inherent 
in every new age, it had to do so only on the very basis that has been stated. 
For it to throw herself into the sanctification of each new social order, bring 
forth out of her treasures things new and old, and show again and again her 
power of witnessing under changed conditions to the catholic capacity of her 
faith and life, it could only do so from the very distinctive basis of its calling.
Hence, Otto Weber’s corroboration of the dialectic theologian’s stand that 
this was the enslaving shortcoming of liberal theology and cultural 
protestantism in general, and it was imperative to recognise the said bondage 
and recover the said insight which is demonstrative of the dynamism of the 
reformation faith and the New Testament in particular.
Having stated this, one notable point in Weber’s treatment of nineteenth 
century theology is his acknowledgement of the contribution of historical 
critical scholarship, especially in its facilitation of Biblical criticism and 
theology in general. And this was generally the view held even by those 
who were standard bearers of orthodoxy as what was mainly unacceptable
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was the tendency of aggressive and narrow rationalism.
However, it was the advent of the Third Reich that led Otto Weber (see 
also Emil Brunner and Friedrich Gogarten) to turn to ethical (especially social 
ethics) questions as the political trends brought about a situation of the 
gravest challenge for theology and the Protestant Church than ever before. 
And it is to this that we now turn.
c) Reckoning with National Socialism
As we have indicated, the rise of Nazism and its eventual assumption of 
power in 1933 brought about a situation that could be said to have led to a 
repeat of an ‘exilic experience’ for the protestant church in Germany. The 
crisis of the 1920s culminating in the failure of the democratic government 
and subsequent rise of the totalitarian state exemplified a situation of 
dejection and disillusionment that was no doubt reflected in daily life as much 
as it was within the Church itself. But the advent of the Third Reich brought 
about a scenario of optism that was reflected in the enthusiastic response that 
some sections of the protestant church membership had towards the regime. 
Notable is the National Socialists’ attack against Godless Marxism, 
Materialism, decaying morals and what was seen as destructive authors; a 
move that was seen as leading to the rejuvenation of society. The awakened 
Conservatism within the Church actually saw these events as serving a 
Christian stance. Already, anything ‘liberal’ such as the right to advocate for 
individual rights was seen by many an enslaving trend which the country
had nearly died of. The exercise of authority, leadership and the emphasis of 
the whole embracing moral ideals as in traditional society was seen as the 
only way the country could stand united in confronting an hostile w o r l d . 4 2
But as things turned out, there was more at stake than the simple 
endorsement of renewal and rejuvenation in national life. Within the 
Protestant Church were movements that saw these events brought about by 
National Socialism in terms of divine dispensation. And those within the 
movement of the German Christians are a classic example of this. And yet 
there were those who not only shared some of their ideals in their attempt to 
work out a theological grounding of social ethics as was the case with many 
theologians of Conservative persuasion, but even those identified with 
dialectic theology like Friedrich Gogarten found himself caught in the web as 
he reverted to the traditional Lutheran ‘doctrine of the Orders of C r e a t i o n ’ . 43
However, it was during the ecclesiastical plans of alteration in 1933 that 
the grave reality of the situation the Church was facing became clear. For it 
was not only the Nazi regime's determination to influence the outcome of it 
that came to the open, but the racial and nationalistic concerns that were not 
only going to compromise but destroy the very witness of the Church
itself. 44
For theologi ans like Otto Weber, an exemplification of a clearcut stand was 
absent especially when faced with the challenges arising from ths crisis. 
In fact, what he represented when addressing himself to the said plans of 
ecclesiastical alteration in April 1933, was an inclination that was reminiscent
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of National Conservation. This is especially illustrated by his assertion that 
the new set up should be based on confession and a framework providing a 
re-assertion of order and commitment which was lacking in the age of 
individualism.^^ This approach was in line with the totalitarian and anti­
democratic process already taking shape in the German Nation, was no doubt 
a statement in support of National Socialism.
At this time he joined the NSDAP and by May he had become a member 
of the German Christians. And this led to his promotion as the Minister of 
the Reformed Church in the Spiritual Ministry under the Reichbishopric of 
Muller, an undertaking that brought him to the centre stage of the 
dominating church politics vis-a vis the s t a t e .4 6
Obviously, there were genuine concerns of an ecumenical nature which 
were on the background of the said attempts at forging a united protestant 
church, but the political considerations that dominated the process 
overshadowed all that was envisaged. It was inevitable therefore that this led 
to the consequential explosive theological crisis of Summer 1933.
Indeed, the turbulent scene with which the churches found themselves 
posed serious theological questions that called for decisions on issues that 
were of far reaching consequence, not only for the time, but their future in its 
entirety. In Klaus Scholder’s own words,
‘The only thing that seemed to matter was to stand 
one’s ground to some extent in the midst of this 
torrential flood, and to secure positions that might 
guarantee the survival of the Churches even in the 
Third Reich’.47
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And the urgency of this was no where felt more acutely than in the task of 
theology. For that critical function which is inherent in its task in relation to 
the witness and preaching of the church was here tested to the full. The 
epistemological principles and the hermeneutic criterion upon which issues at 
stake were to be dealt with depended on whether those involved could see 
beyond the simple enticing utopia of National Socialism.
What emerges, however, is that there were those who were prepared to 
satisfy the particular trend rather than face the critical demand of facilitating 
the Churches’ witness. For in no time, those within the German Christians 
started formulating what came to be known as a ‘Political Theology’. One 
who came to establish himself as one of its leading exponents was 
Emmanuel Hirsch. In fact, he worked out a philosophy of Christian history 
in order to offer a rational justification of the adopted direction. And since he 
thought of the period in terms of divine dispensation, he took the political 
revolution as the decisive epistemological principle for theology. In other 
words, the political theme determined the theological stand and action of the 
Church.
The thrust of his thought was that it was the same one God who met us in 
the Gospel’s call that also did the same in the stormy events of h i s t o r y .48. 
Of course, this was not without qualification. And Walter Horton has rightly 
pointed out that Hirsch ‘did not mean to put the two calls on the same 
absolute p l a n e ’4 9 .  On the contrary he noted the distinction by stating that,
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‘The Lord of Contemporary History is a ‘Verborgener 
Gott’- a God that hideth himself, whereas in the Gospel we 
have the face of God revealed. The God of History imposes 
on us our present duty. The God of the Gospel opens up to 
us our eternal d e s t i n y .’50
Even so, the underlying arguments are those used in support of natural 
theology. For example, he stated that to locate the conception of revelation 
and grace in Jesus Christ with exclusivity is a christological narrowness 
which denies the reality of the stated wider aspect. 5* In other words, there 
was no doubt in his mind that events of history have their own revelatory 
quality - apart from that made plain in Jesus Christ. And his fanatical 
nationalism was demonstrated when he devotedly exhorted the protestant 
church to be on the lead in shaping the nation in terms of the Vfllkisch 
l d e o l o g y . 5 2
Wilhelm Stapel was even more explicit in his exaltation of the VcJlkisch 
movement. In fact, he did not hesitate to equate the Nazi regime’s stress on 
order, renewal of morals, and upholding of authority with the authoritative 
and autonomous status with the Old Testament status of the Torah for
Israel.53
Friedrich Gogarten, who had parted ways with Karl Barth by stating that 
his theology had no adequate grounding for social ethics, especially showed 
similar inclinations as he treated the question of faith and history. As we 
indicated earlier, his recall of the traditional Lutheran doctrine of the orders of 
creation served to illustrate this concern with history as still having the 
imprints of God’s will for us besides the corruption of sin after the f a l l . 5 4  
As Walter Horton puts it,
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‘The basic social institutions (family, the economic order, 
the political order, etc.) are divinely ordained in their 
basic structure; and though they have been corrupted 
by sin, still bear the imprint of the ‘Order of Creation’, and 
must be respected as embodying God’s will for their 
members.55
And so he understood this to be the foundation of Christian obedience to 
constituted authorities of which the Third Reich was. It is this stress on the 
state that underlined his support for National Socialism of which he had 
become a member, besides joining the German Christians. Like many in this 
movement, the political trend was the only agency through which the moral 
contempt of authority and ills related to the age of individualism was to be 
overcome. And this was the only way to bring about the desired healing for 
the spiritual and political life in s o c i e t y . 5 6 .  Consequently, his approach was 
in no doubt a boost to Emmanuel Hirsch’s political theology.
Otto Weber recognised the distinctiveness of the gospel and, therefore, 
the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. In fact, he asserted that this was 
decisively central for Christian faith and was the foundation on which the 
Church stands on its confession. But he was prepared to say that there was a 
place for general revelation which has to be acknowledged as existing in 
God’s creation and events of history. Even so, it was only after the Nazi 
revolution that he discriminated against the misinterpretation of this teaching 
as if to give distinctive revelatory quality to what appears in history and 
creaturely existence.57 Indeed, his advocacy of order and authoritative 
leadership was not only underlining his Conservative and anti-democratic 
stand, but implicitly if not explicitly in support of the authoritarian political
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order of the Third Reich.58
What may have been a guarded inclination to Vblkisch i deology and 
religiosity by theologians and especially those in the membership of the 
German Christians came to the open in November 1933 through Reinhold 
Krause’s speech at the Sports Arena in Berlin. As a member of the German 
Christians, he exalted the Aryan race and the ideology of the Third Reich 
demonstrating how many within the movement were prepared to replace 
anything that did not serve the Nazi regime. And so the concerns that had 
dominated the ecclesiastical plans of alteration within the protestant church 
were no longer confined to the realms of theology; but it was clear that the 
underlying drive was purely of an ideological nature geared to serve National 
Socialism.
In fact, here was an explicit demonstration of an idolatrous reality best 
illustrated by the adopted gods such as the trust in man, race, blood and 
Vdlkisch ideology.59
It was imperative then for anyone with the insight to recognise this reality 
and therefore, meet the challenge of the witness of the Christian faith or 
submit to the inevitable bondage of the period.
The mantle of prophecy was, however, for Karl Barth. For to him, the 
problem was with theology itself as alien forces including political trends had 
been entertained as forming the criterion of its articulation. And he singles 
out these alien forces as actually the real powers that deprive it of its
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f r e e d o m .60 In other words, whenever they are made an integral part of 
theological articulation, then it is inevitable that they will dictate its 
orientation.
Hence, his call for the recognition of the only one criterion for theology; 
namely the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ. In his words, ‘It was the only 
basis through which the recognition of the Lordship of God is made - and so 
is the judgement of all our adopted gods such as trust in man, blood, race, 
and every given ideology.* Indeed, he underlines the vital responsibility of 
this distinction by saying,
‘This responsibility will be demonstrated in the fact 
that it will interpret those other authorities by the 
criterion of revelation and not revelation by the
criterion of those other authorities.’^ !
This was the thrust of his argument for the freedom of theology and 
indeed the thinking and action of the Church. For him, this was in reality the 
recognition of the Lordship of Christ over the Church and all her 
undertakings in whichever form. In other words, the recognition of the one 
criterion underlined that what is said, thought and done from this perspective 
takes precedence over any cultural, political, anthropological or metaphysical 
insights. And so it remained as a fundamental factor that was imperative for 
faith and the confessional stand of the church as far as he was concerned. 
Indeed this was the central point and framework on which the confessing 
church through his instrumental guidance responded to the crisis of the Third 
Reich.
Moreover, his rejection of natural revelation did not only underline his
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conviction that even our preconceptions of divinity and humanity are 
shattered through God’s self-revelation, which forces us to consider him as 
he wishes Himself to be known, rather than as we have preconceived h i m , 6 2  
but could not conceive an attempt at looking at God as Lord of history in 
isolation or apart from his given r e v e l a r i o n . 6 3  And his debate with Emil 
Brunner on this question serve as a fitting illustration.
Although we shall elaborate further on this as we discuss the question of 
revelation and existential interpretation, the basic contention is that it is from 
the position of revelation that a clear cut view of God’s Lordship is 
exemplified. The basis of the argument is that when talking of revelation we 
are actually speaking about God’s own self-disclosure. And since all that 
we can speak about him derives from that which is received, then as Andre 
Dumas says,
‘God's action is self-authenticating as it is
that which God has already done of that which gives us
the right to speak o f  H i m . ’6 4
For Barth, this is the basis which sets the Christian Church free to live in the 
obedience of faith. As it has been pointed out,
‘Barth develops a theology of liberation .... of 
the Christian Church from the prison of its 
social, cultural and intellectual m a t r i x . ’6 5
And especially so against the challenges of the Nazi regime. The 
theological direction deriving from this decisive framework served to 
demonstrate the unconditional primacy of theology, and remaining true to its 
function even in relation to p o l i t i c s . 6 6 .  An indispensible freedom which is
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derived from the Word of God is only properly exercised when this 
recognition is made.
Ronald Thieman makes this point even more explicit in his response to 
George Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine by stating that Barth was an 
intratextual theologian. In his words,
‘Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the 
scriptural framework ... which absorbs the world, 
rather than the world absorbing i t . ... It supplies the 
Interpretative framework within which believers seek
to live their lives and understand reality.’67
This underlines the basis on which his approach is to be understood. 
Moreover, the Barmen declaration which Barth was iiSrumental in its 
formulation, and which through his leadership, served to set the basis for the 
confessing church's opposition to Hitler and his Christian supporters, has at 
its core the understanding of the calling of the church in no other framework, 
but that of scripture. The first article which summarises all the six principles 
clearly illustrates that which is basic and decisive when it states:
‘Jesus Christ, as he is attested for us in Holy Scripture, 
is the Word of God which we have to hear and which 
we have to trust and obey in life and death. We reject 
the false doctrine, as though the Church could and 
would have to acknowledge as source of its proclamation, 
apart from and besides this one Word of God, still other 
events and powers, figures and truths, as God’s 
revelation. *68
Hence, Otto Weber’s observation that this was in effect an act that was 
forcing the church to confess in a new and very concrete way the basis of its 
existence.^ And this drew the framework within which theology and the 
Church undertakes its task.
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However, Karl Barth’s approach was not without its own shortcomings. 
Already Karl Heim and Paul Althaus questioned whether the narrow stance 
did not render the church’s task in social responsibility inept.70 The other 
major concern was the tendency in the thrust of Barth’s emphasis to be too 
inward looking. And this was best illustrated by his treatment of the Jewish 
question. The Aryan Paragraph which many rejected had offered the 
opportunity for treating what was in fact the central question in the crisis of 
the Third Reich. In fact, it is Dietrich Bonhoeffer who points out this failure, 
even by those on the forefront in the opposition to Nazism to see this as a 
central question. And yet he argues that it was when one took seriously the 
entire theological, moral and humanitarian implications that the question 
i ises that one could find it unavoidable to realise its centrality.' 1 In other 
words, it was actually a pointer to the reality of what was to be understood as 
the essence of the Church. In his words,
‘The task of Christian preaching was nothing short of 
stating that here was the Church where Jew and German 
stand together under the Word of God: here is the proof 
whether a Church was still the Church or n o t .  *72
This was no doubt the central critical question for theology. Indeed Karl 
Barth in a letter to Bethge concedes that his silence on the issue was no doubt 
an act of theological weakness on his part.73.
In summary, it is clear that a return to Conservatism was in no way a 
corrective measure to the undue emphasis on human subjectivity in liberal 
theology. In fact, the reality of the situation demonstrated how easy it was to 
move from what was seen as a trend leading to idolatry to a full blown 
embrace of the same. And it was a stance such as that of Barth (besides the
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shortcomings) which served to remind the Church of her true calling amidst 
the crisis.74
Even so, what served as decisive in bringing about a theological 
breakthrough was in itself the source of many questions that dominated 
theology thereafter. This is especially true for the whole question of 
revelation. For the above did raise the question of the relationship between 
Revelation and History and all that which relates to issues of human 
existence. Indeed, the debate between Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann 
serves to demonstrate this concern. This is to say that even the unbalanced 
antithesis between the theology of the incarnation and that of the cross have 
at their root the treatment of this question. And it is to it that we now turn.
D. Revelation and the Question of Existential Interpretation
As we have already indicated, the collapse of nineteenth century liberal 
theology saw the re-assertion of revelation as the foundational framework for 
theology. This is especially true for many post-war theologians, who saw in 
revelation the only grounds for reconstructing theology anew. However, the 
interpretation of this assertion proved so diverse and complex that the 
undertaking can be said to have set the stage for the plurality of approaches 
that came to characterise twentieth century theology.
In spite of this diversity though, emergent dominant themes such as 
revelation and the knowledge of God, revelation and the question of human 
existence, and revelation and the meaning of history revolved around what
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has been referred to as the ‘unceasing struggle on the double front of the 
objectivity of the Word of God directed toward God, and the existential 
reality of man’s l a n g u a g e . ’^
For Continental protestant theology (European continent) especially, it 
was Karl Barth on the one hand who took the lead in articulating the 
concerns of the former as his stress on the objectivity of the Christian faith 
meant that objective revelation was the decisive framework on which 
theology derives its orientation. This is to say that the very event of God’s 
self-disclosure in His word, Jesus Christ was the only basis and context in 
which our knowledge and speaking of God is derived. In this respect, 
objective revelation for him took precedence before any discussions on its 
subjective p o s s i b i l i t i e s . ^  The stress here, as was acknowledged by Emil 
Brunner and even Rudolf Bultmann, though with a differing methodological 
framework, was that theology could not speak directly of God apart from 
his own self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. And this for Barth was in itself the 
point of departure as far as the subjective framework is concerned. For the 
direction was rooted in God's own initiative.
However, the decisive breakthrough came with his rediscovery of the 
“distance” existing between God and Man, well expressed in his theme of 
the “Otherness” of God which dominated his early works and was indeed the 
Leitmotiv of his crisis theology. At the root of this was the forceful 
revindication of objectivity for theological understanding which he found in 
S0ren Kierkergaard’s axiom of ‘Infinite qualitative distinction between time 
and eternity’ as it gave expression to what he understood of the scriptural
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depiction of the relationship between God and us. This is what he expresses 
in his commentaiy on the Epistle to the Romans,
‘God stands over and against man and everything 
human in an infinite qualitative distinction and is 
never identical with anything we name, experience, 
conceive or worship as God’??
In fact, the recognition of this reality for Barth gave direction to the first 
task of theology, and for him, this was to begin with the recognition of the 
truth of God as God which entails the fact that he can only be known of 
himself. And the thrust of objective revelation was not a matter of 
expressing the objective reality of God in himself, but what he found well 
depicted in the dialectical methodology derived from Kierkegaard. For as 
alluded above, therein was the truth of God as God - beyond the finite realm 
and therefore distinct from man - and yet, having revealed himself within
i t . 7 8
This, for Barth, was in itself a reversal of the subjective framework, as it 
begins with ‘the realization that makes it possible for us to know the One by 
whom we are already k n o w n . ' 7 9  And this lay at the root of his polemic 
against any thought which takes its starting point in the certitudes and 
interests of the consciousness of the human subject as he found in 
rationalism - especially Descartes' proof of God from the Idea of God in 
Man, and in Schleiermacher and R it s c h l .^ O  Indeed, a similar approach is 
what led to his rejection of natural theology in the working of his theology. 
For as is best demonstrated in his famous “No” to Emil Brunner, the logical 
consequence of the need to work out a connection between the definite
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revelation and the common concerns of natural theology such as the 
understanding of man as made in the Image of God, albeit fallen, the 
Universe as God’s creation, the ordering of society through such institutions 
as the family and the state which were traditionally seen as divine, and the 
natural order as held through God’s preserving providence irrespective of the 
fall, as Brunner argued, was for him nothing short of not only having two 
sources and norms for the Christian faith, but would simply mean that those 
things falling under it (natural theology) will have their own reveladonal 
quality.8 ^  This for Barth was no different from embracing once again the
tendencies that had been found to enslave the nineteenth century liberalism.
Worth noting here, however, is that what was more significant in Barth’s 
re-assertion of objective revelation is his realization of the imperative demand 
therein for a particular understanding of the theological task. For as 
Bromiley points out, the fact that he understood revelation to be tied to the 
category of the word meant that at issue was the larger conception of 
theology itself and its method in no other terms, but from the perspective of it 
being the ‘theology of the Word of God.’82 in fact, it is this particular 
conception which serves as a unifying point between his earlier stance which 
was very much dominated by his polemics against the question of human 
subjectivity and the latter approach which exemplified his concern for the 
concretization of the objective. Even so, the constant emphasis of God as the 
subject and man as the object remains. As David Ford points out, Karl 
Barth’s treatment of the knowledge of God in his Church dogmatics serve to 
highlight this truth, for therein he defines God as the subject of the biblical 
history, and therefore the methodological clue to our theological task.83 In
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his own words,
‘God is the one whose being can be investigated 
only in the form of a continuous question as to
h i s  a c t i o n . ’8 4
This was not only expressive of his affirmation of the distinctiveness of 
the definite revelation in a consistent rejection of natural theology, but as 
David Ford further points out, it formed the basis of his conception of the 
freedom of God. For to him, God’s choice to restrict himself to the one 
definite revelation demonstrated the reality of his independence from 
anything else apart from that which he has done and d o e s . 8 5
However, one other aspect that was decisive for Barth was framework of 
faith which he understood as defining the very character of theology. As he 
demonstrated in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, the basic 
thrust was that the way of faith was in fact the reversal of the concerns of the 
enlightenment as far as the basis of faith’s rationality was concerned. And 
this stance was given impetus by the insight he drew from his study of 
Anselm where it became clear to him that the assertions of faith have their 
own internal coherence as the basis of understanding its truth is not from 
without but within its own p r e m i s e s . 8 6  As Eberhard Jungel expresses, the 
decisive insight from Anselm bears this truth which goes to Augustine, that,
‘Intelligence comes about by reflection on the 
credo that has already been spoken and
a f f i r m e d . ’ 8 7
And so the question for the theologian is ‘to what extent is reality as the 
Christian believes it to b e ’? 8 8  In other words, the task is that of considering
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the factuality of Christian truth alongside the demonstration of its inner 
n e c e s s i t y . ' ^  And so, at issue, therefore, is not ‘the coherence of a freely- 
invented conceptual system, since the whole which thus obtains is a single 
witness to an event outside itself, an event which demands exactly this 
witness as its cognition. *90
This summary point which embraces his entire church dogmatics 
demonstrates the seriousness with which Barth took Anselm’s contentment 
in relying upon the self-vindication of the object of theology, i.e., on God’s 
free grace, and only the wish to prove it on its own terms. In fact, this, as 
has been pointed out, became the key which shaped his new theological 
method. For therein in Anselm’s theological scheme was ‘the subordination 
of the subjective to the objective, rationality (which has an original though 
not exclusive affinity with the subjective) to necessity (which has an original 
though not exclusive affinity with the objective.)’^ *
In other words, here was the demonstration of the way of faith in its 
negation of the Cartesian practice of setting prior considerations such as to 
what or whether God can be! On the contrary, its starting point is one of 
acknowledgement or rather ‘recognition (cf. his distinguishing of 
4Erkenntnis' - knowledge from ‘Anerkenn ung’) of the reality of the 
revelation event exemplifying the fact that 'God presents us with Himself as 
an accomplished fact, as a reality which does not submit to the confirmation 
of our sense of possibility, but actually contradicts it.’92 The way of faith 
was not, for him, irrationality, but was a faith seeking understanding 
operating dynamically within the given.
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It has to be said though that the basic thrust well expressed above, of the 
reality of God’s revelation and its implication for the theological task, was 
not to be understood as if it remains on a superficial level in terms of its 
concrete relation, as far as Barth was concerned. And an illustration of his 
thinking emerges quite clearly in a lecture he gave to Swiss Reformed 
Ministers in 1956, where he called for a change of approach from the early 
stance, whose emphasis on the ‘Otherness of God’ may have suggested an 
abstractionist conception of revelation. In the given paper he stated,
‘But did it not appear to escape us by quite a distance 
that the deity of the Living God (- and we certainly 
wanted to deal with him -) found its meaning and its 
power only in the context of His history and of His 
dialogue with man and thus in his togetherness 
with man? Indeed (- and this is the point back of 
which we cannot go -) It is a matter of God's sovereign 
togetherness with man, a togetherness grounded in 
Him and determined, delimited, and ordered through
Him alone  Who God is and what He is in His deity.
He proves and reveals not in a vacuum as a divine being - 
for - Himself, but precisely and authentically in the 
fact that He exists, speaks, and acts as the partner of
man, though of course as superior partner  In
this and only in this form was - and still is - our view 
of the deity of God to be set in opposition to that earlier 
theology. *93
Theology’s witness to God's revelation then could not be otherwise than 
in relation to its concrete manifestation in the incarnation event. In fact, his 
rejection of analogia entis of Roman Catholic theology in preference of 
Analogia fidei centres on this conception of revelation. For to him, the 
former was in reality man’s presumption of a given commonality between 
himself and God which falls under the “No” of his earlier theme of the 
“Otherness of God”. But the reality of the latter was in fact the realization of
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the sheer miracle of God’s “Yes” - that free and loving initiative and 
movement towards us displayed in the said e v e n t . 9 4  And so, he re-asserts 
the very character of faith which does not rest on itself nor on what can be 
seen as an extension of itself, but on what is quite other than itself. 95 
Moreover, the freedom of God in the said 'Yes' is re-affirmed as is best 
summarised in his discussion of analogy when he stated,
‘All kinds of things might be analogous of God, 
if God had not and did not make a very definite 
delimited use of his omnipotence in his 
revelations. *96
This is to say that Karl Barth's whole theology was therefore 
Christologically conditioned as he unfolded every aspect of the Christian 
faith in the light of Jesus Christ. And as it has been pointed out, this was not 
only true for the doctrine of God, but the very pressing concern with the 
question of human existence or indeed the interpretation of empirical history.
The basic thrust is in Barth’s location of Christology in the context of 
God’s lordship stretching from eternity to eternity. This meant that Jesus 
was not only ground and goal of creation, but indeed the only clue to 
anthropology. Consequently, our understanding of man is not derived from 
some generally reconstructed anthropological models or the embracing of 
some archetypal lineage of fallen Adam,, as Jesus Christ was the only 
prototype of humanity.97 The same is true for our treatment of the question 
of revelation and the meaning of history. For the fact that he sets the history 
of Jesus Christ within the said context of God’s lordship of God, from 
eternity to eternity, i.e., understanding of it as an event encompassing and
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embracing the entire history of God and man is in itself a contradiction of the 
subjective conception common to Liberal theology. In other words, it 
cannot be understood as the progressive overcoming of evil and the gradual 
building of the Kingdom of God. But on the contrary, as James C. 
Livingston, states,
‘History (for Barth) like nature, is a veil hiding the 
purposes of God. Only in faith can man discern any 
meaning to history and that meaning lies not in 
history itself but beyond history, in revelation.
History is the stage where the drama of the struggle 
between the temporal and the eternal is played out 
and where man faces the ever-present eschatological
“crisis” of faith.’98
This is to say, therefore, that events in history cannot be understood in 
and of themselves, but from the context of the purposes of God, made plain 
in Jesus Christ.
By way of summary, then, we can say that although the initial stance was 
coloured more by his polemics against the preceding trend of theology, his 
latter trinitarian based approach bears the unfolding of the objective in a real 
historic event. The decisive continuity though remains in that the “Christ 
event” exemplifies the eternity of God in His triune being (Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit) breaking into time and history of human existence. This is what 
we find in his description of the incarnation event,
‘God becomes temporal without ceasing to be 
eternal. His call to man in Jesus Christ is a 
genuine, concrete, historical event in time.’99
And this underlines that, even though God remains distinct from the 
world as transcendent God, He affirms it, thereby exemplifying the reality of
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the truth that in all His absoluteness, He is free love, entering into fellowship 
with His own, claiming man as His Partner and Friend. Hence, Andre 
Dumas’ observation that this for Barth demonstrated that God’s objective 
reality stands as much for his Otherness as for his Communicability.100
It has to be said though that what emerges from the foregoing is that the 
thrust of his Christology remains on a superficial contact with human 
history. It is in McGrath that this concern Finds its true expression, as he
says,
'Barth’s concept of the divine freedom in revelation 
necessitates that the ensuing revelation merely recapitulates 
its eternal antecedents. The incarnation, death and 
resurrection of Christ merely declare what has already 
happened eternally. These events, so central to Christian 
theology as a whole (and two of which are unquestionably 
central to the New Testament Kenygma) are thus minimized 
in their significance, in that the emphasis is seen to have 
shifted from God's revelation in time to the eternal 
antecedent of that r e v e la t i o n .  101
The consequent result of the above is reflected in the treatment of the 
whole question of the relationship between theology and philosophy and 
between revelation and the secular history. For as Livingston points out, 
'Barth and those who have followed his direction’s conception of man’s 
knowledge of God in terms of what can be called ‘radical divine actualism 
bears the exemplification of man as passive receptor of God's 
r e v e l a t i o n . ’ 102 jt js questionable how such a notion can be upheld when 
concrete realization is advocated in the understanding of revelation as having 
been mediated to man by finite, human means. The same can be said of the 
concerns of hermeneutics, for whereas his invocation of the Spirit as 
sufficient explanation of how the event of the incarnation becomes a present
39
reality in the life of the Church, it has to be acknowledged that whereas this 
can be the case within a context of faith, there remains the wider concern of 
how to take seriously the role of the human thought in the task of 
discriminative judgement on issues before it.
The foregoing, therefore, demonstrates the validity of the criticism that 
what we have here is the shortcoming of a fully worked out system of 
understanding of the whole of reality where the man to whom all is directed 
is ignored or treated as passive recipient. 103
It was Rudolf Bultmann, though, whose stress on the understanding of 
revelation in relation to human existence set out a contrasting position from 
that of Karl Barth. Born only two years apart, his background was in no 
way dissimilar, as he also was nurtured within the tradition of nineteenth 
century liberalism. In fact, there are striking similarities between the two in 
spite of their differences which actually became sharper in later years. 
Leading among these is their common rejection of the positivistic character of 
their Liberal heritage in the aftermath of the First World War as they teamed 
up in the new movement of dialectic t h e o l o g y .  * 04 Noticeable also is their 
common assertion of the distinctiveness of the Christian faith and its 
theological articulation in that its subject is God and not man - whose 
existence is only adequately addressed in relation to God. Hence, their joint 
affirmation of God’s revelation event in Jesus Christ as the decisive and 
foundational framework from which our knowledge and speaking about God 
is derived. It is also worth mentioning that in the area of Christology, they 
both recognised that one could not be content with the question of Jesus
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Christ according to the “flesh” (in his humanity) if one had to be true to the 
Christian proclamation, but the whole aspect of Jesus Christ as the God- 
m anJ^
However, it is in their differences that we have the parting of ways that 
came to characterise modern theology - the milieu of Otto W eber’s 
theological formation.
It has well been pointed out that what came to play a significant role in the 
contrasting position of Barth and Bultmann was already evident in the early 
years of their association. For whereas both appreciated the input of 
historical critical scholarship (Barth with reservation) there was already a 
growing uneasiness in Barth over Bultmann’s preoccupation with the 
clarification of the theological language and the philosophical categories 
underlying them. Of particular concern to the former was the latter’s 
readiness to embrace and apply the said philosophical categories as useful 
tools for theology.
The borderlines, however, became clear as Bultmann showed an 
increasing inclination toward the existentialist philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger. For whereas Barth was shunning existentialist influence as 
reminiscent of the Liberal age, Bultmann’s contention was not only that 
philosophy generally had a given role in the working of theology, but as we 
stated above, he employed the ‘concepts of this particular existentialist 
philosophy arguing that they provided decisive insights for theology and 
especially the interpretation of the New Testament.’ *06
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A noticeable exemplification of this orientation already emerged in 1925 
with the publication of his essay entitled, ‘What does it mean to speak of 
God?’ For therein he demonstrates his understanding of the dominant theme 
of the ‘Otherness of God’ which was central to dialectic theology in a way 
that it did represent man’s being determined from beyond himself, which did 
really mean being determined by this encounter from beyond - which the 
revelation event exemplifies. 107
This is to say that whereas here was the recognition of the reality of God 
as God distinct from man, and his religiousity or the created order in general, 
he rejected any talk of a ‘wholly other’ God which is construed in a
metaphysical or speculative m anner ; i.e. signifying God’s removal
from the world or locating him in some realm of being distant from the reality 
in which we move and have our being.108 For to him, what we have in 
the revelation event is quite the contrary of such an inclination. For it 
exhibits our encounter with God precisely as that determination of our reality 
which we cannot escape. In fact, this was the root of his polemic against the 
kind of thinking dominant in Liberal theology where man’s thought and act 
was represented as if it constituted the determining centre of reality. *09
The basic point for him then was that when one speaks of God’s 
transcendence in the reality of the event of Jesus Christ, it is not speaking of 
his remoteness in space, but of the fact that he is not at man’s disposal. HO 
This understanding of the revelation event as spoken of in Christian faith is 
hereby well put by Schmithals:
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‘The Christian faith speaks of a revelation which it 
understands to mean God’s act as an event which is 
not visible to the objectivizing thought of reason, 
an event which as revelation does not communicate 
doctrines, but concerns the existence of man and 
teaches him, or better, authorizes him, to understand 
himself as sustained by the transcendent power of 
God.’11!
His understanding of the Christian proclamation as focused on man and 
the reality of his existence in relation to God was, therefore, the underlying 
reason of his shift to the emphasis of human existence. And it was clear to 
him that this line of thought which emanates from the revelation event was in 
reality not only speaking about man but was at the same time our speaking 
about God, and vice versa. 112 Giving expression to this stance, as it has 
been pointed out, was the theory of history and human existence which he
wKtcK vvcvi
drew from Wilhelm Herrmann’s proto-existentialist theology and>given 
perfection by his discussions with Martin H e i d e g g e r . H ^
Since the focus here was not on man per se but in relation to God, faith 
which the revelation event evokes became the primary point of emphasis 
rather than what is revealed. And although he was in agreement with Barth 
on the understanding of faith, his differing viewpoint emerges quite clearly 
as he employs Heidegger’s categories to give expression to what he 
understood of it in contrast to unbelief. Illustrative of this is his embrace of 
the authentic and inauthentic concepts drawn fromvexistentialist philosophy 
of Heidegger. Here, he found the latter to give a vivid demonstration of the 
problem of the undue emphasis on human subjectivity in liberal theology as 
Heidegger’s description of this was that ‘it arises from man’s absorption in
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his concern with the world, in a way of being which is directed towards the 
world, dehumanized, and ultimately based upon misunderstanding and
delusion.’* 14
Even so, the former depicted a state of man that was positive in asserting 
that it enables him to have free openness for the future, Bultmann understood 
this as insufficient and only serving to:
‘bring home to us this awful reality of this fact by 
saying that for it, i.e., for philosophical analysis - 
each man’s particular future can in the last resort 
be defined as “nothingness” and that it can under­
stand freedom for the future solely as “the readiness 
for dread” (Angstbereitschaft), which man has to 
accept by an act of resolve.* * *5
Hence, his remark that if faith is simply this readiness for dread, it is still 
so in the face of the divine saving act. In other words, faith knows that God 
encounters us at the very point where the human prospect is nothingness and 
only at that point. In this respect, he follows Heidegger in the description of 
this structure of existence, which is not dissimilar from that of faith, for in 
both there is a recognition that to live from the future means to be open for 
whatever the future brings .... i.e. the recognition of life as not determined 
by a self-chosen aim, to which all man’s energies and hopes are bent
 The faith .... that the future will bring him his true self, which he can
never capture by his own self-appointed courses. 116
But his prescription here differs from Heidegger in that for him, Christian 
faith rests on the knowledge that its freedom and true authenticity is a gift of 
grace from God and therefore is freed for such a future in that assurance and 
that alone. **7
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Since it is in the New Testament Kerygma that we have that one address 
of God to man, bearing the one depiction of the true nature of man and the 
reality of the one source of his authenticity, and the assurance of freedom 
derived of God in the said given authenticity, the dominant question which 
was central to his ‘New Testament and Mythology* then was ‘how do we 
interpret the “event” the New Testament speaks about as one through which 
God has brought man's Salvation?’ 1 ^
It is clear then that the emphasis shifted the context of reflection to that of 
hermeneutics - which was an area that concerned him more than Karl Barth 
whose innovation of the Spirit as sufficient explanation set the limit. And as 
it has been observed, it is this concern and the different set of issues raised 
therein that sharpened his contrasting stance from Barth and Brunner .
Giving impetus to his approach was his preoccupation with historical 
critical scholarship, which had brought about the general understanding of 
New Testament scholarship, that one could not deal with the central message 
of a text without bearing in mind the influence of the point of view and style 
of the author. This was the recognition that the author was also immersed in
the context and historical process of his time - leading to the description of
/
the New Testament writing as clothed in mythical language which needed 
elimination in order to identify the essential matter of its message. * *9
For Bultmann, the task was not one of seeking to eliminate outmoded or 
false myths from the New Testament, but one of interpreting and 
understanding the self-understanding they express. For he understood the
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real purpose of myth as not presenting an objective picture of the world as it 
is, but to express man’s understanding of himself in the world in which he 
was. Furthermore, he saw myth as an expression of man’s conviction that 
the origin and purpose of the world in which he lives are to be sought not 
within it but beyond it - that is, beyond the realm of known and tangible 
reality - and that this realm is perpetually dominated and menaced by those
mysterious powers which are its source and limit  And so it is an
expression of man’s awareness that he is not Lord of his own being.*20 in 
this respect, what is at issue is not the mythical language or the imagery but 
the understanding of existence that the myth enshrines - questioning whether 
that representation is true. *
Demythologization as an hermeneutic tool for him, then, was to serve no 
other purpose, other than the interpretation of myth such that it was 
understated and made comprehensible in contemporary setting, and thus, 
enabling adequate evaluation of that which it conveys.
As far as Bultmann was concerned, such an undertaking was not a new 
invention of modern period, but a method he understood as present in the 
New Testament itself.
In fact, James Livingston illustrates fittingly how Bultmann sees in Paul 
and John a clear exemplification of d e m y t h o l o g i z a t i o n .  122 por whereas the 
two ‘still expected the end of the world as a cosmic drama, the appearing of 
Christ on the clouds of heaven, the resurrection from the dea& , and the final 
judgement, their grasping of the existential significance of the eschatological
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imagery was such that 'in that existential reality of Jesus’ resurrection, the 
said decisive event had already happened.’ 123 jh is  was in itself a proper 
justification of demythologization as a methodology. But at the same time, 
it served to underline his view that the givenness of mythical language in 
scripture and the validity of the interpretation process in such existential 
nature implied the admission of a move that presupposes some pre- 
understanding of the text - a point of sharp contrast with Barth and those of
h i s  i n c l i n a t i o n .  1 2 4
This meant that the issue of hermeneutics was not whether one comes to 
the text with pre-conceived ideas, but what are the right presuppositions. 
Consequently, it affirmed what we already stated earlier on that the central 
concern in the entire enterprise was the identification of the real question in 
New Testament Kerygma; what is man? Unlike Barth's emphasis that the 
real question of the Bible is the self-revelation of God and not man, 
Bultmann, following Heidegger, saw the emphasis on the former stating, 
‘...Man searches for God .... because he also searches for himself.’ 125 
And this underlined his subjective preference.
The whole Bultmannian thought is, therefore, a combination of 
I leidegger’s analysis of the human being and the transcendental method 
derived from Immanuel Kant, where the recognition of the impossibility of 
speaking about God led to the de-objectifying of him (God) by beginning 
with humankind and his constitutive experiences before addressing oneself to 
transcendental questions.
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This is true for his conception of revelation and the general view of 
history in the light of the New Testament. The former focuses on the 
possibilities in human existence making it possible, while the latter is best 
summed up in the adopted distinctions from Martin Kohler between 
*liistorie ’ and 'Geschichte ' . For therein, as it has been observed, his 
understanding of the New Testament is well rendered in this statement:
‘Rightly interpreted, the New Testament is not 
primarily 'Historic' - in terms of an objective, 
impersonal, factual account of past events.
Rather it is concerned centrally with history in 
the sense of ‘Geschichte’, the meaning, signif­
icance, or intentionality of events for the 
persons who encounter them. In speaking of 
the incarnation, Christian faith presupposes 
certain objectively historical occurrences, but 
overwhelmingly it focuses attention on the 
person or existentially historical event in 
which the human individual is addressed by 
God and confronted with the demand to turn 
from unauthentic to authentic e x i s t e n c e . ’^ 6
This depiction of Bultmann’s line of thought as regards the question of 
the meaning of history is analysed even further by Robert Morgan as being 
the basis of his representation from his work which shows a lack of 
religious interest in the social, historical world - but on the personal, inner, 
existential history, which is said to be the locus of faith, genuine religion 
and the meaning of humanity J27
The logical result then is that here was a drawing of a distinction between 
history and Christian theology, between facts and meanings and indeed 
between God and what happens in the world and time. 128 And this is very 
well reflected in his Christology where he draws a distinction between the 
historical person of Jesus and the Preached Christ, to such an extent that the
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significance focussed on the latter seemed to be divorced from the former. 
Hence the question that served to evaluate his entire orientation,
‘Does the adoption of existentialist presuppositions 
permit the New Testament to speak to us on its own 
terms or does it change the character of the
biblical message by recasting it in a foreign mold?’ 129
This summarising point does not in any way imply that Bultmann is 
understood to have taken Heidegger’s existentialism wholesale, but his 
embrace of it as a prerequisite for the understanding of the gospel is in some 
way similar tonuneteenth century liberalism he was striving to negate.
The question of his emphasis on human existence cannot escape the 
criticism that what we have in the thrust of his approach is nothing but an 
exposure to the risky business of describing nothing but that human 
approach to a kind of understanding and decision which is beyond our reach. 
Hence the charge that his Christology is in actual fact an exemplification of 
an anthropological foundation which he and his colleagues in dialectic 
theology had sought to correct. On this, Otto Weber's observation 
summarises the point when he says that what we have in Bultmann is a 
situation of one remaining a prisoner to a philosophical system which he had 
sought as a facility or aid to his theological u n d e r t a k i n g .  130
Having analysed these two positions, which are in many ways, 
expressive of the theological milieu in which Otto Weber had his formation, 
it is clear that the two basic concerns over-riding the two positions served to 
sharpen his dialogic vision. For he recognised in his methodology the thrust
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of Barth's position irrespective of its shortcomings as an affirmation of the 
Sovereignty and Lordship of God in relation to his creation and to man in 
particular. And thus, his understanding of the revelation event was that it 
exemplified the reality of God and his freedom in relation to us, judging our 
closedness in the encounter and declaring his claims over us as God and 
Creator. And this is reflected in his embrace of Barth’s understanding of our 
knowledge of God as a response to God's activity rather than a noetic 
reception of something.
Indeed, his understanding of theological activity is that of a faith seeking
understanding, which in operating within the context of faith, exemplifies
131nothing short of a fellowship between the individual and his God- And 
thus, he rejected any notion of speaking about God as though he were an 
object in the world.
But in stressing this insight, he recognised the dominant concern in 
Bultmann’s position in spite of its subjective emphasis as stating the fact of 
the concreteness of the revelation event in its salvific reality. And this in 
itself was a rejection of the tendency in Barth to leave an impression of a 
passive relation of the “above” with the “below” - which is absent in the 
reality of Jesus Christ as the God-Man.
This is to say that his understanding of the revelation event was not as if it 
was a kind of an extra-dimensional component, but was an historical reality 
with a vertical as well as an horizontal dimension. And this is what emerges 
quite clearly in his methodology where he rejects both the objective and
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subjective^ opting for a correlation of both.
However, his treatment of the whole question of human existence was 
more akin to Barth’s position as he saw in the God-man, Jesus Christ, the 
only exemplification of what has to be understood of human existence - 
being none other than man before God and his claims over him. This is the 
basis of his assertion, that it was when this is recognised that any anxiety 
about self-understanding is removed as the event of Jesus Christ offered 
the freedom for it. For he understood the talk of God in theology as 
entailing unavoidably our speaking about God’s claims over us, which 
concern not our existence in itself, but always in relation to God and his 
claims over u s .  132 This for him, was the only basis of breaking the 
egocentricism that had dominated liberal theology, and the re-statement of 
this truth which was central to the New Testament.
Indeed, this is what permeates his view on the question of hermeneutics.
For whereas he acknowledges the inevitable presence of some pre- 
understanding in any approach to the text as stated by Bultmann, his 
dominant concern is the primacy of the biblical witness. And this is well 
expressed in the questions he raises in relation to Bultmann’s position. For 
since he sees in Bultmann a movement toward confession rather than from it, 
he asks ‘but can one move toward it without in fact coming from it? Can one 
describe the human understanding of the biblical writings on the basis of 
general hermeneutical categories, without already knowing that man will be 
drawn into a decision in regard to this witness, a decision which cannot be 
derived from general categories? And is not that decision-relatedness based
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on what the biblical scriptures are testifying to?’ 133 jn this respect, he sees 
the binding criterion of hermeneutics as being the bible itself as God’s Word.
Consequently the whole question of the meaning of history in the light of 
the revelation event could not be treated distinctively. For like Barth, he did 
not view Christ’s event as a calculable component of history or development, 
but as an event enacted in history in which God distinguishes his history 
from other history and qualifies i t T h e  basic thrust then is not one of 
giving meaning to history but realising in the event of Jesus Christ ‘that we 
are not to understand God’s will as a general governance of history toward a 
general good end, but as the powerful arrangement of all events toward the 
one event in the midst of history .... an event in which God takes mercy of 
man - the reality of his “being” for u s . ’135 For in this act is the contradiction 
of the worldly, the evil, the dehumanization. In it is the “Child of the light” 
and “of day” amidst the encroaching night, (cf. Rom. 13:12, IThess. 
5.5.).136
The thrust of Weber’s dialogic approach then is anchored in his 
understanding of theology as never an end in itself, but one existing within 
the context of the whole Ministry of the Church to scrutinise, purify and 
reform its preaching and teaching - which it can only do as a ‘faith seeking 
understanding enterprise’. This insight is a big challenge to all forms of 
theological undertaking in every generation, for the basic question remains as 
to how true it lives up to this task. The African scene in particular has to 
come to terms with this if it has to move beyond the simple reaction to 
Western theology.
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But this leaves us with the question as to what was the underlying thrust 
of his Anthropology which permeated his approach? And it is to this that we 
now turn after a brief biographical sketch.
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CHAPTER TWO 
A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ON OTTO WEBER
As already indicated in Chapter One, Otto Weber was bom on 4th 
June 1902 - being the eldest son in a family of six at Mtihlhein in Kdln. His 
upbringing was that of a strict Christian family as his parents were devout 
members of the Free Reformed Congregation at Hessen. The distinctive 
characteristic of this setting was Pietistic and Conservative. Indeed, by the 
age of 17/18, he was already a member of the pupils Bible study group 
(Schulerbibelkreis) through which he first exemplifies his pedagogic gifts as 
his leadership was soon acknowledged in the group.
Although his initial interest was in law, after passing his highers in 
February 1921, Otto Weber decided to undertake theology which he began 
in October 1921 at the University of Bonn. One semester of his second year 
studies was spent at TUbingen University, where he studied under Karl 
Heine and Adolf Schlatter, who as already indicated, did impress him with 
their Conservative and Pietistic orientation.
He returned to Bonn University in 1923 where he passed his first 
degree in 1925. As was the practice, he undertook parish assistantship as 
a curate at a Congregation at Herchen, where he worked especially among 
the sick, as well as teaching Religion and French at a ‘Padagoge’ (High 
School) where he demonstrated his enthusiasm in teaching. In 1927 he 
passed his second and final degree, specializing in reformed dogmatics and 
liturgies. 1
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His formal teaching career began in 1928 when he was appointed 
Tutor at the Reformed Theological College at Elberfeld, where he taught 
courses in Greek, Hebrew, Old Testament and Christian doctrine, focusing 
especially on Calvin. It was not long before his administrative skills were 
acknowledged, leading to his appointment as the Principal of the said 
College in 1930. From the testimony of Professor Smendt at Gottingen 
University, these were the great years of Otto Weber, as he undertook his 
work with enthusiasm, exemplifying a character of a man with great 
potential in the teaching ministry and as a theologian.
It has to be said though, that this marked the beginning of a period 
of great challenges in his life, as events in the political life of the German 
nation were soon to bring about wide ranging implications for the Church 
and its relation to the state. For the years of decay and dejection which were 
associated with the Weimar Republic came to naught in the ensuing rise of 
National Socialism, leading to the Third Reich's assumption of power in 
1933. For the Church, the rejuvenation of national life through such 
attacks against Godless Marxism, materialism and decaying moral standards 
by National Socialists was in itself an opening for revival and spiritual 
reawakening. Hence the enthusiastic support that this brought, especially 
among those of Conservative persuasion within the Church. And as we 
indicated in Chapter one, the events were seen by many, especially within 
the said orientation, as serving a Christian stance. And Otto Weber was no 
exception. In fact, by 1933 he had become a member of the National 
Socialist Party (NSDAP) and also the National Socialist Teachers 
Association (the “NS-Lehrerbund”). By May of the same year, he had 
joined the German Christians who came to establish themselves as the 
leading exponents of Nazi Ideology within the Church.^
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The ecumenical attempts aimed at the Creation of a National 
Church, led to a tripartite ministry in Berlin, with representation from the 
Lutheran, the Reformed and other Evangelical Churches under the auspices 
of Reich’s bishop Ludwig Muller. For Otto Weber, the Church was so 
rigid, and was in need of spiritual rejuvenation and a new sense of 
authoritative direction amidst the rising challenges. And although he initially 
debated the suitability of joining the said tripartite ministry ?  he accepted the 
invitation to represent the Reformed Church, having the conviction that here 
was the possibility of a positive contribution to the concerns facing the 
Church then.
In fact, it was while he undertook this responsibility that he was 
promoted from the Reichsbishopric of Ludwig MUller to be the Minister of 
the Reformed Church in the Spiritual Ministry (Geistlichen Ministerium) of 
the German Protestant Church (DEK) in September, 1933.
However, this new responsibility did not last long, as the German 
Christians' theological inclination toward the Nazi regime proved a trying 
one, culminating in the extremist speech by Reinhold Krause in November 
at the Berlin Sports Arena, where he exhibited a clear-cut inclination to the 
Nazi cause, with his theme of ‘The Popular Mission of Luther’.^ In fact it 
was after this speech that Weber quit the membership of the German 
Christian's, and also resigned his position at the Spiritual Ministry, and only 
accepting to stay on as a reformed representative after persuasion from 
Bishop Mfiller. But even this came to an end, when he finally resigned in 
December 22nd after the Christian Youth Associations were made part of fcc 
Hitler Youth.
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And it was only with reluctance that he accepted the request from 
Muller to take over the role of the Commissarial Administrator for the 
Reformed Church in the Spiritual Ministry of 4th January, 1934.5
A sigh of relief*, however, came in June 26th when he (Otto 
Weber) was appointed to the Chair of Reformed Theology as Professor at 
the University of Gottingen, where he succeeded Karl Barth who by now 
had moved to the University of Bonn - and whose position even then had 
become untenable due to the political pressure of the Nazi regimeA Indeed 
his life was from now on settled into the Gottingen community where he 
married in the summer of the same year and only had outings especially 
during his vocations, and especially to his Rheinland home. And it was 
during this time that he became a member of the National Socialists 
Lecturers' Association.
In October 1936 he teamed up with Friedrich Gogarten in becoming 
members of the Theological Chamber of the ‘Reichskirchenauschusses* 
whose concern was the integration of ethical (social ethics especially) 
concerns in theology.?
Otto Weber wrote his doctoral thesis in 1938 on the Biblical 
Knowledge of the Old Testament, under the supervision of Emmanuel 
Hirsch and Martin Gehardt, which he passed on 7th June, of that year after 
an oral examination on Calvin under Friedrich Gogarten and Emmanuel 
Hirsch.
*Expression from Mrs Weber - interviewed on 12/7/88
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From 1939 to 1945, Otto Weber was the Dean of the Faculty of
Divinity at the University of Gottingen except for a short time in which he
served as chaplain in the army during the war in a post he took over from
Emmanuel Hirsch with the backing not only by those aligned to the
Government of the day, but also by the Confessing Church. 1940 to 45
r
also saw him in the membership of the spiritual 'Vert;kuensrat' of the 
German Evangelical Church.
1950-51 and also 1957-58, saw him once again serving as Dean of 
Divinity Faculty in the University of Gottingen, where he subsequently was 
appointed as Chancellor of the University in 1958/59. In 1960 he was 
awarded honorary doctorate of divinity by the University of Edinburgh, 
especially in recognition of his contribution as a Reformed theologian.
From 1962-66 he undertook the chairmanship of the Foundation 
Committee, overseeing the founding of the University of Bremen, where he 
served as First Chancellor on the appointment of the Senate from 1964 to 
1966. At this time he also was Vice Chairman of the Board of Curators of 
the 'Stiftung Volkswagenwerk'.
He died of heart attack in 1966 while on holiday in Switzerland.
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CHAPTER THREE
OTTO WEBER’S BACKGROUND ANTHROPOLOGY:
THE PERMEATING FACTOR IN HIS APPROACH
It is clear from Chapter One that what emerged out of the new 
direction of theology as a dominant theme in relation to the above question 
was that man is who he is before God. This assertion in the light of the 
theological task meant that here was a reassertion of the reformation dictum 
that the knowledge of God and that of ourselves are inseparable.*
For Otto Weber, this thesis formed the basis on which the subject of 
anthropology had to be dealt with in theology. And there were two-fold 
purposes for such a recognition; first was a corrective measure against an 
over-reaction from the egocentricism of the nineteenth century liberalism. 
For it was clear to him that the logical result of a narrow over-reaction would 
be the formulation of a theology that had to do only with God and not with 
man,
- with the creator and not the creature
- with eternity and not with time
- and with the 'absolute' which has no bearing on the relative.^
In other words, it will be a sheer misrepresentation of the God witnessed to 
in scripture as God who has to do with humanity.
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Secondly, it served to underline the whole embracing realisation that 
man is a theme of theology because God is the theme of theology. 3
But inasmuch as this has been stated, it is imperative that we spell out 
what is understood of man when it is spoken of as above.
Now, the starting point for Otto Weber is the recognition that the first 
and the last word of the Bible is not man - inasmuch as God of the Bible is
Vx.dO«5
not dependent on or is correlative to man. But^to state that the issue in the
tie. ¥•
Bible and in message of the church is really m a^  thus negate any 
theological tendency that envisages a kind of platonic or agnostic notion of 
God's relation to man which has no concrete bearing, as is expressed in the 
Incarnation.
It is obvious that whenever concerns of anthropology arise, there is 
the dominant thought that man has always and everywhere been the object of 
his own reflection .4 And this is well demonstrated in various disciplines, be 
it philosophy, science or art. The same is true in the formulation of various 
world views, where the central point is actually a working out of a pattern 
that exemplifies man's projection of himself upon the world.5
However, the thrust of theological anthropology is that what we have 
in the Christian proclamation and indeed ‘the message of Jesus Christ is not 
additional insights about God, the world, and not even additional insight 
about man himself or a modification of man's self-understanding,*^ but a
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complete ‘new foundation of his existence, the conversion of the whole 
direction of his ex is ten ce .T h is  clearly indicates that here is an invitation to 
a completely new view of man. For what is emphasized here is simply that 
‘man does not “exist” as a “being” in and of itself ‘apart from his 
relationship to God.*^ As Otto Weber states,
‘This knowledge is not the result of an analysis of 
man, of his existence or his self-understanding.
Rather, it is the other side of the message that God 
is the Creator, the Lord of this man. However, this 
message is not, in turn, just the communication of a 
doctrinal proposition - it is the proclamation by God 
himself in his dealing with man’9
In other words, the basis of our speaking of man as he who he is 
before God is because of the fact that God is God - for - the-creature. Indeed 
this for Weber is the qualifying factor of the linkage of the knowledge of 
God and that of ourselves in Christian theology. ^
Even so, he recognises the dangers existing in every anthropological 
undertaking that aims at working out what can be said to be the universally 
applicable representation of man even with the Christian qualification. For it 
is obvious, as Weber points out, that the idea of humanity one comes out 
with, is in fact merely the expression of the self-understanding of a specific 
man breaking into a concrete situation, be it the man of the late classical 
period or of the European Enlightenment or the twentieth century. In this 
regard, he argues in the light of the above that the only possible way is that 
of perceiving "the" man from the perspective of^opposite who is contrasted to 
every m an .^
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This, for Weber is not found anywhere else other than in what is 
expressed in Christian faith as the scriptural depiction of man. For therein is 
the distinction which does not derive its universal picture of man from any 
qualities which are inherent in all men, or because of the universality of sin, 
but from the Old Testament message that the God of Israel is the Creator of 
‘the’ man, and therein, He is the God who turns to all men in the anticipated
age of salvation. 13
Examples demonstrating this universalistic depiction of man are in the 
Yah wist Account of Creation in Genesis, where Israel's God is the creator of 
all men without any restrictions. The connection of faith in the creator and 
universalism is made most clearly in Deutero-Isaiah, even though it is already 
present in other prophetic books such as Amos. Indeed, the basic thrust of 
the New Testament is an exemplification of the Old Testament depictions as 
the father of Jesus Christ is none other than the God of Israel. 1^ And thus, 
Weber sees the continuity being in the fact that,
‘God's relationship to and attitude toward ‘the’ man does 
not become a self-evident generality in the new covenant; 
but is now revealed in its exclusiveness and concentration, 
for it is identical with God's activity in the one man Jesus 
Christ, toward whom Israel's history has been proceeding 
and in whom it ends as the history of Israel according to
the flesh*. 13
In fact, it is in the light of this that the primary concern when dealing 
with a theme such as the ‘Adam-Christ’ is not so much with the analogy, but 
only with the fact that we are dealing here with the idea that humanity is 
qualified not just by whatever characteristics it bears, but by the total
75
constitution which God has set in him. *6 And so to speak of humanity 
before God is to re-state, therefore, that which is exemplified in Christ’s 
event. For therein, the unity of mankind is rooted in the Unity of God as the 
Living, Triune Unity, in which God discloses himself to man.*?
But this stance has not been pursued by Weber at the expense of not 
addressing himself adequately to the dominant question of human self- 
understanding in relation to theological anthropology. On the contrary, he 
begins with the recognition that one cannot envisage a conception of an 
understanding of humanity that does not take the question of human self- 
understanding seriously without ending with some gnostic view which 
essentially suggest man's creaturely sphere to be alien to God. 18 At the 
same time, he takes note of the fact that what is spoken of is not a kind of a 
‘complementary* picture where the revelation event seems to affirm what is 
already there. For the constant assertion of the Christian message is that 
what takes place in Jesus Christ is a ‘total redefinition of the man who 
receives it.’19 in other words, ‘God's revelation in Jesus Christ (as the 
basis of theological anthropology) bears the ultimate questioning of man and 
simultaneously his only truly positive affirmation.’^
And this for him sets the basis on which the question had to be dealt 
with. Hence, his embrace of the New Testament concept of Metanoia  
(repentance, conversion) as the adequate medium in exemplifying the 
connection between the transformation of existence and that of our self- 
understanding. For he reckons in the concept something more than a change
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of ‘mind’ or ‘opinion’, especially when its old testament rooting in the 
concept of shub (to turn back, to turn around) refers not to the thinking, 
meditating, or reflecting, but to the direction and constitution of existence.^ 
And this for Weber was a clear indication that Christian anthropology 
essentially rests upon something other than a mere alteration of our 
understanding of our being and to that extent also represents something 
essentially different from the unfolding of such a process.22
Indeed this was at the root of his polemic against Emil Brunner's 
notion of “Continuity” between unbelieving or untransformed man and the 
transformed. For to him, the only basis of continuity, if any, is that which is 
understood in the light of “Christ-event” which in reality exemplifies a 
decisively changed concept of continuity than that which is thought of by 
B r u n n e r . 2 3  This is to say that even when a pneumatological basis is sought, 
the basic thrust of what emerges is demonstrative of what is understood of 
the person of Jesus Christ as God-man. The dynamic operation of the 
Spirit does not eliminate nor negate the given human factor, but enlists it for 
service in its reality. This is to say that the Christian message is not received 
in a kind of super-human status, but in the reality of human speech and
activity which is true of every creaturely reality. And according to Weber,
‘It becomes the reality which overcomes and transforms 
him (man) only in the incomprehensible and incalculable 
work of the Spirit of God. And where this happens, 
the self-understanding of man is not eliminated but 
penetrated, turned around, brought into a new direction 
and under a new L o r d s h i p . ’24
But the question remains as to what relationship there is between what is
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formulated as theological anthropology and the Christian experience!
What is clear from the above is that Weber sees in the
acknowledgement of a specific theological anthropology a negation of any
notion suggesting its basis being found in the natural man. But having said
this, it is clear that the question of Christian experience remains to be
addressed. The problem as pointed out is not new, nor are the attempts to
give it a significant role. Weber indeed points out that this goes to Calvin
who did ascribe a significant role to “experience”. But as is well known, it
was in Schleiermacher that an integrated system was formulated with his
25stress on the ‘self-consciousness*• And as far as Weber is concerned, the
dominant polemic against human experience being thought of as forming any 
basis for theological articulation does not erase the fact that there is the 
‘experience’ of being a Christian! As he puts it, ‘It does not mean that an 
‘it’ in us believes, nor the Holy Spirit in us believes, but faith is designated 
in the New Testament as the faith of this or that p e r s o n . ’26
The distinction that has to be drawn in Weber’s view, however, is that 
when we talk of the Christian view of man, it is not the analysis of the 
‘Christian’ person, nor is theological anthropology to be dependent upon 
Christian experience as its source and foundation.^? Decisive in the said 
stance is the view that what makes Christian experience is not within itself. 
For he understands what is at the heart of faith as the faithfulness of God
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which is, therefore, responded to rather than the other way around. And this 
no doubt expresses the reformed assertion of sola gratia. But what is more 
important for Weber is that we do not believe on the basis of our experience, 
but in spite of it. Hence, his recall of Luther’s dictum, ‘Our experience 
provides "opposition" to our f a i t h ' . 2 8  And it is in the light of this that he 
states:
‘this opposition, which certainly exists in Christian 
experience, can only be understood on the basis of 
the word addressed to us, as the opposition of our 
existence before God.’29
Furthermore, the reality of “being in Christ” as stated in the New 
Testament (Gal. 2 . 2 0 )  does not imply an account to a religious experience 
emergent out of the event, but the accent as far as Weber is concerned is 
upon the One who gives himself to the b e l i e v e r .  3 0  We see a similar point 
being made by Newlands, when he states:
‘....you cannot define the reality of the human person 
without taking into account the reality of God. The 
hope of man lies in the evidence that the openness 
we need is offered to us by and as the openness of the 
love of God.’31
In summary, therefore, it is clear for Weber that since the borderline 
character of Christian experience is in the reality of faith, this experience 
cannot be an independent object of reflection, and thus, is unattainable as the 
foundation for a theological anthropology. And it is on this basis that he 
follows Barth's stance in contrast to that of Bultmann or Paul T i l l i c h . 3 2  For 
as he states, “the reality which is the essence of the derived reality of faith as 
our faith is not transcendent or beyond in the metaphysical sense, but in the
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strictest sense it is ‘outside’ of ourself, that is, not derived from us, nor in 
us, but solely in the triune God himself, who is, however, our G o d . ” 3 3 .
Unlike Barth, whose emphasis minimises any role of man, Weber’s 
concern is to establish the primary starting point of reflection in God’s event 
and from this reality restate the dynamic expression that is best exemplified 
in the God-man, Jesus Christ.
Having said this, there is no doubt that he sees the initial task of any 
theological anthropology as reckoning with the reality of man’s 
creatureliness in relation to God. Secondly, there is the imperative factor of 
human sinfulness which in biblical language is exemplified by the constant 
state of alienation and conflict with the Creator. And it is on this basis that he 
revisits Barth’s Christologically based anthropology where man as a creature 
is not spoken of in an isolated way, but also as one who is a sinner. This is 
to say, ‘in Jesus Christ our creatureliness is revealed in such a way, that at 
the same time our sin is revealed through him as truly s i n *.34
Now, Weber understands this in two ways: first is the sense that in 
Jesus Christ our sin appears before God as what has been absolutely, 
powerfully, and effectively negated; and the second sense is that in Jesus 
Christ our sin is first recognized as what it is for us. And these two senses 
for him make up the core of the ‘theology of the cross’ in the light of which it 
becomes clear that only in ‘looking to the man Jesus’ can we fully appear as 
what we are before God, and thus in truth: creature and sinner, not in 
ambivalent polarity, but in a unity which we cannot intellectually dissolve
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but which God solves in this man J e s u s ’ .35 And this becomes even more 
plain in his treatment of Christology which is the focus of the next chapter.
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Any treatment of the subject of Christology cannot escape addressing 
itself to the fact that what is at issue is the teaching about Jesus which lies at 
the heart of the proclamation of the Christian faith and theology. The sense 
in which this centrality is understood is, therefore paramount, as it has 
bearing on the articulation of those issues which arise there ijBA which have 
always shaped the discussion of Christology itself. There is also the 
question of methodology and the basic concerns of the subject as dealt with 
in Otto Weber’s theological milieu and the wider context of Protestant 
theology in the post-second World War Period and their implications for 
contemporary approaches to Christology.
Besides the variety of ways in which Jesus Christ is understood in His 
centrality to the proclamation of the Christian faith and theology, Otto Weber 
highlights two that have always emerged as dominant in the development of 
Christian theology. These are: The depiction of Jesus Christ as the 
fundamental ‘idea’ to Christianity and indeed the very ‘principle’ through 
which Christian faith defines its utterance, - and the depiction of Jesus Christ 
as the One who has brought about the ‘turning-point’ in man's relationship to 
God or in the religious self-understanding of man.1 The former, according 
to Otto Weber, Finds its basic root in the view that only the ‘spiritual’ has the 
character of valid authority. It is clear to him that this kind of thinking is not 
new as it was already propounded by the exponents of docetism in the early 
Church.
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In fact the emphasis on unconditional prior positioning of the spiritual 
element over the historical by the spiritualists during the Reformation was in 
itself a revisit to this docetic type of thought even though their stand fell short 
of denying the historicity of Jesus Christ. The same is true for the well- 
known dictum of G.E.Lessing that, ‘Accidental truths of history can never 
become the proof of necessary truths of reason*.2 For besides the basic 
polemic directed against any reliance on historical conveyance of ‘truths of 
history’ from generation to generation (that is, directed against ‘historical 
criticisms’ - viewing of this as source of that which could be said to be 
valid), the essence of this statement advocates nothing other than the 
proposition that the spiritual alone is valid. 3 And this is what becomes even 
more explicit in J.G. Fichte when he states that the ‘metaphysical only, and 
not the historical can give blessedness; the latter can only give us 
understanding.’4 F.W. Schelling exemplifies the same along the lines of 
what was the initial proposition of the so-called speculative Christology. For 
his concept of the ‘incarnation of God’, interpreted as the ‘incarnation of 
eternity’ - a process culminating in Christ’s assumption of a visible human 
form (appearance as the opposite concept to idea) and being its beginning 
also because of this reason, - is in no way different with the understanding 
of the Christ-idea as the code, disguise, expression, or manifestation of the 
unity of the absolute, which is realizing itself in history, with the relative - 
i.e. the world and the human race A  Another demonstration is what was 
already exemplified in Immanual Kant's equation of the ‘Son of God’ with 
the ‘Ideal of humanity well pleasing to God.’^  And so is Friedrich Hegel 
as Weber points out in this statement, ‘But the history of Christ is a history 
for the spiritual community because it is absolutely adequate to the idea’, 
while the basic thought to be acknowledged in ‘God's ambassador’ who has
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preceded us is ‘only the effort of Spirit to reach the determination implied in 
the implicit unity of the divine and h u m a n .  *7
The inevitable consequence of this kind of thinking is what we find in 
David FiiedriclA Strausi*speculative Christology exemplified in his ‘Life of 
Jesus’ where he devalues completely the historical and the personal in Jesus 
Christ. And the same can be said of those who chose a middle way. For the 
essence of their approach bears the said inclination.
Weber acknowledges the datedness of speculative Christology and 
docetic thinking in contemporary theology. But his concern is directed 
against what he sees in this contemporary period as the re-emergence of 
similar inclinations if not a kind of thinking which lead to it. A notable 
example is what he sees as the dominant factor in historical critical research 
and aligned dogmatics' shifting of the ‘historicity* of Jesus into the center. 
For the fact that some of its leading exponents such as Wilhelm Herrmann 
has his understanding of history dominated by the idea of morality, and 
Martin Kahler's concept of ‘the suprahistorical’ being insecure from 
dissolving into an idea, raises the question as to whether the basis of their 
understanding the historicity of Jesus is not that of an idea?* Indeed this is 
what becomes critical when one directs this against trends in contemporary 
theology where radical historical scepticism is linked with theological 
personalism, itself influenced by existential philosophy. For according to 
Weber, what flourishes out of such a soil is a ‘Christocentricity* which in 
reality is nothing more than this Personalism in disguise.^ Hence his 
assertion that the logical end of such an approach as it relates to Jesus Christ, 
is that one is not dealing with a person but rather with the idea of a person, or 
with the original form of our own being as person, or even our own
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historicity. *0 And this for him is to deny the genuine ‘confrontation’ for us 
in Jesus Christ - either binding or loosing as we would instead be cast back 
on ourselves.
By way of summary then, the understanding of the centrality of Jesus 
Christ in terms of that which is spiritual and, therefore valid, leads to the 
‘Christ-ldea’ concept which is in itself a misrepresentation of the Christ- 
event. For as we have illustrated, it does not only lead to the denial of the 
historical and the Personal in Jesus, but ultimately leads to a mere act of 
self-confirmation and simultaneously man's self-exaltation. More so as the 
spiritual element called Christ is understood as corresponding to our own 
being Spirit or to our possession of spirit and thus, an act of self­
confirmation or exaltation which shuts itself completely from the one whose 
encounter and confrontation brings about decision and liberation. Without 
this reality, the very task and understanding of the centrality of Jesus Christ 
which Christology endeavours to exemplify is misrepresented. Hence, 
Weber's assertion that the centrality of Jesus Christ in the proclamation of the 
Christian faith and theology is never that of an idea.**
The alternative possibility speaking of Jesus as the Center would be by 
the lar zr concept of the ‘Turning-Point’ as it is a proposition which places us 
on the foundation of history. In fact Otto Weber points to the various 
Biblical texts which speak of Jesus Christ in a way that what is meant 
concerns history in a practically exclusive sense. For example, John 3:17 
when it speaks of the Son ‘being sent into the world’ or Gal. 4:4 whose 
term ‘fullness of time* means that the Son confronts us t e m p o r a l l y . ^  And, 
therefore, there is no doubt in the synoptic gospels, John and Paul or the
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entire New Testament tradition that our encounter with Jesus Christ is in the 
reality of temporality and earthliness, i.e. within the realm of history and time 
- a factor neglected or marginalised by the proponents of a Christ-idea. What 
this concept also means, however, is that in Jesus Christ, a “time” reaches 
its conclusion, a “time” is consummated and a “time” is inaugurated.13- 
And this raises the question of the adequacy of the term even though it is not 
ambiguous.
For as Weber points out, the term cannot be said to refer to the course of 
events of “World history” in an empirical sense without clarification. And 
this is simply because what has taken place in Church history and even the 
so-called ’Christendom’ cannot be said to have been directly influenced by 
Jesus Christ in an empirical sense. What is sustainable is the point that the 
effects of the event - ‘Jesus of Nazareth* have left their traces in the face of 
world history - even though they are not comprehensive as other cultures' 
history have scarcely been affected or influenced by them.14 The viable 
view then would be with the understanding of the turning-point in terms of 
the work of Jesus Christ rather than in terms of his historical influence. In 
Weber's words,
It is not in terms of world history, b u t ‘the
history of salvation*, the history of God's dealing with 
man, which is not to be understood as a kind of 
special history within, next to, or even superior to 
“World history”. It is to be understood as the 
relationship of ‘World history’ to God - who imparts 
to that history its validity.15
Taking the concept as it is though, the biblical depiction does not in anyway 
point to something happening in the event of Jesus Christ which was not 
oriented towards it, but as an involvement of him who has all along been 
involved - God himself, the begotten Son. And it is this that Weber sees
finding expression in this concept when understood eschatologically, 'solely as 
a "then" which was once and for all, which neither arises out of the historically 
recognizable given nor proves itself to be the turning point in the sum of 
recognizable effects'.16 Hence, his concluding remark that as a term,'turning 
point* cannot be said to be in itself an adequate description of the sense in 
which Jesus Christ is the center of the proclamation of the Christian faith and 
its theological articulation.
What emerges out of this analysis of these two concepts, however, has to be taken 
into account as it affects the very understanding of the task of Christology. 
For besides its false representation of the centrality of Jesus, the 'Christ- 
Idea1 as articulated in the former concept is in itself an attempt to state an 
understanding of Jesus Christ as the one in whom the absolutely valid, that which 
"unconditionally concerns us" encounters us. Although the latter concept of the 
'turning point' has its strengths in bringing to the fore the issue of the 
uniqueness, unrepeatability, historicity, temporality, personality and capacity 
for decision of the "biblical christ-event", it remains insufficient without our 
speaking simultaneously of the validity of the Christ event.17 Intact, it is 
only when this is dealt with in this light that it can be argued in a general 
sense, that it is expressing the task of Christology - which as Weber states, is 
to
'give an account of what is meant when the 
Biblical witness and following it the Church 
speak of Jesus Christ's history at a specific 
time, and of his uniqueness, and do so in the 
sense that this history and uniqueness as such 
have the special validity which establishes 
faith, even though they can only be recognised 
in faith'.18
In other words, it states explicitly what is comprehended by our speaking of 
Jesus Christ as the Lord, the Son of God.
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In fact, it is in the light of the understanding of this task that Christology 
has always he»en dealt with in the context of the doctrine of trinity, as the 
event nf Tesus Christ, ds an exemplification of the Trivine God acting upon us 
ant! being fm us. In other words, the focus on this particular activity of 
Christ’s ^vent and thereby on the one in whom God encounters us as our God is 
never d^alt with in an exclusive sense, but in recognition of the said context. 
And it is with this that we turn to the question of methodology.
It is f_,l «=*ar from the above that to speak of Jesus Christ is to speak of His work 
as w*=* cannot speak of the Person of Jesus Christ in and of itself, just as there 
is no comprehension of his work apart from his person. However, the immediate 
concern is not so much the justification of the above proposition for even when 
distinctive treatments of the above is undertaken, there is the imperative 
relation which brings about meaning to both. But the imperative question as to 
which order .is the appropriate one to follow when articulating what in every 
Christology ip said of Jesus Christ in 'two-fold' yet one(of the concept of the 
'God-man’i jp a valid one.
Indeed what has come to be known as the 'great divide’ in contemporary 
Christology between 'Christology from above1 and 'Christology from below’ is in 
itself a demonstration of the problem this question raises.
It is therefore imperative that we address cu*. selves to these approaches in our 
attempt to work out what can be a viable methodology for Christology.
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a) Christology from above
As Weber indicates, ancient Christology's presupposition of the eternal 
deity of the Son meant that beginning from above was a given factor which 
came before speaking about the incarnation and humanity of Jesus. In this 
regard, the approach was very much in line with the relationship between the 
problem of the Trinity and that of Christology, as the former concerned itself 
with the essential issue as to whether, in Jesus Christ, God himself, ‘God 
once more’, and the eternal Son or a being which was divine but not deity 
were present. And the answers given till the fourth and fifth centuries 
including those European modifications under the influence of Augustine by 
implication affirmed both in structure and method the said precedence of the 
deity of Jesus before speaking of his humanity. The same is true with 
classical Christology - even though its major question since the fourth 
century was that of ‘how one should conceive of the eternal son taking on 
“the form of man or humanity itself’ and uniting himself with it.*.^ in fact, 
Weber notes this basic structure permeating the medieval period through to 
the reformation even if the emphasis in Martin Luther is the theology of the 
Cross and so with John Calvin even as he rejected Luther's Idea of 
ambiguity.20 In this regard, the maintenance of ‘Christ's* emptying of 
himself, as the starting point set the framework from above to below. And 
there is no doubt as Weber observes, that this approach in classical 
Christology has that corresponding characteristic of the New Testament 
witness. The same can be said in relation to the definition of the Biblical 
relationship between God as the Creator and man as the Creature.
Both in terms of revelation which is understood in terms of God's 
initiative in his self-disclosure to man, and even in the reality of man's
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sinfulness which clearly shows man as the problem and not God, the 
initiative of salvation is from God, i.e. from above to below.
The question that Weber raises is whether this sequence in itself is a 
prescription for the approach to the subject. For he Finds in this given 
structure that even if the direction is from above to below, the reverse side 
that has to be addressed is the fact that ‘God himself cannot be known in 
any other way except in what does happen here below.*2® Hence, his 
remark, ‘We recognize his being (God’s) in and of itself in his being for us, 
i.e., Jesus Christ*.21 In this way, he sees in the direction of classical 
Christology a pattern that is in itself the source of its criticism. For unless 
one wants to remain with abstract propositions, there has to be a recognition 
that theological discussion is only possible at the event of revelation just as 
that which concerns the eternal Son is only possible in the context of his 
incarnation 22 Whereas Weber recognizes classical Christology's endeavour 
to speak the reality of God's prior superiority and divine majesty, he 
maintains that the Biblical witness which is the basis of theological 
articulation shows that speaking of this is in reality ‘speaking of the 
superiority which is directed toward us, that is, of free grace, and of the 
glory which is disclosed to us, which is the free act, and of the 
communicable attributes of the One who has related Himself to the creature, 
that is, of God, in Christ.*2  ^ Hence his questioning of the ‘above’ 
Christology as to whether its proponents paid adequate attention to the fact 
that ‘God's majesty is encountered by us solely in his Condescension.*24 
What Weber does not say, however, is that the recognition of this fact does 
not render the proposition invalid. On the contrary, the 'above' starting point 
is affirmed in God who takes the initiative in encountering us in the below.
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b) Christology from Below
It is clear from the heading that what we have here is the reversal of the 
above. Although this approach has come to characterise most contemporary 
Christological formulations, Otto Weber traces its origin to the fundamental 
transformation of man's self-understanding brought about by the 
enlightenment under the influence of older spiritualism. And the primary 
point of departure came with the alteration of what was the basic problem in 
classical Christology - namely man in his relationship to God. In Webers’ 
words, "For classical Christology, God was not really the problem, but it 
was man in his relationship to God. This was reversed for the man of the 
enlightenment. Man is now not the problem at all, but God is in every way! 
His existence must first be proven, and the only acceptable way to do that 
was in terms of what reason can directly assert or what can be deduced as the 
unquestionable object of Ifeasonable k n o w l e d g e " . ^  It is debatable as to how 
this shift altered the formulation of Christology. But the dominant 
characteristic emanating from the emphasis on the ‘below* - on what 
McGrath calls ‘an essentially rational cosmos in which man, as a rational 
being, works toward his own moral perfection through conforming himself 
to the rational moral structures of the c o s m o s ’^  . is that the significance of 
Jesus was not more than that of the first among equals' as he was 
acknowledged to be more advanced than the rest of mankind.
Although modern Christology did affirm this approach from ‘below’, it 
is Weber's contention that this is not to be viewed as a direct continuation of 
the enlightenment. Obviously there is a common rejection of classical 
Christology. But the emphasis on history is more a distinctive feature which 
Weber rightly states as more sharply directed against speculative Christology 
and its understanding of the above in terms of an ‘Idea’ than as a critique of 
the ‘above’ emphasis in classical Christology. Indeed, the emphasis on
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history of Jesus of Nazareth understood as no different from any other was 
in itself a rejection of the Idealism of Speculative Christology which devalued 
this historicity of Jesus as we already demonstrated in David Strauss.
In terms of Christology, however, what emerges out of this emphasis on 
the historicity of Jesus Christ is the understanding of the assertions being 
made about him in terms of the Moral Ideal as in Albrecht Ritschl (such that 
his treatment of Jesus was in no different from the ordinary except by 
asserting that he was in an exceptional way that which can be said of an 
historical personality), or as in Wilhelm Herrmann following Schleiermacher 
whose acknowledgement of Jesus as the one who completely belongs to God 
- and therefore discloses that which is of God (his being, love and 
forgiveness). But even this distinction which is derived from the assertion 
that in Jesus Christ is the self revelation of God, the basic interpretation of 
what this means is in terms of what can be understood as the ‘power of 
good’ such that Christian piety can only arise in the field of man's moral 
e x p e r i e n c e . ^ ?  Hence, Weber’s observation that what we have here is an 
exemplification of the legacy of Immanuel Kant.
The Question of the historical Jesus school in its new form, had their 
methodological framework set within this ‘below’ approach as they 
preoccupied themselves with the man Jesus Christ as he could be understood 
through historical critical analysis of the New Testament witness. And this 
inclination is what is found also in Wolfhart Pannenberg whose approach in 
contemporary Protestant theology revolves around the conception of 
Christology as an inquiry into what Jesus was^8 - as he says in his own 
words that
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‘the task of Christology is to establish the true 
understanding of Jesus' significance from history, 
which can be described comprehensively by 
saying that in this man God is r e v e a l e d . ' ^ 9
The immediate question that arises here though is how one can arrive at 
such a true understanding of Jesus Christ that is not subject to the 
presupposed system of historical reconstruction already worked out and 
which is no doubt indebted to its philosophical foundation? In fact, this is 
the same point that has been raised by McGrath in his criticism of 
Pannenberg's theological programme which to him seems to suggest a 
distinction between the knowledge of the history of Jesus of Nazareth which 
can be treated as prior and independent from f a i t h . 3 0  For him, this is a 
questionable proposition which does not seem to take into account the nature 
of the New Testament witness to Jesus Christ. In his view,
‘It has been demonstrated beyond reasonable 
doubt that the New Testament sources present 
historical facts as they are perceived by faith - 
faith operating in the perception of historical
fact in the Kerygma’.^l
The reality of an irreversible intermingling of faith and history in the New 
Testament source itself, therefore, shows how questionable it is to suggest a 
possible isolation of these two inseparable factors. What is encountered 
therein on the contrary is both an historical account as well as an assertion 
of his significance which implies that to speak of the ‘Christ-event’ is to 
speak of God in relation to man and man in relation to God; a factor which 
suggests more a correlative relation of the ‘above’ to the ‘below* and vice 
versa than the one way approach of the ‘below’ to the above, as advanced 
by Pannenberg in ontemporary Christology.
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This is to say that any attempt that seeks to express the said event in terms 
of an exemplification of Christ's true solidarity with humanity cannot be said 
to be a viable proposition when it pursues a stance that sacrifices one aspect 
of his Person. Indeed this criticism has been raised even more explicitly by 
Colin Gunton against Karl Rahner's below approach and especially in his 
advocation of a ‘degree Christology’ which aims at overcoming the 
traditional Christology's apparent insistence on the miraculous otherness of 
Jesus at the expense of his humanity.^2 In fact, John Robinson's embrace 
of this expression of the ‘below’ approach is a fitting example of a revisit 
to the propositions we encountered in the modern period especially in 
Albrecht Ritschl and Wilhelm Herrmann. For his statement that,
‘If one had to choose, I should side with those 
who opt for a 'degree Christology’ - however 
enormous the degree. For to speak of Jesus as 
different in kind from all other men is to threaten, 
if not to destroy, his true solidarity with other 
men;’33
actually defines the significance of Jesus in terms of his possession of human 
qualities - except in a large and unique degree - which is close to depicting 
him as the moral and religious I d e a l . 3 4  And this, for Weber, cannot be said 
to be expressive of the New Testament witness to Jesus Christ
A general overview of both the ‘above’ and the ‘below* methodologies 
then show the insufficiency of either approach in expressing what can be said 
to do justice to the reality of the Christ-event. For as Weber points out, 
reckoning with the New Testament Witness to this event shows that,
‘Christology cannot begin solely from ‘above* 
because God is not ‘solely above’ but rather 
in Christ the God of man; Christology is not 
solely from ‘below’ because what is ‘below* 
is only that by virtue of God's act, and in 
relationship to this ‘below’ faith does not 
perform an apotheosis.’35
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This meant that the only way that was capable of doing justice to this 
reality derived from the Biblical witness was a correlative methodological 
approach which upheld the correlation of the ‘above’ and the ‘below*, God 
and Man, time and eternity and indeed immanence and transcendence which 
takes place in the God-man Jesus Christ.
Inasmuch as the reality of the Biblical witness was a dictate in working 
out the question of the epistemological approach to Christology in Weber, the 
treatment of the actual question of Christology was no exception. In fact, his 
preoccupation with Christology has been formulated throughout the history 
of the Church and within theology as a scholarly discipline begins with an 
overview of the content of Biblical witness itself as the ultimate source and 
foundation of any articulation on the subject. And it is in examining this that 
we can set his contribution in perspective. But before doing this, it is worth 
taking note of what he understands of the character of the New Testament 
tradition.
It is clear to Weber that whenever one is dealing with the New Testament, 
it is imperative to bear in mind that the character of its tradition is already of 
Christological significance. For what we encounter therein is a testimony of 
people who believe in Jesus and their confession of him as Lord goes 
beyond the confines of their circle as they claim the same for those without 
and indeed for the World. Furthermore, it is a testimony rooted within a 
community of faith which has come to understand itself as the eschatological 
Community of Salvation, which means that it does not see itself in terms of 
the subjective conditions of its members, but in terms of the eschaton which 
has broken through in its Lord. Their testimony is therefore dependent on
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Jesus Christ, inasmuch as their very existence as a Community is.
What is even more significant is that their portrait of Jesus goes beyond a 
biographical account in that there is virtually no interest in the development of 
his personality. Instead what we encounter therein is an exhibition of who 
Jesus Christ is in terms of his work.36 Emerging out of the witness of this 
tradition is therefore an assertion that is the very decisive problem in
Christology itself, i.e.,
‘How are we to interpret the fact that the divine 
decision which Jesus Christ, according to the testimony of 
the community, brings and takes concrete form in this one 
who is totally man, man before God, and not just man 
in and of himself but man for mankind?’^
In other words, ‘We are confronted with the early church’s assertion of 
Jesus as ‘true God and true M a n ’ 38 . which can be repeated and interpreted 
when the witness of the New Testament is discussed in terms of its content 
according to Otto Weber.
THE BIBLICAL WITNESS TO JESUS
Scholarship always entails discussion. And there is no exception when 
dealing with the content of the New Testament witness to Jesus Christ. 
Hence Weber’s setting up of such statements in their most important 
groupings even though he recognizes that they are totally integrated into each 
other.
What emerges from his summarized overview is as follows: first is the 
fact that what we immediately encounter in the New Testament is an 
exemplification of the genuineness and unlimited reality of the humanity of 
Jesus. Indeed the Gospel writers were part of the community of men and
99
women whose understanding of Jesus, the teacher and prophet from Nazareth as a 
man, did not constitute a problem/br was there any theological significance that 
he was so as John Knox observes.39 Hence their depiction of him as any other man 
who could be hungry, thirsty, he in need of sleep, be angry, suffer homelessness 
and indeed have friends and enemies.40 The summary point is that these traits 
in the portrait of Jesus which he shares with everyman are <jiven factors of 
Johns' humanity which needed no explanation or qualification.
T'h^  only distinctive point that is of particular significance as Weber observer, 
is to reckon with those elements of the tradition which portray Jesus as the man 
before God. For even if most of the statements briefly alluded to above 
could be said of a god who appears in metamorphosis as a man,, the New Testament 
emphasxS is on those statements that assert Jesus as a man before God. This is 
to say that- there is something more or which goes beyond the physical and
psychic qualities of human beings. It means rather to be the being before God 
who is ordained to be God's opposite in relationship, and whose existence takes 
place "under the law", that is, in obedience given or refused.42
Indeed he illustrates this fact by pinpointing the twofold rendering of Jesus
ac ‘born under the law'. The first being that placing of Jesus in the realm 
which is ruled by the law as expressed in the Old Testament. Hence the binding 
law of uncleanliness and the sacrifice of purification on his mother at birth 
(cf. Luke 2:22 ff), His subjection to circumcision and customary pilgrimage (Luke 
2:9, 41ff), keeping the legal obligations such as those of taxation for the 
temple, sending the healed to [lie chief priest and such like acts of a man of 
fa i Hi within the Judaistic tradition (cf Mt. 17:24 ff). However, the second has
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Jesus' own express confession of this lawfe validity for himself (Matth. 5:
17 ff; Mk 10: 19, 12:28 ff) such that there was no doubt of his
understanding of the ‘law and the prophets* as the only expression of the 
43will of God. The significance of this affirmation, however, is not in
in  v\>hfcf\
terms of the distorted form it comes to be held. Instead the Gospel writers 
demonstrate his ‘obedient yes to the law as a struggle against the law which 
man had autonomously made to himself, in which the good will of God was 
made into man's security in relationship to God.*44 His was, therefore, a 
‘transformation of the law that had been made into a codex of norms, the 
observation of which is thought by the pious person to be a protective wall 
he can use against God, into a “radical attack by God upon man in his 
selfhood that of his self-security” .4^
cX his
The depiction of his life as a man of prayerTstruggles of obedience in the 
face of temptation and trying moments, his act of humility - giving God the 
glory in all things, was understood in no other way than as the conduct of a 
man before his Creator. In fact, the characterization of his reality in the New 
Testament is such that Weber finds no similarity with the conduct of a ‘god’ 
appearing in a disguised form as a man.
Reckoning with the fact that the Gospels were written from the 
perspective of the Cross, and none of them depicting an understanding of the 
Passion as a heterogenous catastrophe, but all seeing the life of Jesus before 
the Cross and His life leading to it, and that both the proclamation and the 
behaviour of Jesus, not to speak of his own prophecies of his suffering, 
correspond to that unconditionally, the life of Jesus, then, is shown here as 
not that of a mere human existence 4^ As we said already, in relation to the 
Biblical concept of man, it is clear, as Weber observes, that the life of Jesus
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is understood as that which was ordained for human e x i s t e n c e . 4 ?  i n  other 
words, the phrase ‘man from above* is a crown of that obedience that 
distinguishes man from the ordinary reference to our experience or 
anthropology, but in terms of God who is at work in him. Hence 
Bultmann's definition of this New Testament understanding of Jesus' human 
existence as God's act 4** (cf. the Prologue of John and Ph. 2:6). Indeed 
this is what underlies John Knox's viewing of the earliest Christology as 
adoptionist.4^
When it comes to the New Testament name of Jesus as the Christ, it is 
inevitable that there is the immediate linkage with the Messianic concept that 
is rooted in the Old Testament^ . 1 thereby denoting Jesus' messianic claim. 
However, Weber indicates quite clearly that the content of the New 
Testament witness has no express depiction of the term understood in that 
sense. On the contrary, we find the Gospel writers being very careful in 
stating whether Jesus called himself the Messiah (the Christ) before his 
Passion. For example, there is every indication that Jesus did not make his 
Messiahship (defined in the narrow sense) into the theme of his proclamation 
He
- ‘responds to the messianic "testimony of the faithless" - of the demonic 
by commanding them to be silent (Mkl:24; 3:11; 5:7)
- to the messianic confession of Peter.. by commanding him to be silent! 
(Mk8:276)
- responds to the high priests question about the messiah affirmatively
- but with reference to the coming son of man (Mkl4:61f)
- answers the messianic query of the Samaritan woman (Jn4:25f) with the 
typical Johannine "I am he" *50
Even when these cited passages are said to be the creation of the early 
church, the issue remains. For Weber points out that this was the 
Community that believed in Jesus, that passed on the rich sayings, the 
accounts of mighty deeds by Jesus before the Cross that clearly made the
102
messianic claim of Jesus literal^ known and reflected. How the same 
tradition can speak of Jesus as avoiding the term “Christ” or Messiah, even 
amongst the disciples is therefore a puzzling question. One view which 
Weber affirms is that ‘the Community understood the acts and words of 
Jesus before the Cross and Resurrection solely in the light of the Cross and 
Resurrection'.^^
There is also Julius Schniewind’s view that i t  was Jesus' i n t e n t i o n . 5 2  
The uniting point in both, however, is that from the light of the Cross and the 
Resurrection, Jesus was in fact already the Christ concealed in the opposite 
form - a reality which Weber says still exists even apart from f a i t h .5 3
The issue then is not one of Jesus' messianic consciousness, or the 
community's claim which is attributed only to their experience, but the 
distinctive factor that ‘he who was crucified’ (Acts 2: 36) has been made by 
God both Lord and Christ, and has been ‘designated Son of God in power 
according to the Spirit of holiness by His resurrection from the dead (Rom: 
1:4)’.54 In other words, there is a complete transformation of the 
understanding of the concept of messiahship in Jesus. For the above entails 
that the Gospel's description of Jesus' way to the Cross was one of 
obedience, such that,
‘The Cross signifies not only the concealment of 
the majesty of Jesus from our knowing, but also 
the final confirmation and realization of the fact 
that the messiahship of Jesus is not to be understood 
in terms of majesty at all (e.g., in the political sense), 
but as obedience and humility, in complete 
contradiction to all the expectations of that time and 
to every human desire. *55
In this respect, the understanding of Jesus’ humanity even in being called the 
Christ was not different.
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Linked with the above is the indication in the New Testament witness 
that the term ‘Christ’ used both as title and name of Jesus has the 
particularity that belongs to the special history of God’s dealing with Israel 
and which is defined in his covenant promise in the Old Testament. And 
therefore we do not have a depiction of Jesus in terms of the “Universal” 
history of ‘man as such* or of abstractly conceived humanity, but one that 
exemplifies this particularity, which is a great puzzle and offense in the 
history of humanity.5** When it comes to the question of his humanity 
then, there is no doubt that he belonged to a particular nation, culture and 
tradition. And in relation to his function, he is the Christ of all men because 
of the particularity of God's promise rooted in the covenant with Israel.57
Indeed, it is in the light of this that his coming is understood in terms of 
the Jewish expectation of God's promise of Salvation (cf. Gal. 3: 15, ff). 
And as we already stated, the distinction that came to be made was in the 
understanding of Jewish popular thought. In other words, Christ as the 
expected one did not act of himself but as the one mandated, elected, and 
empowered by God.5** Moreover, it was already evident in Jewish 
eschatology that Salvation was Universal! - leading to the establishment of 
the sole Lordship of God. But the point of divergence is that he is not the 
one Israel expects in their distorted conception of the Messiah's role. In this 
regard, fulfilment of God's salvific promise in the coming of Christ is in 
itself a crisis to the Jewish expectation, as is evident in their rejection and 
crucifixion of him.
The title of the ‘Son of Man* - or the ‘Coming One’ is found 
predominantly in the Gospels (including John) where it is used as a 
messianic title unlike “Christ” which appears here in a concealed form, yet
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dominant outside the Gospels. It is not disputed that as a title, it does not 
have a messianic reference in the Old Testament, except in the formal sense 
that is given in Daniel 7: 13 f. - where it refers to the context of the people of 
S a l v a t i o n . 5 ^  The givenness of its usage in the Gospels according to 
Weber, therefore, suggests that the title must have been known as the 
mysterious description of the One who was to come - indicating a 
development of its conception from that already stated in the Old Testament, 
as is illustrated in the so-called similitudes of Ethiopic E n o c h . ^ O  in fact 
there have been suggestions as to whether what we have here are assertions 
that exemplify some of these legacies: especially the Idea of the “Primordial 
man - Redeemer”. But the Gospel rendering shows a contradiction of this 
possibility in that the conception here is that of the Son of Man who 
possesses both majesty and humility, i.e. what he ‘possesses as claim and 
commission is NOT separable from what he is for all men by virtue of his 
claim.’**!
Indeed this is what is always alluded to in the rendering of this term as 
expressive of the fact that Jesus is the ‘true man’. The Gospel accounts 
therefore did not only speak of Jesus' usage in terms of what he was to be in 
an eschatological sense, but what he already is! And the same is true in Paul, 
where Christ is the New Man, in whom everything has been made new.
What is central to the New Testament witness, however, is the depiction 
of Jesus as the crucified one. And therefore the reference to his messiahship 
gains a unique dimension in that he is the one who suffers and is rejected. 
Indeed, Weber points to Albert Schweitzer's thesis that the ‘messianic 
problem’ is essentially connected to the ‘problem of suffering’.**2 Notable 
is also the suggestion that the question of a ‘Messianic Secret’ emphasized
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by W. Wrede, as it particularly appears in Mark, is unlikely to have been a 
theological thesis of the Evangelist, but rather was related to Jesus' 
renunciation of power and his acceptance of suffering. ’63 There is no doubt 
in the New Testament that this is the scandal and offence which was brought 
about by the contradiction of the claim of Messiahship and the way of 
suffering. For as Weber states,
‘A messiah’ certified unambiguously by mighty signs 
would not have been rejected by the Judaism of that 
day. ’64
But as he indicates, Jesus’ claim to Messiahship was no doubt associated 
with his willingness to s u f f e r . 6 5  Hence the subsequent equation of his 
standing to that of the suffering servant of God in Deutero-Isaiah.
Amidst the contradiction and offense that the way of the Cross brought in 
the witness of the Community, there is a clear-cut depiction of it as in 
‘accordance with the scriptures’ (cf. I Cor: 15:3, or Lk 22:37 in context of 
Passion).
This is to say that in this event was the realization of the salvific promise 
rather than a thought of executing a designed programme. In this respect, the 
embrace of the ‘Suffering Servant’ concept was very much in accordance 
with the imbedded thought of the ascertainment of the faithfulness of God 
beyond the folly of suffering and the C r o s s . 6 6 .  Indeed this finds its 
culmination in the understanding of the Cross as the one sacrifice and 
atonement ‘for all’ in the light of the resurrection. And it is notable that this 
does not alter the Christian Community's proclamation of it in its historical 
reality that it was the way of the criminal, outcast and the rejected! Yet this
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way of humiliation has become the unrepeatable event of God's salvation for 
all.67 Hence the Easter message that the crucified has been raised for our 
justification.
The question of the resurrection raises a completely new dimension to 
what we have been stating to this stage. For there is the alteration of the 
historical, natural dimension as there is a breakthrough of the extraordinary, 
that which goes beyond the existential history ending in death. The 
immediate question that arises is the sense in which resurrection can be 
spoken of as ‘historical’.
With the New Testament contents being the basic guide here, Weber 
makes the following observation that therein is a significant distinctiveness of 
the Easter narratives from that of Pre-Easter tradition. For whereas the latter 
exemplify a certain convergence of material - at least in the Synoptics, the 
former depicts a divergence that is best illustrated by the different versions of 
where and wherffeaster appearances took place. Noticeable is the absence of 
any development of a notion as to how Easter experiences took place.
Furthermore, there is the absence of any lead back to the appearances of 
the Risen One in the Easter Materials. For whereas the Cross is set up within 
secular history the Easter events are hidden to the world such that what is 
given is the confrontation of the risen with the witnesses. In this regard, the 
resurrection lies beyond the ‘historical’! 68
Apart from the New Testament, Weber reckoned with the fact that the 
concept of the historical had often been understood in such a way that it 
excluded Jesus being raised from the dead.69 Now although this appears to
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suggest an inclination towards denying the reality of the resurrection of the 
Risen Lord, the contrary is the case since this is not what is at issue. In fact 
statements such as those of R. Bultmann, W. Kunneth and even Karl Barth 
in their variant approaches propound the thesis that in ‘history’ as we receive 
it, there is no place for the resurrection, and that it can be seen here only as 
something “incomprehensible”, as a “vertical” which meets a “horizontal”.70
In fact, Bultmann as Weber indicates, goes a step further in 
distinguishing between the ontic and the existential - leading to his 
conclusion that resurrection when interpreted “historically” must necessarily 
then appear as a miraculous proof which makes the cross as a stumbling 
block unreal.7*
For Weber, the question he directs to the above is whether the concept of 
the historical in the way it has been approached has not been in alignment 
with a modern view of history which asserts ‘God has and establishes no 
history, and history is without Cod’?72 It is clear to him that the Risen Lord 
does not fit into our concept of the ‘historical’ which refers to once-and-for- 
all events in the past - which is really the past history of death. For the New 
Testament witness refers to the Living One, who is not sought among the 
dead. Weber's view is that if in the appearance of the Risen Lord an aspect 
of the historical becomes visible, it makes it impossible to understand history 
any more as the permanent event of dying and passing.7^
He acknowledges that the New Testament, and above all, its oldest 
report in I Cor. 15, apparently deals with an event which as such is past, 
for ‘some’ of the witnesses have gone to sleep(!), but in the One who has
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disclosed himself. Here, this event is divorced from its consignment to the 
past (cf.tCar 15:53).7^ In this regard, he finds the decisive point being the 
fact that the New Testament does not appear as a source for dead history 
(for the development and passing on of what is destined to die) but a 
testimony to life (I Tim. 1:1 ff). In fact, this for him is the only sense in 
which resurrection can be understood as ‘historical’. For whereas it touches 
upon the sphere of the history of death, and in a most important way - as we 
have his encounter with witnesses (mortal men) who in turn witnessed to 
other mortal men whose proclamation on the level of the historical brings 
about a community of faith whose essence is not rested in the history of 
death, its historicity is of another kind.7^ Indeed, the assertion is that the 
secular world appears as the recipient, the hearer of the message or 
testimony, but not the witness in an empirical sense. This is the same view 
asserted by William Lane Craig in his criticism of James Keller in his article 
on ‘Doubts about the Resurrection.*7^
Related to the above is the New Testament proclamation of Jesus after the 
Easter experiences as ‘The Raised Lord’ - leading to the common phrase of 
‘The Crucified and Risen Lord’ which is not expressly found as such 
therein. This clearly indicates a similar line of thought to that which we 
encountered when discussing the understanding of the Cross after Easter. 
And the basic reason as Weber indicates is that the New Testament 
understands both the Cross and Resurrection as God's acts upon Jesus. In 
fact, the reference to an activist notion of Jesus' rising as in the synoptic 
prophecies (cf. Mk 8.31; 9:9 f.jlO: 34* Lk 18:33), or reports (Lk 24:6, 
Mk 16$) and even the Pauline confessional formula (cflThess. 4: 14) that 
‘Jesus aied and rose again* does not alter this fact. For the New Testament 
does indicate a divine power inherent in Jesus ‘by virtue of which he would
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have broken through the barrier of death on his own’?? to use Weber's 
words, but as a qualification of the understanding that his death was not 
merely something he suffered, but an act of his obedience.78 in this 
regard the Lordship is derived from the Father who calls him to life. For 
Weber then, the basic thrust is that whenever the risen Lord manifests 
himself, God is being manifested and not a divine being immortal in and of 
itself.7^
Before discussing the question of the designation of Lordship to Jesus at 
the event of the resurrection, there is in Weber a treatment of the question of 
witnesses to the resurrection and the contingency of the Easter event itself. 
For the former, Weber observes that whereas there are no witnesses to the 
actual Easter event, the New Testament contents - especially in Paul (cf. I 
Cor. 15:3 ff) speak. of witnesses to the event as the ultimate court of appeal 
in relation to the certainty of the event. And he finds the legitimacy of this in 
no other way (cf. the proposition of legitimacy of their witness by 
‘objective’ event whose witness they have become by chance) except by 
virtue of the one they testify about. In other words, the preoccupation of 
their witness is with the one they testify about and not about themselves.^® 
Hence Weber's remark,
‘The witnesses point away from themselves, beyond 
themselves, toward the mystery of the resurrection which 
they never describe, toward the mystery of the Risen 
Lord himself which has come near to them in the 
appearances. ’81
For the latter (contingency of the event) Weber finds the underlying 
thrust as stating the contingency of the resurrection as an event in itself and 
from scriptural evidence. In other words, its insusceptibility to
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objectification only leaves roomier any experience of it in the encounter as 
deriving from the one who is acting in the event. In fact, even their faith and 
subsequent witness to the event is vested in the one encountered in the event. 
And thus, we have an illustration of its contingency in terms of its external 
reality.
The New Testament witness to the risen one as Christ, the Lord (Acts 2: 
36) does not only speak of the resurrection from the dead as the 
enthronement of the Son of God (as already in Rom 1:3), as that Son (Rom 
1:4) but that in that event (the sitting at the right hand of the Father) the One 
who had humiliated himself as a profound act of his will is now ex alted 
beyond measure.8^
The title of ‘Kyrios’ - Lord, is a designation of Majesty from God which 
is now declared openly unlike the reference with hesitation to pre-Easter 
Jesus in the light of the said event. But it does not only rest at this point of 
exaltation for Jesus Christ in his genuine and unlimited humanity. Instead, 
this assertion that the risen one is Kyrios as a climax of the New Testament 
witness is in fact an encounter with the second factor of the genuine and 
unlimited reality of the divinity of Jesus. For what is indicated in the title 
surpasses the Messiah titles we already dealt with. And unlike the Son of 
Man title, especially, Kyrios refers from the work to the worker, and from 
time to etemity83 as Weber observed.
Obviously, this raises the question of source - which has been the subject 
of debate as we find in the variant propositions set out by Wilhelm Bousset, 
Rudolf Bultmann and Oscar Cullman.84 Weber's view in concurrence with 
Cullmann is that it goes back to the oldest and earliest Christian community
I l l
whose embrace of the title that was equivalent to the unuttered name of 
Yahweh can only be understood on the basis of the fact of the resurrection 
(cf. Acts 2:36, and the same sense without the term in Rom 1:4) as it 
brought about an integration of the unconditional lordship claimed even by 
the pre-Easter Jesus into faith in the risen one.85
Since the fact of its presence is primary, it is imperative to examine its 
rendering in Pauline writings which form the primary representation of the 
title. It is evident as Weber shows that Kyrios appears in Paul within the 
context of worship. Indeed, the witnessing Christian community has its 
identity centered on their calling upon the name of Jesus Christ as their Lord 
(cf. I. Cor: 1:2, Rom: 10: 12 ff, II Tim. 2:22). It is the focus of prayer 
together with the Father as we find in Paul himself (cf. IThess. 3: 11, II 
Thess. 3: 16). And therefore even if he was brought up within the Rabbinic 
tradition, his speaking of Jesus Christ as Kyrios in the same breath with 
God without seeing any blasphemy of the Father in this invocation could 
only be understood as expressive of his view that in Jesus Christ was the 
self-expression of the Father. In other words, God the Father was revealed 
in his Lordship, as Cullmann asserts.86
In fact, the reality of his exaltation demonstrated his Lordship in terms of 
his work rather than his being. But this was not only directed to the past, but 
present and to all time, as is illustrated in the address of the title as also 
meaning the Master and Present Lord of the community calling upon his 
name. Furthermore, this in itself is a negation of all other lordships as all are 
placed under his judgement. Hence, the depiction of him as the Lord of the 
World. The significant factor though is that pointed out by Oscar Cullmann 
that ‘the honour and dignity of the Son, even as the King of the World, is
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in his submission and his o b e d i e n c e . ’^7
The New Testament Witness, however, brings us to a point of departure 
in its ascription to Jesus of the title of ‘the Son of God* without evading the 
reality of the Cross in its majestic rendering as the Kyrios time.88
This is not to say that a new concept was adopted. On the contrary, 
Weber points out that it was already given in the Old Testament. Notable is 
its application to Israel in relation to Yahweh as the chosen people (cf. Ex 4: 
22 ff, Hos. 2:1? 11:1, Ps 73:15). There was also its application to the 
King by oriental analogy as in II Sam. 7: 14, Ps. 2: 7 and Ps. 110. The 
point though is that it is a theocratic title in both cases as the former points to 
the basis of their historical position, whereas the latter points to the divine 
legitimation of the r u le r .89
Furthermore, he points to the fact that there is no evidence in the Old 
Testament, for a direct application of the “Son of God” title to the Messiah 
and therefore it was not adopted in the New Testament as a consequence of 
Jesus' messianic calling.90
The same is true for the parallels in Greek and Hellenistic ascription 
whose embrace as a possible source of influence is negated by the fact that its 
representation has no notion of such important factors as the Cross which is 
central to the said witness. Hence, Weber’s assertion that what we have in 
the New Testament is the taking of a new road that can only be said to 
demand our contentment with the fact that the Gospels render Jesus' witness 
about himself and beyond that is not susceptible to explanation.91
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Another notable observation is that unlike the Kyrios title, the Son of 
God title in the New Testament witness in the first place is not only directed 
to the presence of Jesus but also to his legitimation. And secondly, it does 
not merge with the statements about the Father, but expresses rather Jesus' 
distinctiveness from the Father and even his subordination to the Father.92 
What is more significant though is that the New Testament testimony goes 
beyond this depiction which has been understood at times in/adoptionist 
sense. For it also employs this title in reference to Jesus' pre-existent origin 
as in John 1. This is to say that ‘the one in whom God is with man is not 
One who has come out of time but out of God's etemity\93 And this 
underlines the dominant tension of what has been depicted earlier on as the 
obedient servant of God with reference to God's eternity in such a way that 
he is spoken of in terms of eternal election and eternal glory. Indeed this is 
the context in which we encounter the subsequent exemplification of Jesus 
Christ in terms of his Deity - when he is spoken of not just as Son of God, 
but ‘God’ - if not in terms of ascribing God's work to him.94 And for 
Weber it only points to the New Testament Church's doctrine of the Trinity 
which had no independent ontology for Jesus Christ.
In summary then, the foregoing offers what to Otto Weber is a possible 
structure of the New Testament witness to Jesus Christ which exemplifies 




But such an assertion is problematic in itself. For what we have here is 
the giving of that which belongs to time and eternity in togetherness! And 
the question is whether and in what sense this can be said to represent 
historic testimony?
In Weber's observation, the problem is focused even more sharply when 
we turn to those elements of the New Testament witness so far untouched 
such as the concept of the ‘logos’ in Johannine writings and the ‘Virgin 
Birth’ in the synoptic gospels.
Moreover, the New Testament community as we encounter^in their 
confession of the Apostle's creed expresses this double-sided Christological 
statement that makes it imperative to state whether we can speak here of 
‘history’ and if so, in what s e n s e . 9 5  For there is no indication therein that 
there is any distinction between what is historical (cf. ‘suffered, under 
Pontius Pilate ....’) and the ‘unhistorical’, Kerygmatic or the incoordinable
(cf. ‘conceived by the Holy Spirit ’) in such a way that they can be said
to have independent functions. In fact the basic depiction is that of their 
inter-connection in a peculiar way!^6 It has to be stated, therefore^whether 
what we are confronted with here falls within the common framework of 
speaking about history or that framework itself is the one that requires 
critical investigation.
For if the common depiction of history is not what is entailed in the New 
Testament even if it is eminently historical in its design a$ is the Old 
Testament in its own way, then our understanding of history points to a 
completely different direction from what we encounter here.
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The common view of history is that which derives its orientation from the 
tendency that took the centre stage during the enlightenment stressing the 
importance of time as a reaction against the ‘other wordliness’ of earlier 
eras.97 The tendency that finds its culmination in the orientation of liberal 
theology in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries as it asserted that 
‘Modern scientific world-view provided the only reliable account of how 
things really are such that the Bible could only be understood in terms of that 
account. *98 in other words, theologians who embraced this approach 
unqualifiedly assumed that ‘existential history’ or ‘factual history’ connotes 
the whole of what is proven to have actually happened in the past.^
But as Weber himself points out, this in itself is questionable as that very 
basis itself had been shown to be relative and therefore untenable as a 
foundation of what which was represented in absolute terms. Indeed 
Friedrich Nietzsche from whom he quotes summarises the point when he 
asserted,
‘recent theology seems to have entered quite innocently 
into partnership with history’ and that ‘it scarcely 
sees even now that it has bound itself unwittingly to 
the Voltairean ecrasez’.1^
And the same is true of Franz Overbeck‘s point that ‘history is an abyss into 
which Christianity has been thrown against its will’. ^ 1
Besides, there is the additional point that Weber finds in Karl Barth’s 
pursuance of Overbeck's criticism of a ‘Christianity’ which views itself 
historically. For central to his (Barth's) argument is that ‘if history’ is the 
whole of all that can be proven to have happened, then it certainly is not a 
criterion for God's self-disclosure to man. *02 This is the same point that 
found affirmation also in Rudolf Bultmann.
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It is clear, therefore, that this dominant philosophy of history which was 
embraced by theological historicism is the one that had been questioned as 
we find in Gogarten, and that was being negated by Ernst Fuchs' assertion 
that Christ is the end of history. In other words, what is at issue as Weber 
points out, is the rejection of the concept of history that is articulated to the 
extent of asserting that history as the foundation of faith. 102
For it was clear in theological Historicism that its preoccupation with the 
historical Jesus was such that he as an ‘historical person’ was set as the 
foundation and standard for contemporary faith in Christ. And so in terms of 
the Creed, what we referred to as the ‘co-ordinable* elements in the 
Christological statement were regarded as assured or as what modern 
research would demonstrate as assured.
In this regard, faith had its basis on these ‘coordinable’ elements and 
could only make use of the ‘incoordinable’ elements as possible tools of 
interpretation. This is to say that with or without the help of these 
‘incoordinable’ elements, faith was dependent on the categories of the 
philosophy of h is to ry .^  And so even Albert Schweitzer and Martin Kahler 
who rejected this orientation of theological historicism in their own way still 
maintained its basic impulses as Weber observes. The same is true for liberal 
theology till the 1920s for the dominant conviction therein was ‘that the 
eternal’, the valid, can only be found on the foundation and in the foundation 
of the historically perceivable.
The turning point that came with dialectic theology in the 1920s,
however, saw a general departure from historicism culminating in the
So,.
subsequent influence of existential philosophy. Even/ it set the stage for
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renewed quest into who Jesus of Nazareth was - such that the same 
impulses could be seen emerging though from a different direction. This is 
especially true with Rudolf Bultmann, whose view ‘that the historical life of 
Jesus is sufficient in a way*, exemplifies the legacy of historicism although 
the basic criterion was that of existential p h i l o s o p h y .  105
The significant point of departure though arose with the new way of 
relating eschatology and history to each other - along with the redefinition of 
history and human existence that we find in Martin Heidegger. For it meant 
that eschatology conditioned and determined the life and history of Jesus. 106 
Hence the speaking of his life and ministry as a turning point. In fact it is 
this particular point that raised anew the question of Christ in ‘time’.
Otto Weber identifies two ways of speaking about history when 
confronting the witness of the New Testament. The first is what he refers to 
as ‘History that is oriented towards death’. This is centred on the thesis that 
‘history’ is the dimension of reality which is chiefly characterized by being in 
the past - i.e., in the sense of the irrevocable and unrepeatable. 107
In other words, even if history is understood as a present experience, as
the realm of our decision and implementation of our “destiny”, time is still
seen as unrepeatable and irrevocable - subject to the fact that it is past and 
108gone. And it is this ‘Pastness’ apart from our customary time that makes 
it so.
What has to be noted here is that since this condition of “Pastness” 
becomes especially concrete in the measurable Pastness of an event, it is
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treated as an “it” which can be researched in an objective sense as is the case 
with nature. And Weber observes that this is indeed the basic reason v h y  
there was a methodologically close association of it with the process of 
nature. For one can observe in both instances causal relationships and base 
judgements on them - even though in varying ways and with varying degrees 
of certainty. 109 Consequently, there is an introduction of a degree of 
relativity into the procedure as causal systems can be used such that whatever 
can be causally related or even explained can never be “absolute”. And so is 
the characteristic we find in historicism and theological historicism even if the 
applied criterion of the philosophy of history tries to conceal it. HO
Having said this, the basic issue is that this orientation of history to the 
Past, the unrestorable, irrevocable and unrepeatable is what he Finds 
summarised in Heidegger's ‘Being - toward - Death*. When Otto Weber 
says rthe between which relates to birth and death already lies in the Being of 
D asein 'llO ^ he is talking of history in the reality of temporality as 
experienced apart from or in theabsence of God. Injfact, what is experienced 
in natural reality illustrated the point being made here in that the events that 
characterise it are birth, adult life, and eventual death, that is, becoming and 
passing away.
However, the second is the history that is oriented towards life. And 
what is basic in this line of thought is even if the reality of temporality 
exemplifies history in the light of the above, the same offers human 
experience the basis of continuity that looks towards the present and what 
can be called life. In fact, Weber observes from historical research that 
history is not ‘dead’ in every sense of the word, as it processes memories 
that live on.
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Moreover there is the significant factor of tradition where the present is 
determined by the past in a way that the past in its influence is relived in the 
present. Hence the viewing of the 'history of death* as one of “life”.* *2
Furthermore, there is that decisive distinction in theology where unlike 
the sceptical viewing of life with its orientation towards death, there is the 
optimism vested in the presence of God in history. The question, however, 
is what this entails in terms of our understanding of history. In other words, 
what does it mean to speak of God's self-disclosure in history?
The first thing that has to be reckoned with is the scandalously unique 
feature of the Christian faith that does not regard God as the Meaning of 
History, even though it lives out of God's self-disclosure in history. Indeed 
faith does not interpret history as it derives its life from the ‘last things*, 
from the ‘Eschaton’, such that history is truly and conclusively an event 
destined for d e a t h . 1 gut this is not to say that there is a superior light that 
appears above history in the platonic sense. For faith is dependent on an 
event within history in terms of its establishment and its life. The very 
words of Jesus, ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life -’, as Weber says, 
refer to an event which takes place in human existence through the 
encounter with the Revealer.1 ^  And so is ‘The Word became flesh’, as it 
asserts that God's revelation and self-manifestation took place in the midst of 
the death-ridden reality of man.11^
In this regard history in the reality of its temporality has no reference to
God even though it is the obvious place of his revelation. In fact, it is this
H/hick . .
particular pointvserve50 tto Weber's polemic against the embrace of
philosophy in theology. For as he says, faith does not need it nor preoccupy
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itself with the meaning of history as it does not owe its existence to it.
One other point that he observes from the fact of revelation taking place in 
simple history is that it negates any attempt to embrace any ideally or 
existentially worked out historical scheme for the understanding of history in 
theology.
This means for Weber that revelation contradicts every kind of 
interpretation of history that attempts to set aside categories of human 
possibilities as the basis for the understanding and the recognition of the
revelation of God in history. Hence his assertion,
‘We do not have any presuppositions at our 
disposal which would enable us to gain objective 
knowledge of the Presence of God in history
 for the special nature of God's presence in
history is not demonstrated for faith in 
remarkable occurrences, although there are 
those, but in the self-proclamation of J e s u s . * *  *6
And the same is true for this self-proclamation of Jesus about himself.
For to suggest this is to place it within our sphere of influence. In fact for 
Weber this applies to the self-proclamation of the historical Jesus, the self­
manifestation of the risen one, and the proclamation of the community which 
follows. In other words, there is every indication from the New Testament 
witness that the above have no connection to some kind of an already present 
and active understanding - even though as a man he falls within the realm of 
subjectivity (subject to our interpretation).
Earlier on, we stated that an historical phenomenon is not only oriented 
towards the past, but also to the present. This, for Weber, serves to
Underline an appeal that comes out of history. For therein we noted that the
viewing of that Past as the foundation of our existence in the Present was the
basic motivating factor for historical research, and the concern with
the
historically certified results. I n other words, the role ofA said results 
becomes crucial for our Present existence itself. And this is what Weber 
recognizes when he says, 'Its intent then is to provide itself retrospective 
legitimacy and to fill itself with "meaning" such that history becomes the domain 
out of which existence derives its legitimation'.117 And so, the securing of 
facts - serves as a self-securing of existence. Hence the appeal inherent within 
it.
Set in the same framework, however, Jesus' self-proclamation is not depicted in 
the New Testament as a conveyance of assured results or as facts historically 
certified, but as a confronting appeal which negates our temporality with the 
'Yes' of life as it is God's appeal. In fact we have a radical departure from 
what we find in Existential Philosophy where the 'demand is to cast oneself 
forward, throw aside the old and stepping out of one's impersonal identity as 
'One'118 and the future into which one is to cast himself is a dark future which 
one is to accept in a blank risk.119
For Jesus' self-proclamation,which does place us at the end of history as the 
supposed epitome of our retroactive securities because it is 'eschatological', 
does open up to us the offer of faith, of the new existence, of the reality of 
God disclosed to us. 120 In this regard, history is not only important for God's 
self-disclosure, but the latter is also for the former. For as Weber echoes 
Berkhof ‘By virtue of faith in the Christ who has come and in the future 
consummation in the Kingdom of God we see events in time not as the arbitrary 
movement of free powers or the forced effects of inner necessity, but as the 
realm of the redemptive Government of God.'121
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Even so, we have to state what we understand of ‘Eschatological history* 
in relation to history as we find in the witness of the New Testament. 
Already we stated that history of death or calculable history is one that can be 
mastered to a certain degree - leading to its becoming a component of our 
world view. At issue here is the point that the calculability of history 
encloses within itself the calculability of man - which is the end of humanity. 
In this regard, history of death would not be just the testimony to the 
inevitability of death, but would be, in ultimate perfection, the death of man
i') . .as man . This is to say that this entail^the calculability of man, as the 
inevitability of death - is in ultimate perfection the death of man. In other 
words, what we have is not the testimony of the inevitability of history of 
death, but of man as man.
But ‘Eschatological history’ by contrast is a message appealing to us in 
the event of proclamation that the Old is Past (cf. II Cor. 5: 17), as Weber 
observes. In other words, what we encounter in the Old and the New 
Testament is not a pointer to the course of events being determined not by 
past and calculable events, i.e. those belonging to the history of death, but 
the incalculable activity of G o d .  ^ 3  And Weber illustrates this from the 
apodictic law and the prophetic words crossing the calculable events in the 
Old Testament, the very existence of Israel which is not explicable in terms 
of what is calculable, and indeed Jesus’ self-proclamation in the New 
Testament. *24 The basic insight then is not the setting aside or the 
despatching of ‘old’ to historical past, but an encounter with the 
establishment of a new reality which is not derived or deduced from what 
was already there.
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‘Eschatological history’ then is not a deducible ultimate, but rather the 
breaking in of the origin into the realm of the deducible such that what we 
have is not the restoration of the original, but the establishment of New 
Creation.
Weber observes that within the limits of historical knowledge;
*- we can derive the past from what is past
- the mortal from what is mortal
- and the present can be said with a certain degree of caution where it is
going.
But the origin and goal which are held closely related in Biblical thought 
cannot be conceived within this history of d e a t h * . 125
This is to say that ‘Eschatological history’ is, therefore, under the aspect 
of the origin and goal - which in itself is the ending of the history of death as 
it is not derived from it even if it emerges therefrom. And its emergence in 
confrontation is a demonstration that the Creator is not against his creation, 
but against its often craven surrender to death as the dominant element of 
history. Hence the soteriological orientation of the Christ event. For Jesus' 
taking upon himself the reality of temporality is in effect the confrontation of 
that which is of the creator, with the perversity of man, whose sinfulness is 
in actual fact a subjugation to the fate of death. In fact, the New Testament 
witness declares nothing other than this fact in its unified representation of 
the origin and goal of Jesus Christ. For as Weber says, ‘What is more 
important than the Creed is the salvation-event. As the ‘victim’ (in reality of 
the history of death) Jesus is also “Victor’ in that he reveals his glory in his 
solidarity with mankind which is surrendered to the No of God and thus to
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the anguish of the conscience - in that he submits to the power of the No 
which stretches beyond anything which can be e x p e r i e n c e d . ’ 126
In fact, it is from the context of this dialogue with the Biblical witness and 
the insights derived thereof that he appraises the Christological developments 
throughout the history of the Church and which forms the framework of his 
criticism and reformulation - which we now turn to.
CHRISTOLOGY OF THE CHURCH THEN AND NOW
It is clear to Otto Weber that the New Testament witness to Christ does 
not lead to the historically isolated figure of the Jesus of long ago, but to the 
‘Christ of faith’, who nevertheless cannot be separated from his temporality 
and historicity. For as he says, ‘the titles which the New Testament ascribe 
to him refer to the history just as they refer to the faith’ 127
The same is true for the question of history which had to be thought anew 
in terms of Christology. For it was now characterized by the inextricable 
interweaving of what we referred to as ‘eschatological history* and that 
‘history bearing the stigma of death’.
This, however, leads us to an inevitable state of tension where in 
asserting that the historical Jesus is the One believed in, we cannot turn to 
‘factual history’ in an attempt to establish how he is that, nor can we turn to 
dogmatics in an attempt to state plainly who he is outside of faith!
Hence, Weber's observation that this explains why Christian thought has 
always been tempted to understand Jesus as an ideal being. Indeed this is
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what we find already in the early church when gnostic spiritualistic 
movements first thought of Jesus in terms of the gnostic Redeemer, the 
bringer of light - who could not be flesh. A view that found its full 
expression in what came to be known as D o c e t i s m . ^ 8
For therein is the simplest solution to the Christological problem as it 
depicts Christ as God’s intervention ‘from above to below’ - ‘here and now’, 
apart from history with its fatal banalities. Moreover, it is an approach that 
eliminates the said tension in that paradoxes and contradictory statements 
fade, God is absolutely God while man is set aside! and so is the problem of 
history, of temporality, and of mortality which become non issues as they all 
belonged to the world of flesh which was inferior in Hellenistic thinking. 
The primary concern with the ‘spiritual’ world of reality meant that man's 
preoccupation had to be the gaining of knowledge which enables him to be 
released from the said world of flesh, that opportunity of grasping the depths 
of his being or of his destiny beyond the world not known until now. Jesus 
being that given symbol to point the way as a dimensionless point, such that 
the salvation event is no longer an event ii?empirical s e n s e .  ^ 9
However, this kind of thinking had no place in the early Church as it 
asserted its understanding of Jesus Christ as one that had come ‘in the flesh’ 
such that the Salvation event could not be a mere appearance, but one that 
had taken place within this specific history and time (cf. I Jn. 4:2). In fact, it 
is not only this, but the ‘encounter’ emphasis expresses the understanding 
that in this event, God himself has really encountered us in the reality of our 
worldliness and temporality. Even though the docetic tendency has persisted
\K
throughout the history of the Church - either in the above form, or^hat Christ
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understood as a man but deified as was common among monophysites, or in 
the representation of him as the Principle or epitome of the Unity of God and 
man which we encountered in speculative C h r i s t o l o g y .  ^ 0
In contrast, the Ebionites whose background is traced exclusively to 
Jewish Christianity depicted Jesus in terms of his humanity and especially 
his Jewishness such that his divinity is secondary (cf. an exemplification of 
the central problem facing Christians within this background whose concern 
was how to reconcile their faith with the strict monotheism of Israel).
In fact some were of the view that the said divine nature was a unique 
dignity or the Christ who descended upon Jesus of Nazareth at his Baptism. 
A notion also found amongst some Hellenistic theologians such as Paul of 
Samosata (3rd cent.), (c-250-c. 336 A.D)}^1 The basic thrust was that there 
was that maintenance of that important distinction between the earthly and the 
heavenly, the Creator and the Created as even the elevated or deified Jesus 
Christ of logos-Christology was represented in a way that he remained as 
one who was in some way inferior to God. 132 Hence its rejection as 
heresy.
Indeed there is merit in the view that the Church's Christology developed 
to a great extent in its struggle with the above heretical positions. As it was 
in its counteracting stance that it sought to maintain the human-historical view 
of the salvation event, and insisted that in Christ we are not just encountering 
a divine something which consists of the extension and surpassing of the 
human, but God h i m s e l f .  133 However, it was this basic assertion that set 
the stage for the debate that dominated the Church till Chalcedon in the fifth 
century. For the question that arose was how to conceive of the Unity of
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God and man in Jesus of Nazareth? How should God remain God and man 
truly man?
Weber's dialogue begins with Apollinarius of Laodicea (c. 310-390 
A.D.) wlm he argues^ . even if his position quickly found disfavour 
within the Church should be credited with posing the Christological problem 
anew. For he confronted the whole question of how to speak of a true 
incarnation of the ‘Logos’ even if he ended up with what was more akin to 
Arianism!
The first response that we encounter is that of the ‘Antiochenes’ whose 
opposition to Apollinarius led to their argumentation for a genuine human 
nature in Jesus inasmuch as they upheld the view of a genuine incarnation of 
the ‘logos’. Unlike Apollinarius who advanced a kind of melting together of 
the human and the divine by stating that ‘two conceptually perfect entitites’ 
(iduoteleia) could be ‘one’ while preserving their being; the Antiochenes as 
Weber points out, advanced the view that the Unity of God and man should 
not be understood as fusion but rather as synapheia ( c o n n e c t i o n ) .  134 A n d  it 
was this view which actually laid the foundation for the formulation of the 
doctrine of the two natures which was first worked out within this 
Antiochene cycle.
The immediate problem, however, was how to articulate the said 
connection between God and man in Jesus of Nazareth. For whereas 
speaking of the two natures posed no problem, their representation of the 
said synapheia or ‘connection’ was so ambiguous that they were accused of 
teaching ‘two natures’ in regard to Jesus Christ. There was also the problem 
arising from their ethicist orientation which as Weber observes led to a
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conception of Jesus in terms of the “Perfect” man whose attainment of the 
‘logos’ seem* to emerge as a kind of an act of crowning his moral 
achievement - and God's saving activity being seen as a response to human 
effort.
However, the second opposing response to Apollinarius was that of 
Alexandria with Cyril (c. 375-444 A.D.) as the leading theologian in the fifth 
century. His acceptance of the formulation of the two natures in Jesus Christ 
as set out by the Antiochenes and the acceptance of the human soul in Christ 
was a clear negation of the Apollinarian stance which argued for a mixture of 
the two natures^ Cven though his concern to state that the two ‘natures’ 
have their ‘bearer’ solely in the ‘logos’ was an invitation to his opponents 
that his was an Apollinarian situation. For it was no different from 
Apollinarius' view that, ‘there is only one’ physis in Christ because in him 
there is only ‘one’ all-animating source of life and movement, the l o g o s ,  ^ 5  
a charge which he found hard to extract himself from. In fact, one can detect 
a docetic tendency in the implied view from the above that the humanity of 
Jesus had no inherent essentiality. 13*> As for Frances Young, Cyril's 
primary concern seemed to be aimed at defending the coherence of the 
Nicene creed by insisting that it was improper to ascribe some of the credal 
statements to the logos and others to ‘his man’; all its statements were made 
of the one divine subject who existed in a pre-incamate and an incarnate state 
yet without change.13^ The consequence of this kind of approach for 
soteriology according to Weber though, is that instead of speaking about the 
salvation men experience in their encounter with God in Christ, a complete 
shift to a tangible change of being in the cultic sense seem to be implied. 
And the end result is that the manifest and tangible deity of the man Jesus
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establishes the equally manifest deification of man, who is thereby
dehistoricized.’1^
It was in the Chalcedonean definition of A.D. 451, however, that the 
Christological debate reached its decisive stage. For besides the historical 
consequence of Rome emerging victorious in forcing Constantinople - its 
arch-rival into the role of an equal and doing away with Alexandria’s 
dominant position, it was here that the Christology which had been 
developing in the West was asserted. *39
Basic to the disagreement among Greek theologians as Weber observes 
was how to reconcile the question of the immutability of God with the notion 
that Jesus Christ is truly God and truly man. Furthermore, it was 
inconceivable to think of man - including Jesus as being one with God 
without losing his ‘mode of being’.140
But Leo's representation of the western position set the framework of 
what was to emerge out of Chalcedon when he stated, ‘For, just as God is
not changed by his compassion, so man is not destroyed by his dignity....
God's mercy and man's exaltation cannot be ontologically united, but there is 
no falsehood in this unity, as long as there are alternately the lowliness of 
man and the exaltedness of the Divinity.*141 Hence, the abrogation of 
Antiochene and the Alexandrian ‘solutions’ in a way that both were not only 
contrasted against each other, but a greater and difficult paradox was asserted
in the well-known formulation:
‘ indeed bom of the Father before the ages according
to divine nature, but in the last days the same bom of 
the virgin Mary, Mother of God, according to human 
nature; for us and for our deliverance, one and the same 
Christ, only begotten Son, our Lord, acknowledged 
in two natures, without mingling, without change, 
indivisibly, undividedly ’14^
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An assertion that did not only stress the unity of the person of Jesus Christ 
but the reality of his two natures.14^
Of particular significance to Weber in this formulation is that its 
paradoxical statement achieved what the opposing groups and ‘solutions’ 
could not accomplish. And that is to recognise what we already stated earlier 
on that we cannot express ‘eschatological history* with the categories of the 
‘history of death’144. But since the former needs to be expressed and all our 
terms are inadequate, paradox remains the only relevant form of expression 
we have. Not because a unique language is being sought, but because 
‘whoever speaks of him in human words is entering into the realm of 
‘rational’ speech in an attempt to express that which belongs to the realm of 
the incalculable and the irrational’ J4^ For Weber, the Chalcedonian paradox 
serves to remind us of the inadequacy of our language - which belongs to the 
calculable4o describe the incalculable. Hence his assertion that ‘its terms 
(of the incalculable) are not the means for grasping but rather for making 
known that we have been grasped. It is not then a form of mystery, but a 
testimony to the overpowering experience which has come upon us.14  ^
Without being apologetic for the Chalcedonian fathers' paradoxical 
statement, Weber sees in the definition an exemplification of our state of 
awe as creatures when we encounter that which is of the creator - that which 
is of God.
Indeed concepts such as prosopon one person, or hypostasis entity 
were compromise terms to express the reality of the two natures in one 
person in a way that even if they seem to serve the main points required by 
faith, were subject to a variety of interpretation.147 The assertion 
therein though, is that in Christ was no separate human hypostasis entity,
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but that which belongs to all humanity. As we already stated above, the 
Chalcedonian definition asserted that which was the truth about both the 
divinity and the humanity of Jesus Christ, even though it did not envisage to 
say how the natures function - except in what they cannot do (cf. the 
negations of without mingling, without change, indivisible and undivided). 
For Weber, however, this point exemplifies its strength and weakness. For 
whereas it is a valid statement of the mystery, it is no protection from reading 
between the lines an attempt to restore the contradiction that is inherent in the 
reality of God and man in the unity manifested in Christ. Its soteriological 
consequence, however, is of such significance in that the saving activity of 
God is affirmed as having taken place within the reality of our temporality.
The middle ages can be said to be the period when Chalcedonian ideas 
were further refined in a variety of ways, the East pursuing the distinct line 
of orthodox theologians inasmuch as the West had this idea transmitted 
through the theology of Augustine. At issue as Weber observes were two 
questions, i.e. How the ‘hypostatic union’ (unio hypostatica) - common 
term in the west - (or ‘hypostasis* in the East), the unity, in the person had 
to be understood,* 3 nd how the common participation in the ‘properties* 
{idiomata, proprietates or Idiotetai - which Chalcedon spoke of meaning 
peculiarities) should be formulated 148—c o n c e r n s  which directed the 
discussion to a static and unhistorical doctrine of being.
As regards the first question, the basic thrust of the discussion had its 
framework set by Leontius of Byzantium who stated that the human nature in 
Christ does not have its own hypostasis; it is anhypostasis(without 
hypostasis, i.e. its independent being). Instead, it is ‘physis anhypostatos* 
meaning that the human nature finds being or hypostasis in the hypostasis
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of the logos.149 And so the distinguishing features of the particular man 
who Jesus was are then attributed to the divine by hypostasis as well as the 
essential qualities of the species (mankind) to which he b e l o n g s .  150 The 
breakthrough of this suggestion according to Weber is that it affirms the 
point that God remains God in the concrete union with human nature - as 
there is no thought of a merging of two equally important p a r t n e r s .  151
The danger though is that it leads to God's Son being conceived of ‘in 
and of himself’, apart from the man Jesus. Hence his criticism that the 
inclination seems to be part of that way of thinking which tries to establish 
the special features of the person of Jesus Christ on the basis of general 
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  b e i n g .  152 The same is true for the latter question. For once 
the assumption of a particular conception of union is set - as in ‘personal or 
hypostatic union’, then each of the ‘natures’ communicated its ‘properties’ to 
the other. Indeed, its general acceptance as part of Christology right 
through the reformation for Weber demonstrates the inseparable connection 
of the former and the latter question.
In summary then, it is clear to Weber that in spite of the shortcomings, 
the middle ages' important input is in its attempt to maintain the concrete 
historicity of Jesus within the limits of the period - even though it remained 
with the problem of how to explain the ‘Incarnate Christ’ and the ‘Present 
Christ’ as one and the same p e r s o n .  153
The Reformation Christology as Weber observes does not offer any 
novelties in terms of terminology. Basic background that he reckons with is 
the influence from both scholastic formulations and mystic inward experience
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of Christ. Even so, they did not form its essential base as its point of 
departure was justification, faith, the proclaimed Christ.154 This indeed was 
in itself a turning around from the medieval period in that its concern was not 
with ‘above’ or the nature of Christ, per se. but ‘below’ - that reality of 
inseparability between Christ and his work, or as Weber puts it, ‘our 
receiving, our being given, and being claimed.’155 Indeed, George 
Wehrung expresses this point quite clearly when he says, ‘the nature of 
Christ was related to his work once and for all. And since this work took 
place within history, then Christ in his own person must always be 
acknowledged in association with his work, which is the divine work of 
Salvation within history.’15^ And it is this that sets the basis for 
Christology.
It has been pointed out that the Reformers preoccupied themselves with 
the articulation of traditional Christology rather than embarking on new 
developments. And this is evident in the works of Martin Luther, John 
Calvin and Ulrich Zwingli. However, the Communion controversy did 
provide the impulses to develop a Christology out of the Reformation theme 
of the proclaimed Christ. For it was the ‘Present Christ’ that was the issue 
in the Communion disputes as Weber points out. Ours is not to rehearse the 
whole debate except to say in summary form that in Luther, Weber identifies 
his preoccupation with the gift of the divine presence - especially in the 
Eucharist. The logical result being that his immediate concern was with God 
whom he encounters, or as Marc Lienhard puts it, ‘is carried and presented 
by this unique high priest, who is Christ.’15^ This does not mean that the 
particular question of this ‘mediator* taking centre stage was in doubt. But 
the framework in which he treated the Christological question derived from 
the question of God.
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We already stated that his understanding of the object of Christology was 
that it dealt with the benefits of Christ and not with his person and natures, 
apart from the benefits. The basic thrust of his Christological articulation 
was, therefore, characterized by his doctrine of ubiquity - the presence of 
the body of Christ e v e r y w h e r e . T h e  problem though is that in due 
course, the ‘doctrine of the two natures’ was rendered questionable as the 
‘human nature’ of Christ participated abstractly in the divine ‘nature’ as far 
as its properties were concerned. Hence the criticism that this tended toward 
monophysitism as Weber observes. But Luther's attempt to overcome this 
problem is illustrated in his embrace of the Patristic theory of communicatio 
idiomatum (communion or exchange of divine and human a t t r i b u t e s ) . 1 5 ^
As for Ulrich Zwingli, the traditional stance was given except in his 
distinctive assertion that to speak of the ‘Proclaimed Christ’ is to speak of 
the Ascended One, whose human nature was no longer in that tangible 
reality of an historical figure. Hence his argument that the historical Christ is 
a theme of ‘recollection’ or ‘remembrance’ for us (recordatio) as it was 
impossible for him to conceive a bodily presence of the once historical figure 
Jesus Christ. Hence Weber's observation that in Zwingli is a Christology in 
which the unity of the historical with the present Christ is not given in every 
regard as Christ's presence with us is in that spiritual encounter of faith.
John Calvin's stress on divine transcendence meant that when it came to 
Christology, he was concerned to state ‘that the Son of God was 
‘completely’ but not ‘wholly’ present in the historical Christ - just as he is 
“completely’ but not ‘wholly’ with us.’ Calvin thus opposes any 
quantification of the Salvation-event which sets aside the person as Weber 
points out. The summarising assertion being that: whereas ‘the Son of God
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is completely with us, he is simultaneously outside of the humanity which 
he has assumed. He becomes a servant, but remains the Lord. He becomes 
spatial and temporal yet remaining supreme over space and time *16L an 
assertion which returns him to the traditional representation of Christ in terms 
of paradox already exemplified in the Chalcedonian definition. And so the 
‘Mediator’ as the pivot theme of his Christology can best be understood in 
the context of the above. His occasional exposition on the famous extra 
Calvinisticum did not invite any deviation from the boundaries of tradition 
as Weber points out. Even so, it has to be said that it is on this that a 
charge of the ‘Nestorianism’ of Reformed Christology has been made in that 
it appears that there is a notion of a Logos existing entirely outside the human 
nature. ^ 2
The dynamic input of the Reformation Christology according to Weber is 
well exemplified in the constant incorporation of Pneumatology into it 
(Christology). Hence the dynamism of Martin Luther’s concept of 
incarnation which negated any static representation of the event. The same is 
true for John Calvin in his speaking of the communicatio idiomatum  
inasmuch as what is exemplified in Zwingli's ‘Our Christ’ - especially in the 
dynamic rendering of the Living Lord. And therefore one can speak of a re­
echoing of the New Testament depiction - especially as can be found in Paul 
(cf. Rom. 1:3 f, II Cor. 3:17). Indeed, it is Weber's view that pneumatology 
does provide more than adequate reason to regard Christology ‘dynamically’ 
in that the presence of Christ is not a post-existence, but a truly effectual 
existence for us and to the World. For Christology does not deal with an 
ontologically deducible something, but Jesus Christ - the Living L o r d .  *63 
This is a factor that is of particular significance for the Reformation's 
Soteriology.
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However, one other aspect exemplifying the dynamism of the 
Reformation Christology is in the discussion of the ‘State of Christ’ (status 
Christi) which led to the whole question of Kenoticism as Weber points out. 
As he said, at issue was the ‘Present Christ* in his identity with the historical 
Christ, together with the differentiation of the two*.1^  What is of particular 
significance is that it served to modify the Christological structure influenced 
by the metaphysics of being as it exposed the insufficiency of ontological 
formulations in describing the mystery of Christ.
Within Lutheran theology, the doctrine of the ‘states’ was integrated into 
the already established system of the ‘communion of the Properties’ whose 
consequences were as follows; first, that it brought to focus the question as 
to who is the ‘subject* of the process of self-emptying (Kenosis) that is the 
theme of Philipians 2: 6 ff. For Lutheran theologians, it was not the logos 
as that was of God who is immutable, and therefore, cannot be said to be 
s e l f - e m p t y i n g . 1 * ^  To speak of the ‘God-man’ also was no solution as its 
human nature was enhypostatized in the logos. *66 The remedy was to state 
that it was the human ‘nature’ understood to have participated in the majestic 
attributes of God - but renounced them in the act of humility (thought to be 
expressed in Ph. 2: 5-7) in order to assume therein the ‘state of 
exaltation’.1**7
But even to assert that was not decisive (cf. problems arising from I Cor. 
8:6 and II Cor. 8:9). Second, the view advanced by Martin Chemnitz who 
was the ultimate source of the ‘doctrine of the states’ was to think of an 
‘intermittent kenosis’ where the general thought would be that the Incarnate 





‘concealed’ at this time of humiliation. The problem though was that one 
could no longer speak in truth of Kenosis but krypsis or concealment.. The 
basic point that Weber reckons to have emerged from the above, especially 
in Lutheran orthodoxy is that besides the system of the ‘two states’ the 
assumption of the human nature by the pre-existent one was such an 
exaltation of human nature. Indeed, it meant that humiliation and exaltation 
were not to be misunderstood as events belonging to the ‘history of death’ - 
but within the framework of ‘eschatological history* - but more in line with 
what was recently proposed by Karl Barth: that is to say, that ‘self-
humiliation was a reality - but not in the sense of an intermezzo. On the 
contrary, it was as an act of God's gracious and active self-manifestation in 
the sense of his unshakeable faithfulness, but not in that static sense of his 
‘immutability’. For Weber, this means that ‘in the exaltation of Jesus man 
experiences the Yes which rejects him in his sluggish and obtuse self­
centredness but exalts him in Jesus Christ. *68 Apart from this is the view 
advanced in New Kenoticism where Jesus Christ in his ‘state of 
humiliation’ is said to have not possessed the divine attributes - such that 
Wolfgang F. Gess could talk of ‘logos’ as having ‘deglorified i t s e l f ’.169 
This meant that a process of ‘development’ in Jesus Christ had to be 
advanced in order to make sense of his obedience as a free selective act.
Indeed as Weber shows, Gess' assertion is that the work of Christ as an 
act of obedience cannot be understood without a change of the logos.17*1 
But as he reckons with Paul Althaus’ criticism of this proposition, the whole 
argument is unsustainable in that it leads to the division of the ‘diety*. The 
same can be said in the contemporary period where the remedy in the search 
to maintain a kenotic Christology is to advance a thought of ‘a Kenotic Love’ 
as constitutive of the very being of God, as we find in Lucien F.
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R ichard.I71 The basic thrust here is that Jesus Christ is God for us, 
answering God's self-emptying in his own self-emptying, as his self- 
understanding and his freedom are realized in history.17^
The question for Weber though is how to speak of that without 
envisaging that framework of ‘Eschatological history’ if we are not to return 
again to the unsatisfactory propositions revolving around ontology as the 
source of articulating this point?.
In a kind of midway reflection, Otto Weber identifies two major 
characteristics of the development of traditional Christology till the 
Reformation. First is that tendency to work out a definite doctrine - which 
once formulated acts as the criterion for the rejection of other views as 
heretical or part of an isolated group of thought within the church as is 
exemplified by the post-Chalcedonean disputes.
The second is the recognition of the presence of a diversified Christology 
that has its origin in the New Testament witness itself. The former for 
Weber serves to show that traditional Christology bears the impulses for 
criticism within itself, whereas the latter is a basic reminder that Jesus Christ 
cannot be understood as central point of a system of thought or the 
development of an idea. And it is a point he reinforces by saying:
‘The biblical witness to Christ as a human process and 
as the document of such a process was even stronger 
than all the ‘better* knowledge of those who came later.
And the Person of Christ is stronger than the witness 
as he works through the witness. In fact he makes 
that witness effective. *17^
A point that is valid for our articulation even today when we recognise
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from this dialogue that the Church's Christology cannot evade the witness 
of the New Testament - which also stands under the dominant personal 
power of Jesus Christ - who is superior to it.174 His dialogue with the 
post-Reformation period - especially the nineteenth and the twentieth century 
does not escape this critical underlying point.
Notable are his observations on the developments of Christology since 
the Enlightenment where even the attempt to offer an apologetic 
representation of the old traditional view of Christology ended up being a 
self-demolishing process. For as he says, ‘the historical Jesus as they 
construed him was transformed into the peak of all human possibilities; he 
became the epitome of all virtue, the beloved friend of all men because he 
loved all, the model of morals’.17^ Contrary to what tradition had always 
asserted here, Christ was noi the ONE in whom God reaches out to us and 
takes our part, but rather he is the highest perfection of a religion in which 
man reaches out to God and gets God in his grasp,176 as we pointed out in 
Chapter One. Indeed this is what he finds even in the big change that took 
place in both Schleiermacher and Kant (cf. the Rediscovery of the Church) as 
far as theology was concerned. For whereas these two brought about the 
rediscovery of the church and consequently the new formation of 
Christology, what we find in Kant is an exemplification of Jesus Christ in
f-
terms of the moral ideal. Schleiemacher's stand is not far from this in that he 
intergrates christology into the sphere of religious consciousness and 
morality 177
However, twentieth century approaches have recognised again the 
unpredictable and incalculable aspect of Jesus Christ as we already 
demonstrated with the reassertion of revelation as central for theology in
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Chapter One. But this does not mean that traditional Christological thought 
has escaped criticism. For the contrary is the case.
Weber's concern though is whether these criticisms are as a result of a 
compelling structure of thought, which makes it alien to the matter on hand, 
or is derived from the matter itself.17** This is especially the basis of his 
criticism of the thought structures of ‘Personal being* which he finds in 
Friedrich Gogarten. Indeed, he acknowledges that the thought forms of 
existentialist philosophy - which offers terms like ‘person’, ‘responsibility*, 
‘historicity’, and ‘existence’ may possess a greater degree of appropriateness 
for the expression of the ‘mystery of Christ’ because they are derived from 
the encounter with it via Kierkegaard. But his concern though is with the 
short cut that is evidently taken in approaches of this kind when the 
developed Christology is that pursued from insight into the personal being of 
Jesus to a universally conceived personality of man.17^ Indeed, where the 
latter is made dominant as he observes, the outcome is a ‘personalistic, 
existentialist or activist total view of the reality around us, a new world view* 
- such that the person of Jesus is incorporated into that worked out system to 
the extent that the world view itself deprives him of his relation to the 
world. 180
For Weber, this is not a criticism that can be directed against those 
Christological formulations that have embraced existentialist philosophy as 
the framework of reflection, but against every undertaking that tends to 
operate from a worked out system. Hence his criticism of Friedrich 
Gogarten's tendency to operate from a system of ‘pure personality’.1**1 In 
fact, it is the basis in which he criticises Barth’s approach which he sees as
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not free from a worked out system even if he reckons with his attempt to 
conceive Christology in terms of the whole wealth of New Testament
statements.1**7
In a Summary reformulation, Weber reckons that the constant attempt at 
connecting every Christological assertion to history ( -  which has been very 
much evident in this dialogue) only serves to remind us that what is at issue 
is not a ‘Wonderful being’ - but a man in the sense of our history in whom 
God has encountered us. The question of the ‘how’ has been a dominant 
one, which has been attempted in a variety of ways, but what he sees as 
central is that even when we talk of ‘Eschatological history*, there is no 
inclination that can attempt to underestimate the ‘historicity* of Christ’s event 
and be true to the New Testament witness.
Indeed, this is the point he reinforces in his reflection on the ‘Christology 
of exaltation*. For as demonstrated already in the overview of traditional 
Christology, the basic thrust of the Antiochenes was an attempt to look for a 
perfect humanity of the ‘logos’ in the heights - a tendency that was negated 
by the fact that in Jesus himself we encounter one who places himself at the 
depthsx)f our existence1**7
The Alexandrians on the other hand confront, us with a Christ of the 
heights - surrounded by the glory of the resurrection and the exaltation - 
integrated into a transcendent ontology. Of course this Christ humbles 
himself, but does so only in an episode - while retaining the properties as 
later Lutheran doctrine of the states broadly assumed. But the real outcome 
is that we have a Christ who is an actor rather than one who really becomes 
man.
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The rejection of traditional Christology for Weber, therefore, is not 
because of the static ontology it contains, but because it does not permit 
Jesus of Nazareth the lowliness which he did assume acording to the New 
Testament witness. For even if we talk of the exalted Christ, we cannot do 
so in isolation from the pre-Easter Christ. Theology of glory has to be 
reconciled with the theology of the Cross if the New Testament witness is to 
be taken on its own terms.
Furthermore, there is that recognition which has come to light in 
‘Christology of Paradox’ that there is no indwelling aptitude for God in man 
that we know of, except our reception of the Word that God in Jesus Christ 
has accepted humanity and espoused the cause of man. This may be said to 
be what is implied in Barth's Christology. But as Weber points out, its 
‘above’ emphasis is such that the ‘below’ is strictly incorporated into the 
‘above’ to such an extent that history or earthly events have easily become 
the mere documentation of what is above or precedes it.1 **4
At issue in the ‘Christology of Paradox’ of which Weber rightly reminds 
us is that in Jesus Christ, God becomes what he is not. He becomes a 
creature. But not what we may call a neutral creature, but, rather, a creature 
under the curse. He ‘submits’ himself, he delivers himself to the 
contradiction of man against him.1**7 Hence his mediatorial role which is 
more of confrontation than appeasement. For the paradox has its causes in 
us rather than in God’s action upon us or only because God has become 
involved with us.
It is clear therefore that Christ’s event can be recognized and understood 
by us as the Salvation-event. We may undertake an historical approach with
143
the intended objective of recapturing that which can be said to be the 
authentic depiction of the historical Jesus, but that will not tell us that in him 
God is at work! As Weber states, ‘Even the historian who believes in Jesus 
is unable as a historian to establish anything other than a human life which 
was unusual in every regard and the unusual acceptance of this human life in 
the sphere of men's faith. But it remains history of death - where the great 
saying applies: ‘the living cannot be sought among the dead*. A point of 
criticism which he directs against Wolfhard Pannerberg's a p p r o a c h * ^  .  
which has been taken up recently also by Colin G u n t o n . ^ B
We can actually say that what emerges again and again in Otto Weber as 
an underlying critic of traditional Christology right through to the 
contemporary period, is his constant rejection of a central point in a system, a 
model of human possibilities as was the case during the Enlightenment, or as 
a source of a new self-understanding which dominated the nineteenth 
inasmuch as it did the twentieth century through existentialist philosophy. 
For to him, we encounter in the salvation event Jesus being the person 
through whom God has acted and acts in confrontation and fellowship with 
the human creature. Indeed, it is this that is basic to the thesis he advances as 
decisive for Christology, i.e. that in Christology - the issue is not the change 
of our consciousness (cf. Schleiermacher), but the transformation of the 
realm of Lordship and thus the very structure of life. In this regard, Jesus 
Christ is never the object of our knowledge but the giver of new life, trot 
just the knowledge of God - the Redeemer, but is simultaneously the 
experience of a turning around in our existence. Hence, his assertion of the 
unity of Christology with S o t e r i o l o g y . 1 ^
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This dialogic vision exhibited in this revisiting of the classical Christian 
teaching in all the diversity of its representation does not lose sight of the said 
basic thread. In fact, it is one that leads to the constant maintenance of 
method and content as inseparable in the theological task.
The challenge from Weber is in this approach which attempts to do justice 
to the New Testament witness and the Christian experience exhibited in the 
Church's Christology by returning to the whole pervading question of Jesus 
‘Who do you say that I am?’ (cf. Mt. 16: 13; Mk 8: 29; 1X9: 20 ^510-
Today in Africa, the Church faces many divergent traditions and 
theological strands similar to those exemplified in the context of Otto Weber: 
There are of course their peculiarities and concerns dictated by the 
distinctiveness of the African context just as it is with Weber's European 
context of his day. There is even the added dimension to theological activity 
(in literary form) in Africa in that one speaks of its stage as that of 
‘flowering’ after the disseminating activity of missionary Christianity and the 
rising into being of the African Church. A clear historical understanding of 
the heritage that has laid the foundation of the present trends is imperative if 
an effective evaluation and worthwhile contribution is to be made to its 
ongoing growth. This is especially true for theology as it is for Christology 
when we reckon that what emerges therefrom is not only to serve this 
particular context, but is part of the ongoing quest of the Church universal.
The zeal and determination has already been demonstrated in the 
pioneering work of her first generation of theologians and all who have in 
one way or another contributed to this effort. And the primary task of 
working out the African Church's expression of the said event has been
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made. Even though it remains true that theology as a facilitating process of 
this endeavour has to face the challenge with an ongoing sense of 
responsibility.
This is not only imperative in its response to the diverse challenges of the 
Christian church whose representation is of such a variety as the continent 
itself, but also in reckoning with the imperative challenge of entering into 
useful dialogue with the church worldwide. And this is especially true for 
christology where there are a variety of approaches.
The dialogic vision exhibited in Weber shows that variety can and has 
served to enrich the Christological discourse. What has to be borne in mind 
though is the one essential point of orientation; and that is the Christ-event 
through which God encounters us and confronts us as the Lord and the 
Christ. How this is done is the challenge and the preoccupation of the 
African Christian perspective, to which we now turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF AFRICA AND THE RESULTANT 
QUEST FOR AFRICAN THEOLOGY
The Christianization of Africa has been a process of both indigenous and 
missionary activity. The current concerns, dominant themes, and problems 
preoccupying the Church in Africa along with the methodological approaches 
employed in her theological articulation have been shaped in one way or 
another by this two dimensional scenery of its heritage. In fact, we need not 
emphasise that to talk of the Church in Africa is to recall a history that goes to 
the first century when Mark the Evangelist is said to have established the 
Church in Egypt. * It is to revisit that tradition of the early church fathers in 
North Africa where the immense contribution of Tertullian, Augustine, 
Cyprian and Donatus shaped the development of the early Latin theology, 
and indeed provided the foundation of what we now know as modem 
Western theology.^ The same is true for Athanasius, Origen and Cyril all of 
Alexandria whose thoughts did not only form the basis of Eastern Greek 
theology, but had influence also in the West.3
John Parratt has rightly observed that while it is true to say that North 
Africa was properly part of the Mediterranean world rather than Black Africa 
before the appearance of Islam, it is also the case that by the middle of the 6th 
century, the Christian faith had penetrated southward as far as Ethiopia^. 
Mbiti has argued that we have in the Ethiopian Church the bridging of the 
first Christian Africa with the new whose history is very much coloured by 
missionary Christianity and colonialism. For it is the only country 
belonging to the first Christian Africa that withstood Islamic expansionism in 
terms of history and g e o g r a p h y .5
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However, modem Christian Africa derives its distinctiveness from the 
fact that it is largely the child of European evangelization (and sometimes 
colonization) and the A m e r i c a s .  6 The pioneers were the Portuguese 
Catholics who made initial attempts at evangelizing Africa in the 15th 
century, a missionary activity that founded no lasting Church except for one 
convert who seems to have seen Christianity in African t e r m s . 4  This was 
Kimba Vita, a young Congolese girl of royal birth, who soon after baptism 
began to claim prophetic gifts. She identifies Jesus and the Apostles with the 
black race, saw Christ's role as liberator from poverty and oppression, and 
looked forward to a black millenium on Earth. In about 1706 Kimba was 
burnt at the stake, but her ideas have re-emerged in more recent teachings of 
some of the Independent churches.^
The full-blown missionary activity though was in the nineteenth century.
In fact this was the time that saw the beginnings of the great thrust of 
Protestant missions into Africa - with the given impetus originating from the 
Evangelical Awakenings of the time.9 And although one would reckon with 
the accreditation of this missionary expansion of the churches to the breath of 
the Holy Spirit reaching tomado-pitch, it is a fact of history that the 
structures arising therefrom were to a large extent the effect of colonial power 
in Africa, as Jean-Marc Ela observes. 10 Indeed he points out the fact that 
the missions sometimes had need of the military, economic and diplomatic 
support of Colonial Europe such that what one encounters is an expansion of 
the Western Church within that consitituted aspect of the world-wide 
expansion of the ‘West’ exhibited in this activity. 11 And as if to affirm this 
point, the planted African Church and even the orientation of its theology 
remained patterned along the models of Europe such that Adrian Hastings 
would characterise missionary Christianity as that of adopting ‘the faith is
Il
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Europe’ a p p r o a c h .  12 This is a factor that has been understood to explain, 
among other things, why there was little attempt at indigenization - except for 
the celebrated efforts of Bishop Samuel Adjayi Crowther and James Johnson 
in West Africa. Hence Mbiti's assertion that ‘Christian Africa is largely 
living on borrowed or inherited Christianity’. 13
The emancipation spirit that swept across Africa in the nineteen-fifties 
and -sixties brought this factor of a dependent Church into the theological 
agenda. In fact, this is the time that ‘missionary Christianity’ found itself 
not only faced with the charge of being an instrument in the colonial process, 
but as representing a theology that was basically wrapped up in the thought 
forms and cultures of Western Europe. 14 The calls for indigenization of 
Christianity, the emergence of independent churches, and indeed the call for 
an ‘African’ theology served to demonstrate the dissatisfaction amongst some 
African Christians toward ‘missionary Christianity’ in terms of its theology, 
church structures, patterns of ministry and even its liturgy or the ways of 
w o r s h i p .  15 This is a reaction that underlined the serious shortcomings that 
African theologians realised in missionary Christianity. And one that set off 
a real attempt at rethinking the Christian faith in African terms and doing 
theology in an African context as is demonstrated by the preoccupation of the 
African Church in the last thirty years. 16
Besides the immediate shortcomings of the unfortunate unholy alliance 
between the political, economic and cultural hegemony of the West on the 
one hand and the missionary enterprise on the other, 17 there was the 
tendency of ‘missionary Christianity’ to devalue traditional African culture 
and especially to dismiss traditional religion as heathen or pagan, such that 
there was no room for the appreciation of possible aspects of continuities 
between Christianity and African culture and religion. 18
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Obviously, several reasons can be given for this approach which in a way 
dominated missionary Christianity. However, there are clear indications 
from an overview of missionary activity, that a lot had to do with the 
backgrounds of pioneer Western missionaries. For many of them came from 
theological backgrounds where aspects of discontinuity between Christianity 
and every culture were stressed to the exclusion of continuity with local 
cultures. Conversion to Christianity was thus interpreted in terms of a 
radical breaking away from the past and being set in a new pattern of life, 
even if one continued to live close to one's cultural and social situation. In 
other words, the general orientation was that of an uprooting process rather 
than a transforming one. Hence the consequential unacknowledgement of 
the two-dimensional process of continuity and discontinuity evident in 
conversion, and this explains the subsequent condemnation of everything 
African as pagan and mere superstition - such that no dialectic relationship 
was e n v i s a g e d .  19 Indeed there was a recognition by these missionaries that 
African traditional religion was an integral part of being an African, being a 
member of a given tribe or ethnic community and this explains the reasons of 
its not being missionary, for that would imply conferring a tribal status to an 
alien to the tribe, which was unheard of (one had to be bom into it!); a 
pervading reality that could not be reduced to a narrow definition as it was 
the way of life. But this realization of the omnipresent nature of traditional 
religion did not stop them from demanding a total break away from this 
cultural heritage from new converts.^ Many of them had come to destroy 
the ‘Citadel of Satan’ and construct a new one of God in its place. With their 
presumption that there was no God outside Christianity, but the devil's 
realm, traditional religion was no doubt a Satanic faith.21 Samuel G 
Kibicho argues that it is these assumptions and the prejudices which these 
missionaries brought with them against the African people and their religions
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that is at display here. For to them, Africans were ‘Savages, primitive, the 
lower races’ etc and their religions were primitive religions, pagan and 
animistic - creating a serious missionary dilemma (for how appropriate was it 
to use the language and symbols of a people who did not worship the true 
God, and how were they to ‘exorcise’ the languages inbred with ‘Satanic* 
conceptions for them to be a proper channel for expressing the new and only 
true religion and thereby enabling the African to be freed from the claws of 
evil?) which was to become a fundamental cause of the constant struggle 
between African religions and Christianity.^^ Kibicho further points to the 
nineteenth century evolutionary view of human races and of their religions as 
advanced by Darwin and whose popular appeal then was not only outside 
Christian thinking in the West. As he states pointedly, ‘Africans and their 
religions were regarded as being at the bottom of the evolutionary ladder, 
while people of European origin were at the top’. Therefore colonisation 
was interpreted (and still is - especially white domination by the upholders of 
apartheid in South Africa) as a divine mission to help advance these savage 
races in the scale of humanity, or to civilise them. In this divine mission 
(the ‘White man's burden’), colonialism and Western Christianity saw 
themselves as u n i t e d . 2 4  Missionaries found themselves adopting one or 
both theories of how religion came about; how did man ever come to believe 
in the existence of any God, high or low? The two main theories as to the 
origin of religion are both based on the assumption that monotheism is the 
truth of the matter. (The Western world assumes this - and many African 
theologians assume it too, but it is necessary to realise that this assumption is 
made).
As has been observed, the one theory is that which holds the view that 
monotheism is the culmination and peak of a long evolutionary process from
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an original animism or animating up through polytheism and the like, to a 
final monotheism. The process includes fetishism, ancestor worship, 
totemism and so forth. This theory involves the assumption that man’s first 
reaction to the outside world was a single animistic reaction whereby he 
personified the nearby objects of the natural world and those processes of 
nature which immediately affected him. These personifications are the low- 
gods; that is, the gods of fertility, of the rivers and the springs, of the rains, 
of the fields, of the trees - and all gods of the earth, near to earth or distinct 
from it as is the case with the thought of the great gods of the sky who are 
high, remote, unapproachable and unapproaching. Man needed these low- 
gods, and their goodwill and active aid was a prime necessity for survival. 
This is said to be the origin of worship, bom out of the need to placate the 
low-gods on whom humans depend for their life itself. It is further 
maintained that out of this primitive animist religion emerged ultimately the 
idea of one God over all, until in the course of time man abandoned his crude 
animistic notions and arrived at the idea of and the belief in the one and only 
God.26
The second theory is ‘that religion started as a pure, orginal monotheism, 
that it became corrupted, the one into many, but that there was a revival of 
monotheism in Judaism, itself the cradle, if not altogether the nursery, of 
both Christianity and Islam’.22 It follows from this, therefore that the 
creation stories of Genesis are tacitly assumed as right and that when it is 
said in Chapter One that ‘God saw that it was good’ the word ‘good’ means 
‘morally good’. How earth and seas and sun and moon and stars can be 
morally good is hard to understand, just as it is difficult to see what the 
phrase ‘a fallen world’ means. The word ‘good’ means nothing except by 
reference to a predetermined standard. To this many have added the 
uncritical use of the word ‘good’ in the first chapter of Genesis, together
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with the uncritical attitude of the Old Testament by which chapters one, two 
and four are combined to give a picture of the Age of Innocence, giving us an 
unfallen man in an unfallen world. Is there really any such basis in the truth 
of the stories to be found in the whole world over, of a primitive state of
blessedness?28
When we turn to African religions, the evidence therein points to the fact 
that animistic religion existed with a clear notion of a supreme being or 
God29; these religions involve much more than a belief in animistic spirits. 
Animism is only one aspect of these religions, and therefore to say that 
animistic ideas concerning nearby objects and the nearby processes of nature 
existed in primitive times or exist today without any notion or trace whatever 
of a supreme-God, is an assumption based on a preconceived theory and a 
consequent failure to ask all the questions. Certainly one finds the supreme- 
God with his intermediaries, the low-gods, everywhere. Often this supreme- 
God is far away, so remote that he is altogether shadowy. Indeed the 
common practice is that he is not worshipped for he is too remote and it is the 
nearby gods who must be conciliated, and the supreme-God is hardly found 
in tribal customs and rituals - for how can such a supreme-God be found in 
these things?30
What comes into light, therefore is that the failure to ask the right 
questions or to look for such a God in things that cannot contain him resulted 
in the early missionaries missing him altogether; for they were looking for a 
cult of this God, a God who is far away, far above the lowering rain-clouds, 
remote from day-to-day affairs, and in any case unchangeable. Equally the 
belief in an original, pure monotheism is built on a preconceived theory.
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A lot of evidence can be deduced which supports the view that the African 
seems to have had a double animistic reaction to his environment. On the 
one hand was his personification of the nearer objects and the process of 
nature on which his life depends from day to day - a pointer to the 
polytheistic-gods on whom the animistic theory above is based. On the other 
hand, he also personified the totality of things, especially as embraced and 
covered by the all-embracing sky, and he supposed that there existed a 
supreme-God, away on the topmost mountain above the clouds looking 
down upon the flat earth. In this regard, the supreme-God, way up in the 
sky, is as much a product of animistic thinking as the low-gods are. The 
necessity of services, priests and worship of the low-god made their 
existence plain and obvious to missionaries, expecially if they were primarily 
interested in ceremonies and rituals. This double animistic reaction of man 
to his environment or outside world still belongs to our modem world as 
well as to any other; although today it tends to be more ‘sophisticated’, 
based on entirely different premises and using different categories, categories 
that are vast in number in the interpretation of the data gathered through the 
senses - this is the difference but in the way in which we think in comparison 
to our ancestors - for at the heart of animistic thinking is man's attitude and 
tendency to interpret the outside world in terms of purely human ways and 
human institutions and turning this interpretation into a dogmatic affirmation 
about the ultimate or the totality of things. We need not stress that there is 
no special language which can be used in speaking about God. For the only 
possible language is that which is used about man. But this does not stop us 
from being on the guard against imagining that God is a superman or an 
immensely larger kind of man. For even where language, say for example 
mathematical symbols and formulae, was capable of ensuring an escape from 
anthropomorphism, the depicting of God in the likeness of man, or more
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crudely, from making God in man's image - would still be no insurance 
against a picture of God devised in accordance with a particular form of 
human thinking. And this is very much like what may be called letting in 
anthropomorphism by the back d o o r . 31 A notable point is made by J K 
Mozley when he says, ‘The real question is this: Is there anything which is 
true about man which is also true about God? Obviously, if God exists, the 
fact of his existence is common to him and to man. But if nothing more than 
that can be said, the existence of God will make hardly any difference to man 
here and now; it will not give light to his mind, or strength to his will. 
Above all, it will not give him the least direction as to what his attitude to 
God should be or whether it matters if he puts all thought of God quite away 
from him. God is of importance in man's life only if and when it becomes 
possible to say something more about him than that he exists. But that 
‘something more’ must be of such a nature that it is within the ordinary 
man’s power to understand, unless the knowledge of God is reserved for 
some class of man, in which case once again, it will cease to be of any 
concern to the vast majority of men ... Whatever is said about God must 
have meaning which men will recognise because they have been familiar with 
the same kind of language in their experience. Nor does there appear to be 
any good reason at the very start to justify the view that something which is 
true when said about man will necessarily not be true when said about 
God?32
At issue therefore is that missionaries should have been sensitive to the 
permanent recurrence of ‘animistic’ reaction in all ages and should have been 
less eager to adopt either of the two theories as to the origin of religion. As 
it has been pointed out ‘it is regrettable that John Robinson's Honest to 
God, and Exploration into God,33 came a century too late to warn the early 
missionaries of the need for sensitivity in dealing with Africa's double
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animistic reactions, for this same reaction was present and real in 
missionary-Christianity, and although his book did crack the surface, 
enabling some to reflect the shadowy, otiose ‘supreme God’, a God who 
was as much of a product of man's animistic thinking as were the ‘earth- 
bound-gods’, the permanence of this double animistic attitude in all ages has 
helped to preserve this ‘God’ that never was. And although Jesus of 
Nazareth is the emphatic denial of the existence of such a God, modem 
theology is being constantly terrorised and betrayed by its retention of such a 
God. The African experience should remind us of some aspects of 
continuity and discontinuity in Christianity vis-a-vis other religions. While 
therefore, noting that there are aspects of discontinuity between the Gospel 
and African life, practice and culture, we must not neglect the aspects of 
c o n t i n u i t y ’ . ^  Even so, there is need to avoid giving the impression, after 
almost a century of Christian influence, that what the Africans regarded as 
the supreme-God can readily be called or renamed without any radical 
reconstruction and re-definition of the various beliefs and practices, the 
Father of our Lord Jesus C h r i s t .3 5
In other words, it is an adherence to the warning to guard against 
‘positivistic’ views about languages, cultures and religions. And the 
tendency is to ignore the historicity of such languages, cultures and religions 
and the practical life that resulted from such conceptualizations and belief.
For if we do this, we shall be falling into the error of what goes for much 
‘orthodox’ Christian theology, a theology that tends to identify ‘God the 
Father’ with a synthesis of the supreme-God of natural religion and the 
Absolute of the Philosophers. This so-called Christian ‘Supreme-God’ is 
strictly moral, but he remains remote, terrible, ranging from the ‘exalted- 
Jesus’ to priests. Hence the insufficiency of saying that because people
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believe in a ‘supreme-God’ who is one, this must be ‘the Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ’. Indeed there is every truth in the statement that the problem 
that faces modem theology today is that of stating what sort of a supreme- 
God we are talking about; or what kind of monotheism one is talking about. 
For the evidence of the New Testament, the moral Christian experience and 
church tradition will not be adequately represented if this one only God is 
understood to be one and all alone, who communicated with man through 
intermediaries. This evidence has cut through all the medley of 
intermediaries, establishing a pure monotheism that acknowledges God who 
himself can and does communicate with man. One theme of the Christian 
gospel is indeed ‘God is one, but man is not alone and nevermore need be 
so’. Being aware that all our ideas and images of God always have 
anthropormorphic suggestions, the Christian gospel declares that everyone 
can walk and talk with God, for God is immediately near. In fact it does 
underline the assertion that every Christian theologises, and thus, at issue is 
not whether there can be a contextual reflection. This is so because the New 
Testament, the moral Christian experience, and Christian tradition give a 
fuller and richer teaching about God's nature, purposes and activities. Belief 
in God has been deepened and widened through the fact of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ and the presence of the Holy Spirit within the 
Christian church, the fellowship of those who believe that Jesus Christ is 
‘the Lord’ and that God raised him from the dead; the events surrounding 
Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit have a direct bearing upon the knowledge of 
God and have been the chief influence and factors which have led to the 
building up of Christian theology. We cannot therefore formulate our 
thoughts in such a way that there seems to be distinction in the development 
of our thoughts on the person and work of Christ, for example, from that of 
the doctrine of the triune God. All the works of the divine are undivided and
mission follows expression. Those who wish to discard the trinitarian 
understanding of God seem almost to suggest that belief in the trinity was 
and is a simple matter. This doctrine is difficult because we are brought, 
however, reluctantly, to face the attempt to hold together two apparently 
different worlds; whether one looks at it in its Eastern, Athanasian and 
hypostatic way or in the Western, Augustinian and economic one, there still 
is the leap from the eternal to the temporal. Indeed it was evident as we 
discussed revelation in Chapter One that the question of how God can give 
himself to the world (of incarnation), which is a disclosure implying an 
alienation from himself, is a challenge that faces every theologian in the 
attempt to understand this disclosure and to find a way of stating it, a way 
that shall show the unity of theory and practice, paying full attention to the 
historicity of this disclosure or self-giving. And therefore, our ideas of the 
oneness of God, his supremacy, his impassibility, his transcendence have to 
be seen and re-thought in light of the Trinitarian understanding. For the 
unity of God is seen as its stake in the Passion of Jesus Christ and God's 
transcendence is shown to be related to the world, a relatedness which 
speaks of the divine humility, humility seen in the son, the word made flesh; 
and the world is therefore shown to be the stage of the divine drama of 
redemption. As for human thought, it is not autonomous, unshaken by the 
concrete material around it, and if we succeed in the ‘naming’ of God, many 
Christians in Africa today opt for ‘the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ’, the 
name'frnght help us to appeal to the material and to the concretely real. But 
the problem of man is not just the ‘name’ of God, but rather the prior 
problem of man's experience and knowledge of God who has known man. 
How are we to characterise how we are known by him? And surely our 
knowledge, however real it may be, is only partial, ambiguous and tentative 
if such knowledge is not knowing as we are k n o w n .3 6
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It is worth revisiting the timely warning therefore, that all African 
theologians should avoid over-reacting but take seriously the words of H.W. 
Turner, who studied African independent churches with thoroughness and 
sympathy when he says that he is not convinced that the ‘Limitations of a 
culture-bound white Western theology are best corrected by the development 
of other cultural theologies, black, brown or y e l l o w ’.37 in other words, the 
shortcomings of missionary Christianity cannot be corrected by a tendency to 
perpetuate similar inclinations even if it serves at a particular time a contextual 
concern. When it comes to Christology therefore, the urgent task is not one 
of mediation between African traditional religion and Christianity. On the 
contrary, what emerges as the immediate task is the concern to characterise 
Africa's experience of how God has known the African in pre-Christian 
days and now through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and by 
the Spirit which has been given to the African. This is where a dialogic 
insight exemplifies its input in that aspects of distinctive^^ discontinuity 
are not compromised in as much as continuities are to be made plain. Otto 
Weber's characterization of Christian experience (when we talk of encounter 
with God as encounter) as transformation serves to illustrate the point being 
made here.38
Rightly stated, ‘the Africans, like other people, see Jesus, who is the 
exegesis of God, through first century eyes, and that means often we do not 
understand their terms and outlook, their culture is not ours, and the picture 
they give us is full of ambiguities and we are constantly being forced to ask 
in humility whether the ‘clouded’ parts or the ‘faded’ areas are part of the 
original painting or not. And this first century picture constantly refuses to 
be transferred on to a new canvas however modemPhppropriate it may be - it 
always ends up a poor imitation hardly resembling that of the first century,
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the traditions associated with it, and people's knowledge of it then and today. 
This first century picture on the somewhat tattered and worn-out canvas 
demands great sensitivity and careful handling; and whatever picture we care 
to superimpose on the old one (like in Chinese pottery where new diagrams 
are superimposed on to the old ones), due to the shifts in experience, 
methods and categories of thought, this does not mean that the old one is 
completely obliterated, having no relevance and significance for us. This 
means that since we are dealing with a historical picture, and the discipline is 
certainly historical, we cannot finally dispose of any part of the c a n v a s ’ . 39 
This is a point reinforced by Robert Morgan when writing on the study of the 
debate about New Testament theology by stating,
a chess player has a definite aim, and the strategy 
behind his moving pieces around the board is 
dictated by that Similarly, in interpreting the 
whole tradition to reach a cogent position a 
theologian must so marshal the evidence of the 
tradition that an opponent has to admit the 
superiority of his position.40
Not that Morgan equates the theological game with chess in every way. 
For all the rules of the game are not decided in advance in theology. But 
where he draws the resemblance between the two is in the use of tradition to 
provide strategies. For Morgan, the tradition provides the pieces for the 
game rather than the rules. Hence his view that the formulation of a 
theological position requires reflection upon the traditional A view we also 
find asserted by Weber when he says
Dogmatics neither starts anew at a given point in 
time, nor does it commence with the destruction of 
what has gone before in history, it begins with 
critical respect for what has gone b e f o r e . 4 2
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Indeed, it is a view that reckons with the fact that all the pieces of tradition 
come back on to the board after every game of theological interpretation. The 
intention here is not that which seeks to destroy or through theological 
criticism try to mutilate that tradition by annihilating what is thought to be 
u n a c c e p t a b l e .4 3  On the contrary, it operates with the recognition that other 
peoples’ patterns have a role to play in the formulation of our patterns, in the 
communication of our understanding of the ways things are - and may even 
mould our entire patterns! Even though in the end the attempt to discover is 
ours, the patterns made on the voyage are an account of our travels for the 
assistance of other travellers. The lesson therein is that it is only when that 
account is made clearly and responsibly that it can begin to illuminate, or 
even perhaps point towards, the infinitely complex reality of God, who is the 
object of our journey and the path of our t r a v e l l i n g . ^
Now this raises an important point relating to the very nature of the 
Christian Gospel. For whereas the contextual imperative demands an 
exemplification of an expression of faith emerging out of a peoples' 
encounter with God in their time and place, it is that which they encounter 
which dictates their expression. And the same is true for Christology. For 
the concern for relevance has tended to lead to that practice where ‘our’ 
portrait of Jesus is painted on the old canvas. Thattdealised picture of 
ourselves or our ideals such that our reference to the first century witness 
(New Testament Church) is in fact a process that exemplifies our reflections 
of twentieth century African faces. Sentamu's call is therefore timely when 
he says that ‘African theology must resist the temptation of portraying Jesus, 
as many have done today, as a paradigm for the self-reliant, self-sufficient 
and entirely ego-directed - seeing Jesus as a model for the self-made man; 
which in fact is the figure of a self-portrait of bourgeois-capitalist secular 
man in his attempt to take Jesus away from his orientation and reject it as
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unintelligible to people today; or to portray Jesus as the oppressed, the 
under-privileged, the exploited, the powerless, who need to struggle with 
sinful-structures, principalities and powers, overcoming them by ‘obedience’ 
to the causes of justice and ushering in liberation, which in fact is a utopia
b e lie f  in progress’.45
MacKinnon rightly states ‘Christianity faces man with the paradox that 
certain events which could be otherwise are of ultimate, transcendent import; 
and this without losing their character as contingent events. The 
propositions crucifixus est sub Pontio Pilato; passus et sepultus est, are 
contingent propositions; their subject matter moreover is altogether innocent 
of miraculous undertones. Yet this judicial murder, its pain and its end, form 
the substance of c o n f e s s i o n ’ . 4 6  Obviously, this needs further elaboration 
which will come later. But for now, the invitation that seems to emerge from 
the above, is for us to recognise the Christian Gospel as a principle of life 
whose centre is the person of Jesus Christ, who although welcome and is 
easily adaptable, is at home in no culture 47
Reckoning with this fact then, how are we to characterise the subsequent 
emergence of African theology, taking into account the missionary past 
already outlined and the state of the church in Africa today? Following 
Kwesi Dickson, it is important to state from the very beginning that we 
recognise the fact that wherever the church has come into being, theologies 
of greater or lesser sophistication exist as every Christian t h e o l o g i s e s . 4 8  
And thus, at issue is not a question of going into the old debate of trying to 
justify the existence of an ‘African theology’. On the contrary, our concern 
here is more to do with how best to understand and characterise that which 
the term denotes in terms of its national, confessional, methodological or 
conceptual framework.
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We need not stress that ours is not a pioneering undertaking in that 
various attempts have already been made. In fact, it is in the light of this fact 
that is necessary to clarify what is meant by our usage of the term ‘African’ 
in that there are varying depictions of what is implied by its usage in the said 
attempts. For example, some African theologians hold the view that African 
theology, strictly defined, is the systematic presentation of the religious 
beliefs, ideas and practices of African Traditional Religions such that it is 
distinguished from African Christian t h e o l o g y . 4 9  Our position, however, is 
aligned with those who see this as a pedantic distinction since both must be 
concerned with the truth. Resorting to the Latin phraseology of Theologia 
Africana could be more of a romantic expression intended to serve as a 
linkage to the Latin Fathers of North Africa whose contribution to what is 
now known as Western theology was undoubtedly immense, even though 
Upkong has attempted to see its merits in terms of being a common title for 
both French and English-speaking A f r i c a .50 Indeed, it is worth stating that 
there is legitimacy in the usage of all these designations as is demonstrated by 
some African theologians who use them interchangeably. The primary 
concern is to recognise that at issue is an attempt to articulate that particular 
expression of the African people as they respond to the reality of their 
encounter with Christ's event; that self-disclosure and self-giving of God 
proclaimed in the Christian Gospel. This is an expression that is not done in 
isolation but within the heritage of its past such that there is a reckoning with 
that reality of continuity and discontinuity with the pre-Christian religious 
expressions as our christological quest would hope to exemplify.
In as much as the term ‘African theology’ is a whole-embracing one, we 
have to state that the continent confronts us with such a diversity and variety 
that is in itself a depiction of its geography, size, the complexity of her
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peoples’ cultures, languages and religions. Indeed, there are homogeneities 
such as similarities of rituals, practices and ideas amongst African peoples - 
especially in what has come to be known as sub-Saharan Africa. But these 
similarities do not overshadow the fact that there are also remarkable 
d ivergencies.51 Hence, the call to be on guard against sweeping 
generalisations, whether it is in reference to the cultures of the African 
people, their religious perspectives, and even their economic and social 
insititutions. And the need to reckon with the reality of the plurality of 
theological persuasions which we encounter therein.52
The South African situation confronts us with a particular dimension in 
the definition of African theology. For the continued oppression of Africans 
by whites through the racially discriminating legislation of apartheid 
architectured in its origin by Dutch Reformed Church theologians, has 
always led to the identification of African theology with Black Theology. 
The question as to who should participate in the quest for this theology 
therefore, becomes one of primary importance even though it may sound 
superfluous in the ordinary sense of treating the subject. As Basil Moore has 
shown, the point of departure emerges when we reckon that what we are 
dealing with here is a quest of ‘a theology of the oppressed, by the 
oppressed, for the liberation of the oppressed’.53 A wider perspective is 
raised by Justin Upkong who does not see the basic concern as one that aims 
at exclusivity. On the contrary he argues that the cutting-edge critical 
response of Black theology has always arisen from the basic concern to re­
discover in the Gospel that liberating theology of both the oppressed and the 
o p p r e s s o r . 5 4  This is a view that has found eloquent expression in Alan 
Boesak when he says, ‘Black theology ... comes from a situation of 
oppression and suffering of a people who believe in God and who ask what 
the Gospel of Jesus Christ has to say about the situation, is also a theology
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of liberation ... that which leads to a spiritual and a political exodus out of 
the situation of oppression toward one of liberation, - out of inhumanity, 
darkness and hatred toward a situation in which we, both whites and blacks, 
can regain our common humanity and enjoy a meaningful life that has been 
d e s t r o y e d ’ .55 Indeed, this is the insight which has found qualification in De 
Gruchy whose articulation of black theology is with the understanding that it 
is the Christian faith that determines how to relate to the sociopolitical 
situation, not the situation which determines the f a i t h . 5 6  The tendency to 
assert colour as the criterion of participation in its articulation by some of the 
exponents of black theology has, however, entertained shortcomings similar 
to those which it sought to overcome.
In pursuance of our already stated understanding of African theology as 
that response to the Gospel, that quest whose aim is to arrive at a distinctive 
meditation upon faith in Christ that does justice to the life-circumstances of 
the African C h r i s t i a n ,57 our usage of the term ‘African’ in our christological 
quest is not therefore different. Indeed we share the view of those whose 
definition of African theology in terms of the above render its usage as a 
summative and interpretative term for the various prayers, sermons, songs, 
poems, writings, beliefs, etc., through which the African Christians have 
and continue to express their experience of God's Salvific Act in the Event of 
Jesus Christ. And we need not stress that this befits that conception of the 
nature of theology as ‘a risky, albeit exhilarating business of reflecting on the 
experiences of a particular Christian community in relation to what God has 
done, is doing and will do - the ultimate reference point being the man 
J e s u s ’j58 a  conception that begins with the recognition that theology is of 
necessity particularistic, existential and provisional in that the universal faith 
of Christianity is always exhibited in local manifestations^ o  reality that
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always makes it imperative for every theologian to be sensitive and 
responsible to his own local community in as much as he reckons with the 
fact that the totality of its (community's) cultural manifestations do not 
supercede the greatness and richness of the Christian Gospel. The question 
here then is not one of exclusivity, but the realisation of the fact that the very 
diversity of the Christian Church begets plurality of theologies in that we do 
not all apprehend or respond to the transcendent in exactly the same way, nor 
can we be expected to express our experiences in the same way. Contrary to 
a possible viewing of this state of affairs in the negative, Tutu reminds us 
that here is a reason for rejoicing because it makes mandatory our need for 
one another because our partial theologies will of necessity require to be 
corrected by other more or less partial theologies. It reinforces the motive of 
interdependence which is the inalienable characteristic of the body of Christ. 
It is after all the Gospel of Jesus Christ which is eternal; man's response is 
always time-bound and his theology even more so. The former is what 
ultimately gives Christianity its universality. Of course theology will have 
universal elements because there are certain constants such as the 
recalcitrance of human nature and the thrust for self-transcendence.^^
It has to be said though that what has come forth in the calls for the 
enhancement of a local expression - best expressed in the term indigenization 
- has at times tended to be too backward looking, if not at times giving the 
impression that what is sought is a kind of a mixture of African traditional 
beliefs and the Christian Gospel.^O Tendencies of these kind, however, 
arise when one does not reckon with the fact that culture is not a static thing 
but is always dynamic. And a theology that arises out of what we referred to 
as that distinctive meditation upon faith cannot be blind to the scandal of the 
Gospel, but at all times will take into account its declaration of judgement
181
upon every culture in all its ungodly inclinations. Serious reflections on 
ones's context is no excuse for cheap and hollow theology. And therefore 
African theologians have to take seriously J.C. Thomas' reminder when he 
says,
...Africanizing Christianity can only be done ... if 
both traditional religion and the doctrine of the 
Christian churches are examined carefully and 
systematically and areas of agreement and conflict 
are carefully defined and demarcated. It is a 
tragedy that in just these areas African theologians 
are producing works which are superficial and
unscholarly.61
One area that we already pointed out as a major shortcoming of missionary 
theology was the general negation of African belief and religious heritage to 
such an extent that some could share Emil Ludwig's questions as to ‘how an 
untutored African could conceive of God? For deity is a philosophical 
concept which savages are incapable of f r a m i n g ’ ,62 and thus be engaged in 
that avowed duty of not only ‘civilizing’ the African, but drumming the idea 
of God into his mind - thought of as a tabula rasa - or at least filled with 
demonic ideas - which can only be exorcised by an exercise as the one stated. 
This is a fundamental error that would continue to be made even when people 
like Robertson Smith had long ago stated that,
No positive religion that has moved man has been 
able to start with a tabula rasa to express itself as 
if religion was beginning for the first time; in 
form if not in substance, the new system must be 
in contact all along the line with the old ideas and 
practices which it finds in possession. A new 
scheme of faij£an find a hearing only by appealing 
to religious instincts and susceptibilities that 
already exist in its audience, and it cannot reach 
these without taking account of the traditional 
forms in which religious feeling is embodied and 
without speaking a language which men 
accustomed to these forms can u n d e r s t a n d .63
But it is not enough to highlight these shortcomings and then not learn from 
them. For example it has been well documented that by negating Africa's
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religious heritage, missionary Christianity could not draw such enhancing 
insights as that of corporate life in African society which did not only stress 
the communal bond as source of identity, but the inseparability of the sacred 
and the p r o f a n e . 6 4  i n  other words, to speak of God is to speak of one who 
does not affect only one aspect of an individual's life, but his total way of 
living as an individual, as a family member, and his public life in society. 
When one turns to today's African Church and its inclinations, there seems 
to be a repeat of the above in that it seems to be advocating disengagement 
from the hectic business of life and that split of private and public life which 
has been a typical characteristic of Western s o c i e t y . 6 5  i n  fact it has been 
argued that this could be the root cause of its inability to speak meaningfully 
in the face of a plethora of contemporary problems which assail Modem 
Africa. A theology that seeks to undertake a holistic approach, that seeks to 
undertake to articulate that quest of faith engaged in the challenge of the 
Gospel or its witness and which seeks to yield that power which enables us 
to be driven back to Scripture and its witness in the Church's witness in 
history, and into the world of our time as we hope to in this undertaking, 
cannot afford such short sightedness.
One insight that seems helpful to me from Weber's dialogic approach is 
that which begins by identifying its primary task as raising those fundamental 
and formal questions with respect to the nature, content and method of doing 
theology. For by doing so, there is opportunity to identify the dominant 
directions of the common articulated positions of theology, their concerns 
and their approach in articulating them. As diverse a church as that of Africa 
today and the variety of its theologies can only be addressed adequately if we 
bear the above in mind. In fact, I take the view that this seems to be a helpful 
way worth attempting in our quest for christology. For it is by doing so that
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we can address those formal questions regarding our fundamental stances 
and presuppositions.
It has rightly been observed that easy rejection of Western theology by 
African theologians has meant that even concerns of methodology have been 
dismissed as pro-Western,'66 and yet it is only by addressing them that we 
can recognise those things that give shape to our thought forms.
It is important to bear in mind the inseparability of methodological 
questions and the content of theology. Some African theologians in their 
enthusiasm for contextualising theology have tended to forget this important 
factor such that what emerges from their articulation is an easy equation and 
identification of theology with strategies for specific Christian a c t i o n . 6 7  
Indeed, the challenging demands of Africa's economic, social and political 
problems confront the theologian with questions demanding immediate 
existential decision and direction. But the responsible theological task that is 
undertaken with the understanding of the role of theology as the compass of 
the Church cannot shy away from paying sufficient attention to the what and 
how of its t a s k .6 8  And a rigorous wrestling with the challenges of the word 
of Scripture and the existential situation of the Church in Africa can generate 
illuminating insights if this is seriously taken into account.
Acknowledging that all theologies and all pre-articulated religious 
experiences are in any particular situation shaped by the controlling images 
and the linguistic and conceptual categories inherited by the theologian in the 
cultural setting, I feel obliged to reflect on the emerging orientations and 
perspectives in the articulation of theology in Africa today before addressing 
the question of religious authority which sets in perspective our christological 
formulation within this context.
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EMERGENT PERSPECTIVES IN AFRICA’S CONTEMPORARY
THEOLOGY
Whether it was by sheer coincidence or otherwise, the emergence of a 
serious attempt at rethinking the Christian faith in African terms has always 
been traced to the Emancipation Spirit that swept across Africa in the mid­
fifties and sixties. As we already indicated in the preceding chapter, this was 
not only the time when the issue of a dependent Church was brought to the 
theological agenda, but it also marked the beginning of a clear expression by 
some within the Church that the time had come when there had to be a 
restating of Christian realities in a way that was to reflect African thinking 
and expression. In fact, Bolaji Idowu sets this turning point in perspective 
when he says,
‘During the All African Conference of Churches in 
1963, it became quite clear to a number of us that 
the Church in Africa could only attain self-hood 
and be adequate for her mission when she 
possessed a first-hand knowledge of her Lord of 
the Church and was able to express that 
knowledge in clear accents made possible through
her own original meditation and thinking.’ 1
This is the point which Gwinyai Muzorewa also highlights with his assertion 
that the inauguration of the said Conference did mark the official beginning 
of African theology.^ This move was not so much geared towards filling a 
theological ‘vacuum’, but one that for once undertook with seriousness to 
confront the emerging Church in the Continent with the imperative challenge
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of the need to exemplify that expression of originality in her response to the 
Gospel within her context. And nowhere else was this more evident than in 
the widespread desire for ‘indigenisation, or ‘contextualisation’ of both the 
theory and practice of the Gospel Witness. In fact Mercy Oduyoye who has 
given a splendid account of this in her book Hearing and Knowing - 
Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa, points out that it was not 
only the articulated input of Idowu’s ‘Toward an Indigenous Church' that 
gave expression to the above desire, but formed part of an ongoing process 
facilitated by individual and collective effort in the quest for ‘original 
meditation and thinking’.^ This can be said to have culminated in the Ibadan 
Consultation of African theologians in 1966 which has rightly been described 
as,
‘an expression of a deep longing that the Churches 
of Africa might have an opportunity of thinking 
together of the faith which had come to them from 
the older Churches of the West through 
missionaries of a different cultural background 
who, in the nature of things, could not fully 
appreciate the reactions of their converts to their 
faith in the light of their own traditional beliefs and 
practices.’4
For as she states further, African theologians, like the Samaritans at the well, 
were saying, ‘It is no longer because of your words that we believe, for we 
have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is indeed the Saviour of the 
World.’ (Jn. 4:42).5 This assertion exemplified the emancipation spirit 
through which the said events and the called for process was understood in 
no other way, but as liberating attempts that freed African Christians from 
‘predigested’ theologies. For it enables them to recognise the shackles of 
Western categories and practices in missionary theology, thereby
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facilitating their creative working out of new modes of self-expression and 
communication. And this is demonstrated by the various efforts undertaken 
by pioneer African theologians in their search for authentic forms of 
expression. This undertaking that was not only given a boost by the 
collective input of various consultations and conferences, but the self-hood 
movement of the churches and the impetus of the ecumenical movement.^
It has to be said though that inasmuch as some saw in the call for 
indigenisation a major breakthrough in the way of realising the desired 
authentic expression, problems connected with the whole process were 
already being identified. For to some, indigenisation seemed to suggest a 
process that lends a syncretism as some of its exponents tended toward 
uncritical accommodation of a given cultural form in the attempt to make the 
Gospel relevant, and thereby compromising its witness. To others, it 
seemed to contradict the understanding of the growth of the Church. As 
John S. Mbiti writes, ‘I have not used the term indigenisation of the Church 
in Africa. I find the term to be contrary to my understanding of the Church. 
Indeed, I reject it so far as it implies “indigenising” an already existing 
Church, already created Church.
The most serious criticism, however, is that the concept has led 
theologians to be far too concerned with the past, both in defining their task, 
and the identification of the sources for articulating the Gospel within the 
African setting. This tendency that has been seen on the one hand to be 
isolating and perpetuating a kind of fragmentary approach to theology,^ and 
on the other hand, as one that seems to treat culture as something static rather 
than dynamic. This created a situation where issues being dealt with as of 
particular importance seem to have little or no relevance at all to the spirit of
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modernity that leads Africa to the future. This is a problem that even Idowu 
who established himself as a leading exponent of indigenisation was not free 
from. For inasmuch as he challenged the Church in Nigeria (and the rest of 
Africa too) to exemplify that atmosphere of spiritual freedom experienced 
through being in Christ, - that unmistakeable stamp of an indigenous Church 
instead of being a kind of a colony of Rome, Canterbury, London or an 
outreach post serving the vested interest of some European or American 
missionary board,^ his reliance on the symbols, thought forms and language 
of Africa's traditional religions as the source of authentic theological 
expression befitting an African Church set his approach on a vulnerable 
footing.
Indeed, the basic input was no doubt one of seeking for an indigenized 
Christianity where in the case of his native country Nigeria, the church 
should enable the worshipper to worship, articulate what he believes in the 
form, idiom and expression that is Nigerian. This is an approach and 
theology that does not aim at simple rewriting of European theology based on 
the European experience of the Lordship of Christ, but one that exemplifies 
the very nature of the Christian faith as fulfilling and not destroying or 
uprooting, making and freeing and not enslaving. 10 This affirms the reality 
of the particularity of every given Christian community in such a way that 
there is acknowlegment of the universal dimension of her faith and the 
preeminence of the eternal, cosmic and unchanging Christ who is the Only 
Lord of All.
But the basic problem for Idowu is that for him to rely on the said 
symbols, thought forms and language of Africa's traditional religions as the
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only medium through which authentic indigenous theology can be expressed 
did not only confine his approach to the limitations of the value of their use, 
but exposed himself to the misrepresentation that his is a call for a ‘response 
to the Gospel in terms of traditional culture’. 1 * Hence the assertion that in 
spite of his desire to derive those insights that were to lead Africa toward the 
future and those that were relevant to the spirit of Africa's modernity, his 
programme of indigenisation tends to be past oriented, backward looking and
retrospective.^
Amidst this crisis and restlessness with a theology and methodological 
framework that tended to be backward looking and was more prone to regard 
African culture as static rather than dynamic, coupled with a desire to move 
towards the future and to be relevant to the spirit of modernity in Africa, 
there arose the new term ‘contextualization’ which became a household name 
unlike adaptation, accommodation or inculturation used interchangeably with 
indigenisation. The dominant view was that unlike indigenisation which 
tended to be used in the sense of responding to the Gospel in terms of the 
socio-religious elements of African life, contextualization, while not ignoring 
this, takes seriously the socio-political aspects of life such as the struggle for 
human dignity, justice, issues of secularity and technological advancement as 
it seeks to produce symbols, thought forms and language that are universal 
and yet inclusive of Africa's reality. In other words, authentic 
contextualization is always prophetic, arising always out of genuine 
encounter between God’s Word and his world, and moves toward the 
purpose of challenging and changing the situation through rootedness in, and 
commitment to a given historical m om ent.^ Gwinyai Muzorewa's words 
sum it all when he says,
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‘contextual theology does not mean mere 
conformity to the past and present situations, but 
critical and prophetic confrontation with the
movement of history.’ ^
This point is reaffirmed by Allan Boesak when he says that authentic
contextual theology is not merely an exhumation of the corpses of tradition as
seems to be the case in indigenisation, but of those traditions from the past
which can play a humanising and revolutionising role in contemporary
society. It takes from the past what is good, thereby offering a critique of the
present and opening perspectives for the future.^
Like indigenisation, however, the representation of contextual theology 
has had its shortcomings. For to some, the emphasis on the context and the 
specific human situation has tended to suggest an orientation whose starting 
point is no longer the text of scripture as it is re-read within a given setting. 
This seems to be the case especially among exponents of black theology 
whose embrace of James Cone’s approach has at times appeared uncritical as 
it tended to perpetuate that over-emphasized attachment to the black 
experience and the black situation as if the setting itself is the starting point of 
theological r e f l e c t i o n .  16 Questioning this tendency, Allan Boesak has rightly 
stated that
‘the black situation is the situation within which 
reflection and action take place, but it is the word 
of God which illuminates the reflection and guides 
the action. We fear that one attaches too much 
theological input to the black experience and the 
black situation as if these realities within 
themselves have revelational value on a par with 
Scripture. God, it seems to us, reveals himself in 
the situation, the word being heard in the 
situation, thereby giving meaning to the situation.
The black experience provides the framework 
within which blacks understand the revelation of
God in Jesus Christ. No more, no l e s s ’ . 1 7
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The most recent criticism is that which we find in John Sentamu's work 
we referred to earlier, and which focuses on the definition of 
contextualisation as a term whose conception suggests a dichotomy between 
message and context, as though the message is apprehended apart from the 
acquired structure of consciousness given in the context first and then either a 
restatement is made in terms of indigenous categories or the context is 
challenged and changed according to the message perceived by those who are 
no doubt rooted in and committed to the historical context. ^
What is questionable as he points out is the kind of understanding of human 
apprehension and perception suggested here. For if language and human 
apprehension arise together in the mind's act - as we believe to be so, and 
that we do not first get hold of a subject and then shop around for just the 
right word or language to package the subject of our experience, then the 
definition as given above does not adequately express the phenomena of our 
apprehension of the Gospel. Moreover, whatever is given as the Gospel is 
given us in and through, and never apart from the linguistic and conceptual 
structure of the context and the dominant images therein; and this does not 
rule out subsequent critical and reflective methods attempting to find better or 
richer concepts for expressing our given experience.
Sentamu sees the problem arising also from what seems to be a dubious 
and non-African perspective of what understanding itself is . For unlike 
some forms of Western thought, understanding for Africans is not a tool, a 
faculty that humans possess among many other faculties, but rather that 
fundamental form of existing, the self-referent sense of the way in which our 
existence takes shape amidst contemporary African realities. When we speak
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of experience, therefore, it should not be regarded as just an issue of 
subjectivity or a domain of privacy; experience, therefore, is not some form 
of ‘natural’ theology in which we begin de novo with religious experience, 
but rather the use of experience as a means of understanding a faith content 
that is by no means derivative from such experience.
Illustrating from the New Testament, he points out that when Paul spoke 
of being ‘in Christ’ he did not propose to derive a theological concept of the 
corporate Christ from experience, but rather, given the reality, he attempted 
to find analogies within experience which could serve to provide 
understanding of what the corporate Christ meant in his actual existence. 
The issue here was what ‘in Christ* meant, and to what extent it was 
exhibited and intelligently related to his experience - bearing in mind that 
his encounter with the risen Christ spoke of his transcendence. This is a 
factor he found going beyond the concern to contextualise or indigenise in 
that what is encountered here, it would seem , is a Tology that proposed 
Jesus Christ's uniqueness and defines the sense in which he is so in a special 
way, one that demands the combination of textual, historical, sociological 
and geographical, liturgical and ethical methods. It starts with the 
recognition that at the centre of its task is a person; Jesus Christ, who will 
never, logically never, be transparent to any or all models, for the point at 
which he is most completely one with us is the point also of dissimilarity. 
This is to say, therefore, that it is imperative that the root of Christology and 
the content of the Christian Gospel is recognised as lying primarily in the 
experience of New Testament Christians - which remains indispensable as 
the starting point of any Christian theology. For as Pannenberg reminds us,
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‘every interpretation of an event must be justified from the context in which it 
was experienced or from the context of new experience which calls forth new 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ’ . ^  This is to say that the interpretation of Jesus finally 
adopted depends in part on the estimate of the quality of traditions gathered in 
the New Testament. For it matters as to whether we can dismiss these as 
fanatical delusions or irresponsible inventions giving us a merely human 
religious teacher who came to be thought of as divine due to the influence of 
Hellenistic religions or whether we hold them as exhibiting the characteristics 
of reliable testimony.
The New Testament records mediate a figure of the past so that he 
becomes a reality in the present and they can validly be called the media of 
historical mediacy and the given or datum of Christology in the sense that 
they constitute both its starting-point and its finishing-point; they prescribe 
the problems and define the issues with which a fully articulated and 
integrated Christology must finally d e a l .20
The basic argument here is that although we must wrestle with the 
material and try to put ourselves in the shoes of the first century Christians, it 
is worth bearing in mind that what we are offered is these early Christians' 
understanding of Jesus, stories about Jesus which were not passed on 
simply because they happened to be stories about Jesus which they loved to 
hear, but because each story demonstrated the power of God at work in 
Jesus, and proclaimed the significance of what was happening through him, 
not only for those who had met him during his earthly life, but for those who 
met him now, as the risen Lord. It is by sensitively examining this Christian 
experience that we discover where the uniqueness of Jesus lies and what sort
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of a uniqueness it is. As we stated earlier on, this is not just a question of 
repeating biblical metaphors but an attempt at interpreting the various 
expressions of Christian faith, an interpretation that seeks to be truthful to the 
witness of those first century Christians and the experience of many Africans 
today; that Jesus Christ alone among men is the bestower of full salvation, 
and why it is that the language used to describe Jesus of Nazareth is language
tv> o r t f a /  typtffe&fr
that a theist of a monotheistic religion would use to describe Godytovthe 
significance of Jesus Christ for those who hear the Gospel. If the ‘death of 
Jesus on the cross and his resurrection represent the bearing of human guilt 
and man’s mortal destiny by God himself, who "identifies" himself with the 
man Jesus and in so doing overcomes guilt and death for us all’,21 it means 
that we have to take seriously this particular moment of God's action for us. 
The particular circumstances, place, time and the particular culture are so 
bound up with the revelation itself. And therefore, if we want to understand 
what the Evangelists are saying to us about the significance of God's 
revelation in Jesus Christ, then we have to wrestle with their ways of 
expressing the Gospel truth; for God spoke to them in their situation, and 
they responded to him in the language and terms which they knew. This is 
seen in the various books of the New Testament where the Gospel is applied 
in every possible situation as is shown by the distinctiveness of the way it 
was represented to the Jews in Palestine, in the Gentile world, and in mixed 
communities. For example, Paul's expounding of the relation of the Gospel 
to the Jewish man to the Jews employs terms of his own background and 
that of his leaders, but when he is writing the same message to the Greeks in 
Corinth, he does so in terms of their situation as is illustrated by his relation 
of the Gospel to Wisdom and P h i l o s o p h y .2 2  it is the same message - but the 
language and form and expression vary. The same is true in John's Gospel
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where the writer picks up themes of the various Jewish festivals to show 
how Jesus Christ embodies everything to which they were pointing. And the 
same can be said of the letter to the Hebrews whose focus on the Jewish cult 
rather than the law led to the exposition of the significance of Christ's event 
in terms of the Jewish sacrificial system such that for him, Jesus Christ was 
the fulfilment of all religious hopes.23
At issue here is that these authors used different aspects of their Jewish 
heritage to demonstrate Christ as the fulfilment of their own longings, the 
focal point of God's activity, which was true to their experience, at least they 
tell us so. The Gospel then must be expressed in our own language and in 
terms befitting our culture and situation if it is to be relevant, bearing in mind 
that we do not know all the answers about Jesus of Nazareth. This 
reinterpretation means that the Gospel is always proclaimed as relevant to the 
situation of the age which implies a permanent application of the Gospel. 
Jesus Christ himself may be the same yesterday, today and tomorrow, but 
the way in which he is preached changes, and must change as Jesus is set in 
the life of each Christian community and is interpreted in terms of their 
needs, ideas and culture.
The culminating point for Sentamu's argumentation and which forms the 
basis of his rejection of the dichotomised text-context scheme he sees 
inherent in the representation of indigenisation and contextualisation as we 
have shown above is what he views as central to the New Testatment 
witness. As he puts it, ‘the words, titles and ideas which the first Christians 
naturally used to express their faith in Jesus were part of a background which
203
is totally different from ours, but we do well to remember that in all the 
varied ways in which the New Testament speaks about Jesus (as Christ, as 
Lord, as Saviour), what is ultimately being spoken about is the activity of 
God. Jesus is seen as God's involvement with man and the w o r l d ’ . 2 4  This 
factor makes it imperative, as he says, for our Christology to point beyond 
the figure of Jesus to the activity of God bearing in mind C.K. Barrett's 
reminder that ‘it is possible to study the history of Jesus at some length 
without ever perceiving that the issue involved in it is the truth about God. 
The truth that Jesus himself directs us t o ’ .25 And one which was not lost to 
African theologians. For in their consultation conference held in Ibadan in 
1965 they demonstrated their awareness of this by stating; ‘we believe that 
the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Creator of Heaven and 
Earth, Lord of history, has been dealing with mankind at all times in all parts 
of the World. It is with conviction that we study the rich heritage of our 
African peoples, and we have evidence that they know him and worship him; 
we recognise the radical quality of God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ; and 
yet it is because of this revelation we can discern what is truly of God in our 
pre-Christian heritage: this knowledge of God is not totally discontinuous 
with our peoples' previous traditional knowledge of h i m ’ .2 6
Embracing dichotomised text-context scheme for Sentamu, therefore, 
seems to go contrary to this awareness and the reality that the Gospel for 
what it is, is apprehended in and only through the social matrix. This is 
especially true when thought and apprehension have no independent 
existence apart from the social and shared existence.
What I find debatable though, is whether a particular representation of
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contextualisation such as the one under discussion can be taken as 
representative of contextual theology. There is no doubt that exponents of 
African theology whose basic concern has been one of redressing the 
imposition of an alien world-view and thought structure in the African 
church, found contextual theology rendered in terms of the dichotomised 
text-context scheme plausible. And the stated criticism holds true if this 
reaction to a theological status quo is made the standard framework for the 
theological task of the Church in the continent. But when it comes to the 
usage of term contextualisation as an exemplification of that dynamic process 
of the church's reflection, in obedience to Christ and his mission in the 
world, on the interaction of the text as the word of God and the context as a 
specific human situation within which the word is received,27 then the issue 
is different. For it seems to me that the underlying concern here is the 
understanding of the very nature of theology . In other words, there is a 
recognition of what Bengt Sundkler reminds us of when he says,
‘theology .... is that ever-reviewed re- 
interpretation of the given Gospel to new 
generations and peoples, and that re-presentation 
of the will and the way of the one Christ in a 
dialogue with new thought forms and culture
patterns'.^
Furthermore, the concrete reality of God's activity in Jesus Christ may be 
rooted in the historical incarnation where the salvific act was concretised in 
historical terms. But the transcendent nature of the one at work makes it a 
living reality in every generation as the limitation of time and space have no 
place. Osadolor Imasogie as he discusses the role of culture in theological 
articulation, however, reminds us that
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‘the very fact of historical incarnation suggests 
that this presence is not always effectively 
mediated through the medium of theology 
formulated in one culture and generation.
Symbols lose their potency and the theological 
formulations become atrophied when the symbols 
around which they are built have become 
irrelevant or foreign to a people of another culture.
There is always a search for living and relevant 
symbols that mediate the saving presence of God 
in Jesus Christ. This is what theologians mean by 
the concept of the contemporaneity of the eternal 
Christ who comes in every age and culture to 
every generation waiting to be apprehended in the 
cultural and historical life situation of a particular 
people. He does not become real to the people 
merely on the basis of what an earlier generation 
and culture has said, as important and valid as this 
is. He becomes real only on the basis of the 
authentic discernment by every generation. When 
this discernment occurs, the new generation 
discovers, to its joy, that the Christ thus disclosed 
is the same eternal Christ known by the earlier
generation in their own situation’. ^
This is a discernment that does not come about through simple translation of 
what others have said in their language, idiom and thought forms or 
symbols, but one that invites critical wrestling with the text as read and heard 
in the present. In other words, the content of the Gospel message in all its 
claims is as much for scrutiny as the traditions it has come through to us. 
For the task of theology is as much of a dialogue with the past and the 
present as it is an appraisal.
When it comes to defining the task and method of our theological 
articulation, it is not sufficient to emphasise the contextual as if what is 
sought is a parochial kind of theology befitting only the African Church as 
the case has been in the past. As we have stated above, we reckon that 
elements that characterise a particular theology and contribute to its
206
development take shape in the tackling of problems relevant to its time and 
place in the sight of God's revealed Word. And the history of Western 
theology suffices as an illustration of what is being said here in that her 
confrontation with the philosophical, religious and socio-political difficulties 
of her time did provide a service of theological ad v an ced  But at no time 
did this particularistic concern overshadow the universality of her message. 
Hence the reminder that no theology is authentic and universal if it does not 
meet the integrated needs of a particular people in a particular historical 
context. As Imasogie puts it, ‘it is only as theology responds to the 
existential needs of a people within the specific cultural and historical milieu 
of their self-understanding that the universality of it can be enhanced and 
enriched. After all, what is universality if it does not mean relevance for 
people concerned?^ 1 And this is the same point we find echoed by Robert 
J. Schreiter, though from a different approach, when he says,
‘The gospel is always incarnate, incarnate in the 
reality of those who bring it to us, and incarnate in 
those who help us nurture the beginning of faith.
Church is a complex of those cultural patterns in 
which the Gospel has taken on flesh, at once 
enmeshed in the local situation, extending through 
communities in our own time and the past, and 
reaching out to the eschatological realisation of the 
fullness of God's reign. Thus there is no local 
theology without the larger church, that concrete 
community of Christians, united through word 
and sacrament in the one Lord. The Gospel 
without church does not come to its full 
realisation; the church without Gospel is a dead 
letter. Without church there is no integral
incarnation of the G o s p e l ’ .3 2
What is being called for here, is the need to distinguish between 
particularistic approaches to theology that tend to be parochial and always 
seem inclined to operate on exclusive frameworks that romanticise culture
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and identities of given communities, and that working of theology that 
emanates from a given Christian community’s witness of her faith - one that 
is always the key source for theology's development and expression. The 
latter seems to exemplify what authentic contextual theology implies, and one 
which can be said, therefore, to have been, and will continue to be the 
character of theological enterprise. This being the case, therefore, the 
challenge is to recognise that it is a shallow way of theologising to think of 
contextualisation in terms of the mere task of finding adequate analogies from 
a given setting. On the contrary, it invites us to articulate that vigorous 
interaction between the text as the Word of God and the context as a specific 
human situation. This is a form of articulation that brings to the fore both the 
judgmental message of the text on the given context inasmuch as it 
exemplifies those given values it affirms, c ne that can be said to depict a 
dialogic relationship between the biblical text and the human context where 
all forms of idolatrous beliefs and practices, whether secular or religious, are 
judged and stand condemned. And yet that which is compatible with the 
Gospel message or law of God as witnessed in scripture, is purified,
transformed and put under the Lordship of C h r i s t .3 3
*
In view of the above, therefore, our methodological frameworks, it 
seems, cannot be worked out on the common divide of either preoccupying 
oneself with concerns of the transmission of the Gospel message as is the 
case with translation models like adaptation or inculturation, or those 
concerned with the existential questions of the context within which the 
Gospel is proclaimed as contextualisation is at times portrayed to be. On the 
contrary, I would argue for a dialogic framework that recognised the 
inseparability of the former from the latter. For that dynamic interaction of
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the textual message with a given context in the entirety of its experience 
cannot, it seems, be exemplified in any other way other than this. Moreover, 
this is what it entails to speak of the incarnate Word. It is worth stating that 
to speak of an African theology that is based on the Bible, the theology of the 
early church, African tradition and the living experience of the church in 
A frica^  without excluding, as he does, experiences of the Christian faith 
and thought in other contexts such as that of the Western church to which the 
church in Africa owes its Christian heritage, is to speak of an approach that 
is imperatively dialogic. And one which can be said to offer a workable 
framework for the articulation of that which the Christian church in Africa in 
all its diversity testifies to.
Dominant themes in contemporary thinking
Having highlighted the methodological concerns that preoccupied African 
theologians during the post-independence period (and continue to do so) 
reckoning with their limitations and their strengths as frameworks of 
articulation, it serves our purpose to turn to those themes that have come to 
dominate the theological scene - thereby facilitating the characterisation of 
contemporary trends of theology in the continent.
In the lead as one of the recurrent themes among African theologians is 
the role of culture in theology. The variety of ways in which it has been (and 
continues to be) treated, and the wide range of issues involved in the whole 
question of the Gospel and culture, however, makes it difficult to adequately 
address all that needs to be said on the theme in a sub-section of a chapter
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such as this. And it is in recognition of this limitation that we propose to 
focus on two basic features that have tended to characterise the thinking of 
African theologians in their approach to the subject
The first one falls within the framework of what we may call an apologia 
stance of African theology. For it is here that some African theologians, in 
their prime concern with that past of pre-Christian Africa, have not only 
negated the paternalistic history of some missionary approaches in their 
adoption of a ‘tabula rasa* viewing of the pre-Christian African m i n d ,35 but 
tended to argue for a dichotomised representation of Christianity and culture. 
The basic reason is that it does not only operate on a false and an artificial 
depiction of the essence of the Christian faith, but one whose main intention 
(as African theologians would argue) was the suppressing of African cultures 
as the invading European culture took a dominant role.36
Whether one operates from that framework that seeks a synthesis 
between Christ and culture, and one in which Christ stands above, yet 
embracing the given culture in its aspects, as in Clement of Alexandria and 
Thomas Aquinas, or the dualistic representation where a radical distinction 
is made between God and man - and, therefore, Christ and culture (while 
maintaining rather than dissolving the tension between the two) as in Luther 
(and to some extent, Paul, Marcion and Augustine), or that of Christ as the 
transformer of culture 37 _ as this treatise is inclined to, the incarnation 
event makes it untenable to talk of cultureless Christianity. And the same is 
true for theology where few today, as Oduyoye reminds us, would dispute 
that it is ‘a field that is not unaffected by history and culture. Myths by 
which we express religious intuitions that are beyond words and beyond
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history are constructed out of experience. Our human yearnings to fathom 
the unknown life, the differentiation of existence, death, and that which is 
beyond death are at the base of the Creation stories that are found in primal 
world views including that of the Hebrews. Similarly, our hope that chaos 
will give place to order, isolation to communion, and death to life is also 
bom out of experience’. ^  This is a point that finds affirmation in Osalador 
Imasogie when he states that no human perception is pure - always tainted by 
the distorting effect of one's culture.39
What emerges in what has been referred to as the ‘anthropological’ 
concern of African theology serves to demonstrate this recognition, in that 
therein is not just the acknowledgement of the above stated reality, but a 
move to rehabilitate the past of Africa's rich cultural heritage and religious 
conscience without which our articulation of the present remains incomplete. 
In fact, Kwame Bediako has rightly observed that those engaged in this 
endeavour (which is undertaken as a self-conscious Christian  and 
theological effort) do make it plain that it is only when this is done that the 
true identity of the African Christian is given.40 This explains why those 
who have been on the forefront of this endeavour have not given in to the 
temptation of treating the reality of Africa's religious past in terms of a 
‘chronological’ past but as an ‘ontological’ past, which together with the 
profession of the Christian faith, gives account of the one and the same 
identity, namely, the religious consciousness of the African Christian.41 
This is to say that in as much as there is an assertion of discontinuity with the 
past which conversion entails, there is also a recognition of a ‘continuity’ that 
is not divorced from culture, but as Kenneth Cragg has stated in another 
connection, what is being spoken of here is that ‘integrity in conversion’ that
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exhibits that unity of self in which one's past is genuinely integrated into 
present commitment. In other words, the crisis of repentance and faith that 
makes us Christian is understood as truly integrating what we have been in
what we becom e.^
Speaking soteriologically, therefore, the passing away of ‘the old’ in 
conversion experience does not mean ‘uprooting* one from his culture as 
past tendencies seemed to suggest. On the contrary, what is being spoken of 
is an affirming transformation. The danger though is to view this cultural 
continuity in such a way that it seems to form the basis which the 
authority of theological articulation is derived. For inasmuch as we seek to 
emphasise the aspect of continuity as one that bears the particularity of a 
given Christian community, or an exhibit of its distinct identity, it remains 
finite and therefore relative. Any attempt to absolutise it is, therefore, bound 
to lead to the same tendencies we saw in Chapter One when the ‘German 
Christians’ of the 1930s absolutised the authority of the Third Reich's 
political experience. Adrian Hastings makes a fitting cautioning reminder 
when he says,
'Any absolution of the authority of any particular, 
personal, ethnic or international religious tradition 
or experience - even the experience of the 
Reformation or the life of a saint or whatever - is 
inherently to deny ultimately that absolute
authority of the Biblical tradition’^
The second dominant concern in the treatment of the role of culture, 
however, moves beyond this and focuses on the whole question of the 
hermeneutic criterion in theology. For whereas it is important to assert that 
cultural continuity exemplifies that reality of the particular Christian identity,
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it is also essential to recognise that the way theology is articulated depends on 
how we address that aspect of our human experience that informs our 
theology as much as the Bible. This is especially imperative, for in 
accepting, as the Asian theologian C.S. Song puts it, that there is no such a 
thing as a theology immune from cultural and historical consequences 
we are acknowledging some type of human experience as source for 
theology that is always in a kind of interplay with the biblical source. To 
many African theologians, the suppression of African culture did not only 
bring about a crisis of identity, but that of hermeneutics, as given 
frameworks which were always Western-blended, perpetuated an alien 
representation of the preaching and teaching of the Christian faith that had no 
place for traditional thought patterns of the recipients. In fact, John V. 
Taylor, writing in the early sixties had already highlighted this problem when 
he said,
‘Christ has been presented as the answer to the 
questions the white man would ask, the solution 
to the needs that Western man would feel, the 
saviour of the world of the European world view, 
the object of the adoration and prayer of historic
Christendom... *45
The stress on Africa's cultural heritage as providing the hermeneutic key 
was, therefore, an undertaking that served to redress the too-European 
depiction of Christianity. But more significantly, it also served to 
demonstrate the acknowledgement of the fact that it provided the framework 
within which African Christians understood the revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ. In other words, ‘it arose out of the understanding that at issue is not 
the status of a given culture, but the realisation that ‘cultural’ particularities 
are ‘situations’ in which people receive, and give theological shape, to the
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Gospel m e s s a g e ’ .46 As it has been stated, ‘No such situation constitutes a 
privileged, cultural perspective as such. The test of theological truth is not 
whether a claim is espoused by a particular cultural group, but whether that 
claim can be shown to be legitimate in the light of the revelatory source, the 
scriptures. The Bible alone has privileged status as an Archimedean-point 
for resting encultured theological c l a i m s ’.47
It has to be said, though, that inasmuch as there is a wide recognition of 
the relativity of cultural situations and, therefore, its role as the framework of 
interpretation, some would want to argue as if it can be taken to provide its 
own legitimacy. A case in point is what seems to emerge in the recent work 
of Itumeleng Mosala where in arguing for black history and culture as 
hermeneutic starting points for black theology, he appears to go along the 
way of past theologians whose objective seemed to be the creation of a 
parochial theology with its hermeneutic criterion drawn from within its own 
s e t t i n g .4 8  Indeed the history of Biblical interpretation and hermeneutics has 
been loaded with thought forms and even ideological inclination of those 
cultures and context within which it has been expressed. But it seems to me 
that the task and purpose of Christian theology is not served by repeating the 
same - though now in African clothing if the motivation is mere translation of 
the above. Fruitful endeavours seem to arise more from serious dialogic 
process between the twqf, each correcting, challenging and enriching the 
other.
One other significant theme that has claimed a central place in the work of 
many African theologians has been that of liberation. In fact, Adrian 
Hastings' assertion that it is the central theme of African theology 49 js no
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exaggeration when we take note of the fact that anyone engaged in the 
African Church's theological reflection, is always confronting that concrete 
reality that bears the past history of colonial experience, neo-colonialism, the 
dehumanising experience of apartheid in Southern Africa, the continued 
suppressive, corrupt and dictatorial regimes in many independent African 
states, militarism and the inhumanity of endless coup d’etats, civil wars and 
the depressing realities of human deprivation brought about by poverty, 
hunger and disease.
Indeed Zablon Nthamburi, who has established himself as one of the 
leading exponents of the theology of liberation in the continent, argues that 
African theology's emergence as a theology of liberation arises out of its 
attempt to address itself to the above as they exemplify that concrete and 
existential situation of the African people.50 To talk of liberation as a theme, 
therefore, is first and foremost to make a statement of what is understood of 
the task and function of theology. For unlike what seems to be the 
inclination in some forms of Western theology, the function of theology is 
not only confined to articulating Christian teaching with a view to providing 
spiritual edification, but is also an engagement with those aspects pertaining 
to the physical and material well-being of persons.51
This is to say that in treating this theme, there is an awareness that when 
we speak of salvation which is liberation's frame of reference, we are neither 
speaking of an event that is reduced to a purely inward personal affair with 
‘other worldly’ emphasis, nor that tendency toward reducing it into a 
political, social and economic programme that has no bearing on that
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dimension of humanity that transcends every programme and p r o j e c t . 5 2  As 
it has been stated, taking either approach does not serve but mutilates the 
Gospel. The Gospel announces the freedom of all people from sin and 
servitude - which as Gustavo Gutierrez has pointed out ‘includes hunger, 
misery, oppression and ignorance, injustices and hatred which have their 
origin in human selfishness.53 In this regard, salvation is more than a fruit 
of personal asceticism . For it has that social, historical and political 
dimension that negates any tendency to relegate it to a promised eternity. The 
basic point here is that salvation is both transcendent and immanent, other­
worldly and this-worldly in that it addresses the whole person who is at once 
spirit and matter, soul and b o d y . 5 4 .  And any attempt to treat it otherwise 
would only lead to a false representation of what is said of salvation in the 
Christian Gospel.
Taking the cue from Latin America's liberation theology, African 
theologians who have addressed themselves to this theme of liberation have 
taken the view that it is to be understood within the above depiction and 
aspiration to salvation. This is an exciting promise of freedom that beckons 
in both the Old and New Testament. And one which already finds a fitting 
exhibition in the exodus event. This is what comes out forcefully in Andre 
Neher, as cited by Gutierrez when he says,
‘With the Exodus a new age has struck for 
humanity - redemption from misery. All 
constraints are accidental; all misery is 
provisional. The breath of freedom which has 
blown over the world since the Exodus can dispel 
them this very d a y .’55
And the same is true of the New Testament proclamation where as in
216
Galatians 5:1 the declaration is that ‘for freedom Christ has set us free*. The 
only distinctive point in this biblical way of speaking about freedom is that it 
is freedom from  sin which is the deepest root of all misery, poverty, 
injustice and oppression. And at the same time freedom fo r  God and for 
others.56
To suggest that sin and guilt play a lesser or no role in the treatment of 
liberation because the emphasis and conception of sin is reduced to social ills 
as in liberation theology seems to be misleading. Indeed Tokunboh 
Adeyemo has rightly said that African peoples are humanistic in their 
approach to religion, that they do not seek God for his own sake, but rather 
that they may receive favour in return. With such a utilitarian attitude, sin 
can only be understood in terms of social ills whose eradication is in terms of 
meting out adequate punishment that is received here and n o w .  57
A strong affirmation comes from Baeta who has pointed to the continuity 
of this thought among African Christians. For as he writes,
‘While such terms as ‘sin’, ‘grace’,‘the precious 
blood of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ’, and 
other Christian themes are constantly spoken 
about, the central preoccupation is and remains 
how to cope effectively with the ills of worldly 
life. ‘Sin’ is really relevant only in so far as it is a 
potent cause of bodily, mental and social 
disorders. The significance of ‘the blood of 
Christ’ resides in the fact that, by doing away with 
sin, it prepares the way for, or itself directly 
effects, bodily heating.... The ‘Gospel’ here may 
be summed up in the actual words of a very 
typical separatist church public invitation: ‘Bring 
all your worries of unemployment, poverty, witch 
troubles, ill-luck, enemy, barrenness, sickness, 
blindness, lameness, sorrow. Jesus is ready to 
save all who come to him in belief and faith (Rev.
22:17, John 6:37)'.58
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John Mbiti, however, reminds us that inasmuch as this may be the case, 
there is also that understanding of sin as alienation of the individual and 
society from God and which is only bridged in the salvific act of God that 
does not only happen in the here and now, but also in the h e r e a f t e r .59
Mbiti takes this as representative depiction of sin, and therefore, the 
understanding of salvation that has found its continuity into Christianity as 
demonstrated by the common depiction of sin and salvation among African 
independent churches, and to some extent in the mission of the historical 
c h u r c h e s .^ O  This then lays the foundation for the dominance of thinking that 
represents salvation, first and foremost as deliverance from the here-and-now 
oppression, and only secondarily and remotely, spiritual in the sense of life 
to come.61
Inasmuch as this may be the case, however, it seems to be an 
overstretched depiction of both African religious thought on sin, evil and the 
way of deliverance and salvation, and that which is represented in African 
Christianity. For as Mbiti reminds us, African traditional world view has 
that depiction of human life as a unity between physical and spiritual entities. 
And as long as one is alive in this body, physical threats have spiritual 
consequence and spiritual threats have physical c o n s e q u e n c e s . ^  Bearing in 
mind that these effects are of individual as well as communal nature, the said 
threats do not only affect the social harmony in the community, but that 
between the individual and God. Taking an illustration from John Pobee's 
treatment of sin and evil among the Akan of Ghana, it is evident as he says
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that sin does not only disrupt the social harmony and the personal 
achievement (in form of acceptance) sanctioned by traditional code, but that 
of society and the spirit-world or G o d .  63
It seems to me, therefore, that any attempt to pursue the line of argument 
taken by Adeyemo inasmuch as it has a lot to offer is to follow the same 
pattern of a dichotomised viewing of life which is alien to African thought 
itself. In fact, there seems to be a plausible point in the argument that the 
focus on the liberation theme has helped to refocus Christian thinking on 
what is essentially a biblical view in that both the Old and New Testaments' 
treatment of man's relation to God is in holistic terms. To revisit Mbiti once 
again, ‘Man is the object of God's salvation as it is narrated and recorded in 
the Bible. And man is both physical and spiritual. So biblical salvation 
embraces these entities together. When only one is stressed at the expense of 
the other, a distraction of biblical salvation ensues and one part of man is 
virtually excluded and starved o u t ’ .64
The emphasis on the socio-political environment in contemporary Africa by 
exponents of liberation theology has tended to suggest that any talk of 
liberation is centred on this area of human life where sin is exemplified by 
common social oppression. But it is clear from the above that this cannot be 
dealt with in isolation, but as an integral part of the Gospel message. A 
fitting summary that seems to depict that which is central to the liberation 
theme in christological terms is that given by Walter Lowe when he says,
‘The real issues emerge not by an abstract 
consideration of freedom and reason, as occurs 
even in existentialism, but by concrete encounter 
with the negative realities of injustice and 
victimisation. Salvation in this context is
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experienced as liberation and Christology comes 
to centre upon Jesus' ministry and Crucifixion.
By his active identification with the poor and 
outcast, Christ pronounced judgement upon all the 
self-serving ideologies - including the complacent 
Christologies - which ignore and thus condone the 
hidden violence of the status quo. Thus the 
context the liberationist proposes for Christology 
is not a generalised notion of history at all, but the 
concrete, self-critical practice of following in the
way of Christ's own prophetic ministry’.165
In this regard, belief in Christ's redemption does not make one an immigrant 
out of history, but challenges one to proclaim and live the reality of what that 
means in the here and now as one sojourns to the hereafter of God's 
Lordship in eternity. For there is a widespread awareness that to speak of 
liberation or salvation in the ultimate sense is actually to state that which 
belongs to God. This is an awareness that is the basis of the believers' 
confidence and hope in the living out of that experience though inexhautibly 
in the present - sojourning to the hereafter of God's eschatological reign 
where this is experienced in full.
There is no doubt that even in the sketchy attempts at representing the 
variety of approaches to liberation, we cannot claim to be offer what one 
would call ‘the whole embracing’ depiction of it by African theologians. But 
at the heart of it as it has been shown above is that what is spoken of is that 
which is the kernel of the Gospel - embracing both the physical and spiritual 
dimension of life, for human beings and for Creation at large and thus 
exhibiting that which is meant by the Gospel as good news.
There are also other themes of major or minor concern to articulators of 
theology in contemporary theology in Africa and which serve to exemplify
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their orientations and what can be said to be an African perspective in 
contemporary theological thought. But it seems clear from the above that in 
whichever way these themes are treated, emerging orientations demonstrate 
that unending dialogue between today's Africa and that of the past. This is a 
dialogue that does not shy away from those realities of discontinuities, but 
brings them to the fore as it does those affirming continuities finding 
expression in Christian thought. This is a process that is not served by 
attempts at stressing the universal reality of the Christian faith with a 
tendency toward parochial emphasis, nor are they served by the 
contradicting stance. The reality of Christian identity exhibits both the 
particular and the universal and it is in focusing the issues facing the 
particular that the agenda of the universal is shaped and vice versa. The 
same is true for such a central theme for Christian faith as liberation. For the 
theology and the church would seem inward-looking and with no bearing on 
the daily experience of those addressed if the Gospel remained focused on 
the spiritual and not physical. Any attempt at taking either stance as is the 
tendency among some African theologians would only serve to exemplify 
what seems to be a mistaken understanding of the theological task and the 
very teaching and preaching of the Christian Gospel itself. This explains 
how imperative it is to address on eself to the question of religious authority, 
thereby setting in perspective the formulation of Christology as articulated in 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CENTRE FOR RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
Africa's theological and religious scenery may have its peculiarities 
and distinctive characteristics that set it apart from that of Otto Weber’s 
continental Europe in the 1930s. But the existing plurality and diversity 
therein throws one into a theological jungle that would seem to lead one to 
the same problem Weber had had to wrestle with during his time. And that is 
the problem of religious authority. For where the negation of liberalism and 
the general orientation of theology in Europe brought about the crisis of 
direction, and therefore, an authoritative framework, the above reality facing 
theology in Africa confronts one with no less a problem. More so when 
amidst the chaos and suffering, the apparent lack of power of the World 
Church to alleviate the suffering of many demonstrates that the external 
authority of a great church is not adequate. As in Weber's Germany, 
therefore, there is a real yearning for spiritual authority: the authority of a 
holy and loving God in the dimension of the whole human race, and not just 
of the individual country or person. And as the case was for Weber and 
theologians of his time, the need to discern this authority and nature of the 
Bible, the meaning of revelation and inspiration, and the nature of human 
response to revelation need$no stressing. 1 As recently observed, this 
involves the realisation that authority can be settled in a religious way; and as 
the past few years have vividly illustrated, the godlessness of many regimes
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in Africa and the failure of many governments after independence to satisfy 
the African dream for freedom and liberation has made it imperative to 
recognise that the call here is for a transference of the supreme problem of 
life to the area of the personal conscience. For the whole moral tragedy of 
the African world is now in the arena of the single soul no longer sheltered 
by the African extended family or the Church. Authority has to be seen in 
the nature of the redeemer: Christ is the new conscience and the new King; 
and the cross and not the ecclesiastical body must be seen as the new seat of 
his authority. Yes, the cross as Christ crucified, ‘the power of God unto 
salvation* afresh in the ‘evangelical’ experience of the desperate soul, and 
rising anew its new trust and new life. Like Kant whom we visaed in 
Chapter One, we have to break with rationalism's quest for theoretical truth 
as the prime object in theology if we are to find an answer to the question of 
ultimate authority. We have to emphasise a shift from sheer rationalism to 
reality, from the purely intellectual to include the ethical. If language is an 
exploration of reality, it becomes apparent that thought is not an end in itself 
but only an instrument serving the purposes of the actualities of life. And as 
it has been said, it might be helpful if the notion of reality replaced that of 
truth. For as African traditional beliefs show, religion does not place us in 
line with the way the world relates to us, but in rapport with the reality of it. 
Moreover, ‘pure thought’ with the character of complete detachment is 
inadequate when dealing with the interests of human life. The ideals and 
purposes by which we live cannot be decided by impartial intellect alone. 
Our ideals result from value judgements which involve the will, and 
consequently they are moral judgements. And is not the holiness of God, a 
holiness that is best expressed in ethical terms as the absolute moral reality, 
the identification of the moral norm and the ultimate reality? If such holiness
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be the nature of the ultimate reality, then by this measure man's 
righteousness or his moral judgements must stand or fall. Again' as African 
traditional beliefs indirectly bear witness, the supreme task of all religions 
must be the securing of that holiness. And the absence of an eschatology in 
African traditional beliefs^ is partly due to the realisation of the fact that man 
is dislocated from such holiness and all attempts must be made to be attuned 
to it and hence the whole notion of the ‘living-dead’.^
The imperative question that arises from the above, however, is how 
this ultimate moral reality is made known. For the holy is both urgent and 
inaccessible, imperative and unapproachable. Neither thought nor experience 
unaided can rise to it.4 The answer seems to lie nowhere else other than in 
revelation or the self-disclosure of this ultimate moral reality. And as we 
already pointed out in Chapter One, the basic argument here is that there is a 
recognition that what we are dealing with is utterly and completely other, 
outside us and yet confronting us and thereby being the given of our starting 
point. In this regard, what we hold as truth or right, and indeed our very 
perception of reality can only be understood on the basis of the ultimate 
moral reality's act of confronting us. Now, this is not to say that our 
viewing of Christian discourse will be in terms of what would seem like the 
holding of eternal moral truths as the reference point, and thus, depict our 
relationship to God as dependent on the recognition of them. But an 
undertaking that recognises Christian proclamation and therefore Christian 
teaching, always directs us toward a history in which, in a way absolutely in 
kind, God's grace and truth were present in action for our salvation. Unlike 
the older supematuralism's representation of revelation as supernatural 
communication of ultimate truths, or the romantic-idealistic speculation's
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representation of it as the overcoming of man's limits, there is a 
representation of that reality of God's coming to us and being for us in this 
event. ^
Hence the emphasis of faith as the framework on which rationale of
that which is received in revelation is made. But then, what is the nature of
this revelation? To start with, it is evident from the above that revelation
belongs to God and not an object of human discovery. In fact, it is not only
our knowledge of him that derives from his initiative, but it is the very basis
on which our faith is constituted. And thus, we have the reverse order in
which theology represents our knowledge of God. For unlike other
disciplines, the starting point is not with us, but God whose initiative in
encountering us forms the basis on which our knowledge and religiosity is
based. This is the point that was echoed by Karl Barth in Chapter One when
he argued against the rationalist tendency's attempt to depict religious
knowledge as if it were about God whom we know. For the basic thrust of
his famous ‘No’ was his concern to emphasise the beginnings of Christian
faith in God who knows us, and thus diverting the then dominant concern
with rational exemplification of Christian faith as if it rests on propositions,
M r
statements and truths revealed to man, to the reality that at issue here was the 
being of God and his knowing of us is his revelation (cf Gal 4:8-9).^
Now this is not a lapse into a kind of theological incomprehensibility, 
but a recognition of the fact that our speaking of the revealed knowledge is in 
itself a pointer to a kind of knowledge distinctive from that which we attain 
through our own effort or thought. The recognition of the fact that what we
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are dealing with here is that knowledge which has come to us as a gift, and 
thereby underlining the testimony of faith that God makes himself known to 
us rather than that we attain to the knowledge of him. The Bible, as John 
Macquarrie has rightly pointed out, never suggests that man has to strain his 
mind to figure out a shadowy something behind the phenomena. There is 
indeed recognition of man's innate quest for God, but God himself meets 
and satisfies the quest. Man does not search out God, but rather the reverse 
is true. One of the greatest Psalms begins, ‘O Lord, thou has searched me 
and known me’, and goes on to describe the ubiquity and inevitability of the 
encounter with God7 Indeed, we do not speak here only about this revealed 
truth of God's being, his design and plan concerning humanity's fate and 
future situation and position which can never be found out by any scientific
Q <*
research, but that of reality in general as God's Creation.6 This is factor that 
does not set the question of Christology at the centre of theological 
discourse, but one that defines its task.
One other significant element in dealing with revelation is that it is 
personal. For what we are dealing with as revealed is not knowledge about 
things but a relation to a subject. In this regard, theological enterprise is in 
reality a person's intelligent response to a person, the response of a will to a 
will, of the whole finite person to a whole person, absolute and h o l y . 9  This 
is the same point expressed by John B aillie^
i'r»
In fact, it iS'the realisation of this point that many theologians see a 
proper response to revelation in terms of ethics rather than as an intellectual 
assent to new truth. Indeed, the unity of theory and practice in Christian 
faith is exemplified by our submission to the revealed will of God - without
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which one can easily trip oneself up in what appears to be a mere intellectual 
assent to the imperative of divine love. In other words, there will be no 
recognition of the fact that the assent to this divine imperative demands 
submission of the will - a submission which very often leads from the Upper 
Room, to Gethsemane, and Calvary without seeking for the guarantee from 
God as to whether such submission will lead to resurrection. The end result 
here the is simply a reflective and contemplative obedience to the God whose 
imperative come to us in an act of self-abandonment. 1 1 But as William 
Temple reminds us, ‘every revelation of God is a demand and the way to 
knowledge of God is by o b e d i e n c e .  *2 This is the same point stressed by 
Walter Kasper from another perspective when he says,
‘Faith is the comprehensive re-action of the human 
being to the prior action of God in revealing 
himself, it is a trusting in God and a building on 
God, a gaining of a foothold in God, a saying of 
‘Amen’to God, with all the consequences this 
entails. To have faith is to take God seriously as 
God, without reservations. It is to give him the 
honour and to glorify him as Lord. It is to 
acknowledge his Lordship with praise and 
thanksgiving.’13
Having said this, however, I share the view of those who see the need 
to guard against the temptation of turning obedience of will, and response, 
into a kind of virtue or the hypostatising of it. For what we are dealing with 
here is our obedience, response and will as people known by God. This is 
to say that the kind of response we are talking about here has to be like that 
of Isaiah 6 - where we have an exemplification that is characterised by 
admiration and dread:
Woe is me!
For I am lost;
for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the 
midst of a people of unclean lips; for my eyes 
have seen the King, the Lord of hosts.’ 14
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This is an act of reckoning with the revelation of the holy that revives 
or brings into light, even more vividly the perversion, defilement and the 
godlessness of our being. In this regard, our speaking of revelation 
demands our recognition that what we are dealing with is a revelational event 
that deals with our human predicament as sinners - for it is redemptive. The 
same text of Isaiah 6 underlines it all when it says:
‘And he touched my mouth, and said: Behold, 
this has touched your lips: your guilt is taken 
away, and your sin f o r g i v e n . ’ ^
Joseph Pungur has, therefore, rightly stated that the rejection of the 
tendency to treat revelation content as metaphysical knowledge about God or 
some speculative undertaking, stems from the realisation that the very object 
of revelation is the exigency of our e x i s t e n c e .  *6 in fact, i t  would be a 
mistake to suppose that revelation gives us the science of man. There is no 
revealed anthropology or psychology. The failure on the part of many 
missionaries, social anthropologists and students of comparative religion, to 
see this object of revelation, made them treat African religion as if it were a 
bizarre museum, entirely different from other religious phenomena formed in 
Western culture.^ The content of revelation must be of a practical nature, 
confronting the great realities of this world - the moral poverty of all ages. 
And that is why theology can be always ad hoc. Is not the concern of all 
religious the ultimate knowledge about our existence, rather than the 
subsidiary knowledge about our universe? And whatever views one may 
hold as to how the world came into being, whether God created man out of 
nothing or he is the product of big-bang theory, or evolution - or to use 
Albert Camus, the French novelist and playwright's words, ‘It does not
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matter whether the earth goes round the sun or the sun round the earth, the 
only really serious question is whether, either way, our life on earth is worth 
living - and whether we are advancing m o r a l l y Writing along the same 
lines, Paul Tillich says,
‘Revelation is the manifestation of what concerns 
us ultimately. The mystery which is revealed is 
the ultimate concern to us because it is the ground
of our being.’
An interesting point on this has also been made by John Baillie.20
Whatever else can be said about revelation, it is clear from the above 
that it is a statement about the grace of God. It is the gospel of redemption, 
God giving himself to man, pouring himself into human history, sacrificing 
himself for human recovery and noS&owing or the teaching of something. 
And if we are to teach or show this revelation, it has to be accompanied by 
deed or tested by our deeds in a world that is godless. And this action of 
God has to be seen not merely as knowledge of the way of deliverance but 
the deliverance itself. For what is being spoken of is not primarily the 
knowledge of salvation as revealed, but salvation itself.21 Nor just the truth 
about God, but God coming as his own truth - in the form of life in this 
salvific act. Hence J.K. Mozley's assertion that ‘when the church confesses 
the doctrine of the incarnation, of God manifest in flesh, she does not claim a 
rationalistic triumph; what she contends is that eternal mystery has come into 
special contact with men through temporal mystery, and that the knowledge 
of the truth has thereby been increased. Truth came through Jesus
Christ, not ultimately because he spoke true things, but because he was the
truth.22
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Echoing what we said of the Christ event in Chapter Four, it is 
evident from the above that there is no place for the kind of thinking 
represented by Wilhelm Herrmann, who by following his teacher, Ritschl, 
seems to depict God's self-manifestation in terms of the spiritual or the moral 
ideal.23 For any entertainment of such a thought or vision of the ideal can 
do nothing to man but fill him with despair and a sense of the unattainable. 
As Paul realised in Romans 7, we need the power that would enable us to be 
and do what we know to be the truth. To put it in Weber's words, ‘The 
basic instruction for us as a believing community is to learn Christ (Eph 
4:20) - the power and promise of God's Yes and Amen (II Cor 1:20) to us, 
the basis where the truth o f life in the place o f death is exemplified’.24 in 
this regard, revelation is never understood as God giving me all I need to 
know to enable me to fulfill what had been revealed to me, but as God's 
giving of himself to me, and enabling me in a relationship of love to become 
and begin to imitate what I am discovering from the relationship. Thus, 
Baillie would rightly state that our concern in revelation is not primarily the 
knowledge of salvation that is spoken as revealed, but salvation itself as 
manifested in Christ. In the same breath, he says that 'it is not enough to say 
that what God reveals is not a prescription by which we may save ourselves, 
but the knowledge that he himself has saved us ... God does not give us 
information but communion; he give us himself in c o m m u n i o n ' . ^
Since mere illumination or the statements about man's moral 
predicament or the nature of God is not adequate, God needs to do 
something to man. It is not a re-interpretation of what life is all about that is 
needed, but, as Jesus told Nicodemus, at the heart of this encounter is a 
reconstruction, the coming into being of a new creation, a new birth, a
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passage from death to life. And it is in reckoning with this that Weber, as we 
pointed out in Chapter Four, sees the task of Christology as never a mere 
exercise in the knowledge of God the redeemer, buttfs simultaneously the 
experience of a turning around in our e x i s t e n c e . 2 6  Indeed, i t  is this same 
point that Edward Schlillebeeckx makes from another context when he says 
that Christianity does not merely throw light on man's existence, but aims 
above all to renew that existence, and the theoria of Christianity is an 
implicit element of t h i s . 2 7  And so we could say as John Baillie has 
remarked that what we have here is an exemplification of that two 
dimensional rendering of God's word in Hebrew thought where God's fiat 
and his effective action are one. God speaks and it is done. We are to some 
extent then, prepared for the New Testament affirmation that the Word can be 
seen and touched as well as heard and read (The Word became flesh and 
dwelt among us, John 1:14).28
The essence of revelation does not lie in the consciousness of Christ, 
construed psychologically and acting aesthetically, but in his personality as 
embodied in an act which changes the whole of human destiny. The 
authority and nature of revelation does not lie in Jesus, ‘the superlative of 
man's conscience’, but in Christ as the redeemer of the conscience and its 
new life. To echo Otto Weber once again, revelation is in reality redemption, 
the Good News of God's ‘being for us’ in that it exemplifies that decisive 
dealing of God with the moral tragedy of man. For the destruction of man's 
insularity typified by his self-glorification that takes place in the event of 
Jesus Christ, is in reality man's liberation precisely because it shows him 
where his limitations a r e .29 The primary and unequivocal revelation of God
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is therefore, nothing other than the fact of Jesus Christ. I share the view of 
those who say, therefore, that if this had been realised by many missionaries, 
their extravagant claims about African culture and religion would have 
appeared to them to have suffered from cultural deficiencies and would have 
prevented them condemning everything in African culture as pagan. It would 
also have become apparent to the exponents of African theology, that it was 
unnecessary to write endless volumes justifying the starting of African 
theology. It seems to me that it is only when the nature of revelation forms 
the basis on which we witness and articulate the truth of the gospel that we 
can best characterise God's saving action which is at the heart of our 
Christological task. Whether we are dealing with the African Church as the 
specific context of our articulation or the broad perspective of the universal 
church, it seems to me that the only way we can do justice to this central 
point of the Christian Gospel is by taking it as the only framework of our 
orientation. And one that serves to judge methods we employ in our 
articulation.
If revelation is to be understood as God's action through Christ which 
redeems and reconciles man to himself, how does this conception of 
revelation bear on the Bible? The African scene as it has been rightly 
observed, seems to go on unaffected in any large measure by the critical 
treatment of the Bible which has dominated Euro-American Christianity for 
many years. The way history has fallen on faith like a beast of prey 
threatening to tear it to pieces, however, has not escaped Christian thought in 
the continent. Indeed, there are still many traditionalists who continue to 
hold the view that the origin of scripture was unique. God himself has 
dictated it and writers were merely authoritative instruments of the Holy
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Spirit. They thus equate the Word of God with the words of scripture. 
What the Bible gives us is divine knowledge communicated in the form of 
prepositional truths. Consequently, the authority of the Bible is grounded in 
the process of its origin;30 despite the fact that this whole doctrine of its 
unique origin has been challenged and denied by the historical critics.31
The dialogic insight of Otto Weber does remind us of the need to learn 
from the past. But this seems not to have been taken note of by those who 
pursue the above stance in their treatment of the Bible. For if they had done 
so, they could have realised how the challenge that occurred in Europe to that 
kind of thinking brought about the inevitable collision between faith and 
history. In fact, it was as a result of this collision already pointed out by 
Weber, that all future doctrines of the origin and nature of scripture could not 
be formulated without taking into consideration its unique historical 
character; the fact that Christianity has its root firmly planted in concrete 
events of the past, in the acts of God in history, and finally in the advent of 
Jesus C h r i s t . 3 2  Indeed, we need not stress the datedness of any view that 
seems still to hold the doctrine of unhistorical and verbal inspiration of the 
Bible. I share the view that the Bible has to be understood as an historical 
book, written and transmitted by fallible human beings, and therefore, 
exposed to the same risk of error and alteration as any other ancient book. In 
other words, the Bible must always remain open for a purely secular 
interpretation in as much as we recognise that which we encounter in its 
proclamation.
The trickling of Biblical criticism into African spirituality and 
theological thinking, however, raises a situation of concern. For the scenery
239
that has been emerging appears to perpetuate the common divide in Western 
theology where one either belongs to the liberal school-characterised by what 
seems to be the subjection of one's orientation to the mercy of historical 
criticism, or fundamentalism or conservatism whose preoccupation seems to 
be one of retreating behind the crumbling walls of the traditional view of 
Biblical scholarship (by far the majority in the African scene). This state of 
affairs, it seems to me, enhances polarisation that is not healthy for creative 
scholarship. Indeed, it serves as a hindrance rather than one that gives 
impetus to what can be said to be an authentic quest of faith of the African 
Christian. This is the kind of quest that does not shy away from the 
challenges of critical scholarship, but as one that wrestles with them in that 
true character of a faith seeking understanding. This means that one has to 
be prepared to enter into dialogue with all schools of thought and be prepared 
to appreciate the penetrating insights of those who may not necessarily share 
your inclinations. Alan Richardson gives us a fitting example in Barth, who 
inspite of his detestation of liberal scholarship, could not help acknowledging 
some of the insights. For example, he cited him as acknowledging what was 
very much an insight deriving from liberal scholarship when he said,
‘As human words the words of the Bible are, like 
those of any historical documents, open to 
investigation by the techniques of modem 
historical and critical science. Such science can 
serve a useful purpose in investigating the 
historical Christ of the New Testament, provided 
that it is clearly recognised that the ‘real ’ historical 
Christ is none other than the Biblical Christ 
attested by the New Testament, that is, the 
incarnate Word, the risen and exalted one, God 
manifested in his redeeming action as the object of 
his disciple's faith.’33
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What is needed in African Christianity, especially in the light of this 
conception of the proper function of the historico-critical method, is the 
appreciation of the penetrating insights made by P.T. Forsyth long before 
1919 when Karl Barth, though avowedly rejecting liberal theology, was able 
to demonstrate that historico-critical method is not necessarily bound up with 
the presuppositions of those who had first used and developed it.34 The 
penetrating insight is that the subject matter in Scripture is more than 
literature, history and religion; it is a witness that extends over more than a 
thousand years to a relationship between God and humans in which first in 
Israel, and then in Jesus Christ and his Church, the deepest mysteries of 
humanity's life in time and beyond time were r e v e a l e d . 3 5  But one that in 
treating this subject matter does not shy away from facing the witness to it, 
as had been done in and through all that which is historical and belonging to 
human experience. In other words, one that embraces the fact that the 
Scriptures are a theological as well as a historical entity, and demanding, for 
their scientific investigation a methodology that is as reponsible theologically 
as it is historically. 36
This is to say that we have to learn from Biblical criticism (especially 
as preachers) the need to make the Bible for the listeners a real historic and 
living book. For it is by doing so that we can get rid of the amateur habit of 
laying out the Bible in diagrams, schemes which treat it like a game park and 
which ignore the historic and critical study. In fact, those who tend to 
maintain allegorical interpretations of Scripture in the hope of maintaining by 
saving the now negated concept of verbal inspiration, as with many 
preachers of the East African Revival and some independent Churches, are a 
fitting example of what we have stated above. The lesson here goes beyond
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the concern to save verbal inspiration. For what they are doing in effect is a 
repeat of what was found among some exponents of Karl Barth's tendency 
to draw too sharp a separation between historical and theological 
interpretation of the realities we encounter in Scripture. Exponents who, in 
accepting the above approach as given, and thereby treating the former as 
preparatory and therefore of secondary importance, were inclined to 
concentrate on the latter as the primary task. And yet it was by doing so, as 
James Smart points out, that they, in embracing Barth's use of analogy and 
typology in his interpretation to reintroduce not only analogy and typology 
but also allegory as legitimate devices in extracting an edifying meaning from 
the text, ended up with what seemed like a return to the Middle Ages' forms
of theological interpretation.^?
The sacredness of Scripture, and therefore its authority, is not 
maintained by obscuring the full human character inherent in it and by 
attempting to remove it into a world other than the one that we inhabit. For 
any attempt to do so leaves the text of Scripture a static formulation of divine 
truth rather than the human historical words of men like ourselves. But when 
we recognise the two dimensional reality we encounter in Scripture; i.e. the 
encounter, the relationship, the interaction of God and man, then we are able 
to appreciate the lessons from historico-critical method that the historicity and 
aliveness of the Bible is exemplified in the upholding of both realities. This 
is to say that therein is the proclamation of the willingness of him who is 
God to embrace, speak and act through all that which is human and relative. 
Now, the demand to face this truth, it seems to me, does not kill the Bible or 
diminish its authority, but serves to demonstrate the true character of
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Christian faith. The character that shows that in self-surrender even unto 
death is no destruction but resurrection. The change is therefore not in the 
Scriptures themselves, but in the way we handle it and the numerous 
presuppositions we bring to it. In our views of the Bible there is much 
scaffolding that must be taken down if the house is to appear for what it is. 
In fact, James Smart argues that the tendency to shy away from this 
responsibility of being ready to take them down amounts to an act of 
theological dishonesty. For as he says,
‘Dishonesty takes subtle forms; a closing of the 
eyes at certain moments or to certain elements in 
the phenomena that are before us, a twisting of the 
facts to make them fit our theory or support our 
practice, a colouring of the facts to make them 
appear other than they are. It happens in personal 
relationships and destroys the integrity of the 
relationships. It happens in society and leaves one 
segment of it blind to the injustices it has for years 
been inflicting on another segment. And it 
happens in the use of Scripture far too often as we 
protect ourselves against those elements in 
Scripture which contradict our cherished 
convictions, our way of life, and our religious 
establishment. But where people stand before 
God their eyes are opened to the truth no matter 
how painful and distressing that truth may be.
God is truth, and to be open to his presence is to 
be receptive to the truth from whatever quarter it 
may appear. Honesty and integrity thus belong to 
the very essence of faith in God, and theology, as 
the attempt to define the realities to which faith 
bears witness, can live only in the atmosphere of 
unconditional truthfulness.’^
However, historico-critical method or any other critical approach to 
the Bible cannot go unchecked. Surely, the final criticism of the Bible, as 
has rightly been observed, is not the ‘higher criticsm’ but the highest, the 
criticism whose principle is God and the supreme object in the Bible, the 
object of reconciling grace. The Gospel is the critic of criticism and therefore
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criticism is secondary and ancillary, and the synthetic principle in the Bible is 
the Gospel. P.T. Forsyth makes even a more pointed statement about this 
after granting that we need historical criticism, that literary criticism has its 
rights, that psychological criticism is worthy, by saying from a christological 
perspective,
‘But allowing for all such things, the questions remain 
dogmatic, was He, is He, what Christian faith essentially 
believed? Did His convictions, of His and of the 
Church, correspond to reality? Was He, is He, in God 
what he thought He was and what He was held to be?
When the first Church worshipped Him with God's 
name, and set Him on God's throne, were they a new 
race of idolators? Was His influence so poor in quality 
that it could not protect from that? He thought himself 
redeemer; did he really redeem? Did God redeem in 
him? Was God the real actor? These questions; and in 
all such questions, criticism is ultra vires (beyond its 
power). These things are settled in another and higher 
court. ...The soundest criticism is the criticism by a 
believing Church, daily living on the grace of the Cross 
and venture of faith. ...The real criticism is not our 
criticism of Christ, but Christ's criticism of us, His 
saving judgement of u s . ’39
This is also the underlying thought and recognition that led Otto Weber to 
state,
‘Theological labour in the exegesis of the bible is 
already derived from hearing and takes place in 
readiness to hear. Thus it has no demonstrable 
security supporting it. It lives from the Witness of 
Christ, and it can fulfill its task when it 
investigates every text with the question, how
does it relate to the Witness to Jesus Christ?’^
Having conceived of revelation as God's action through Jesus Christ 
which redeems and reconciles man to himself, and that this action is 
witnessed to in the Bible, the Bible exists for the sake of the Gospel within 
it. Therefore, in considering the relation of the Bible to revelation, the
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following facts already observed, clearly present themselves. These are that; 
first revelation cannot be equated with the Bible, for it is what gives value to 
the Bible - the Gospel witnessed in the Bible. Revelation is not a book 
saying something, but a person doing something, and what he does 
secondarily says something in turn. In fact, it has validly been argued that 
the dichotomy between thought and action which seemed to have been 
perceived as characterising the resultant depiction of soteriology in 
missionary Christianity, as we implied in Chapter Six, seemed to have come 
about due to the inability to recognise and accept the above.41 Second is that 
if revelation is the Gospel, the act of God can be described in fewer words 
than those of the Bible; and yet the range of the Gospel is certainly beyond 
the compass of any book. For God's saving action has to do with the total 
conqest of history which involves the whole resources of the infinite God. 
This cannot be contained in any book or library of books. It is only possible 
in the action of God, in a present reality of God's presence in the Holy 
Spirit.
And thirdly, an infallible book implies that man's primary need is for 
what a book could convey, namely propositional truth; whereas man's 
primary need is not intellectual but moral, not truth but grace, not 
illumination but redemption, and can only be had in a person. In a word, the 
primary revelation is Jesus Christ him self.^
I, therefore, share the view that revelation is the coincidence of event 
and appreciation. For in the light of the above, we cannot say that the Bible 
is the act, but the record or product of the act; the confessional recital of 
God's acts. If we were to have a summary depiction of this relation of the
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Bible to revelation, then P.T. Forsyth's metaphor seems to tender a befitting 
depiction when he says,
‘God smote upon the world in Christ's act of 
redemption; it sounded in the Apostles' word of 
reconciliation; and reverberated and goes on doing 
so in the Bible. *43
What does this mean for the Christian's regard for the Bible? The first 
point to be made is that Scripture cannot be regarded as source, but the fruit 
of faith. Inspiration is not in the document, but rather in the development of 
those who lived in the faith. We therefore, cannot say that we believe in the 
resurrection because the Apostles said so. We will have to see the Apostles' 
teaching as a gateway to becoming witnesses to the Living Christ. We too 
have to know him and not just about him. Assembling all the facts about 
Christ is not enough - we have to reverse this critical process. For the 
Apostles started with ‘experiencing’ Jesus Christ, they were given the Holy 
Spirit to understand what they had experienced but had not understood 
before, and it was from this context that they thought and acted theologically, 
working out the implications of their reflection in the doctrinal statement of 
the written Bible. For us starting at the end of their credal statement, we 
have to go beyond them to the experience. An outer authority,- e.g. the 
Bible or the creeds is not adequate if we have not encountered the Living 
Christ in their testimony. We have to strive to understand God as he means 
us to understand him.
This leads us to our second point emerging from the above. The point 
that when we speak of scriptural authority, we are actually speaking of God 
who encounters and confronts us in the words of Scripture. His act in the 
event of Jesus Christ being the concrete manifestation of that encounter.
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Now, our recognition of this reality makes it imperative for us to note that in 
as much as we strive to understand God's act, we shall need his version of 
the way in which his acts need to be understood - him remaining the 
interpreter if we were to understand rightly. We need to listen to Scripture in 
submission to his divine a u t h o r i t y .44
It may never become a matter of ‘one's own interpretation’ (new in 
every age), because no prophecy ever came by the impulse of man, but men 
moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God (II Peter 1:20,21)45.
Inasmuch as the Bible is understood as the record and not the act it 
proclaims, it is worth noting that it is a necessary part of the act and of its 
effect. For if we are affirming that the absolute authority of faith is the 
Living Christ himself, and that he so bound himself to the historical 
attestation concerning his self-revelation in Scripture, then the latter 
(Scriptures) necessarily participates in the authority of its Lord.
Having conceived of revelation as the Gospel, God's redemptive act 
that confronts us in the testimony of Scripture and our encounter of it in our 
experience, and the fact that this takes place in the realities of concrete 
history, it is imperative for us to state what we understand of the faith we 
have stressed as the basis of appropriating what is given in revelation. 
Christian faith seems to be understood by many Africans as primarily 
assenting to given ‘truths’; a notion that this is contrary to what is always 
understood of ‘belief’ in traditional religion. This misconception has been 
attributed to the legacy of missionary theology that tended to have been 
influenced by the traditions of Western theology that understood revelation as
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the ‘communication of truths’. But if what we have regarded above as the
nature of revelation be true, namely that revelation is a redemptive deed done
once and for all, and not propositional truth, and that what is revealed is God
himself doing something and not ‘truths’ about God, our faith, our response
to this act of God, has to undergo a radical change. For what is demanded
here is trust in or self-commitment to rather than mere assent to 
46propositions.
An act of individual response to the revelatory act is an act in return: 
the act of trusting obedience. Faith becoming personal fellowship with God 
rather than the holding of correct doctrines, a fellowship that helps the 
shaping of our doctrinal and theological formulation. More so as the Gospel 
is made alive to the recipient by the Holy Spirit. A fitting summary of the 
point is made by Otto Weber when he says,
‘The knowledge of God is not the poetic reception 
of ‘something’, but the relationship and behaviour 
which involves all of man, which takes place 
between the individual ‘I’ (or ‘we’) of knowing 
man and the thou of the loving God. The 
knowledge of God is fello\$hip with God.
...Fellowship that takes place in grateful and 
obedient reponse to the Word given to us, in faith
which answers the faithfulness of God.’47
Criticism has validly been made against African theologians who seem 
to pay little attention to the working of the Holy Spirit and yet what we have 
stated above makes this imperative. Ours can be truly a faith seeking 
undersfficling if there is a recognition of this truth that unless God ‘breaths 
into our labours, all may be in vain’ (cf Gen 2:7).
We have seen that religious authority in Christian faith isVested in
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God witnessed in Scriptures as having encountered and confronted us in the 
holistic reality of our existence in the event of Jesus Christ. Discussing the 
problem of Biblical authority is, therefore, addressing oneself in effect to the 
question of his (God's) authority over humanity. And since the Christian 
Gospel makes it plain that this claim is made so explicit nowhere else than in 
the said event of Jesus Christ, the issue at stake seems to be none other than 
that of Christology.
Our foregoing discussion on the question of revelation's relation to the 
Bible did not only demonstrate how historical criticism's questioning of the 
‘authority’ of Scripture in nineteenth century protestant theology seemed to 
shift the basis of belief to history, but also that of Christology. For unlike 
the traditional approaches to Christology which defined the issues at stake in 
terms of the ontological problem which dominated the patristic period, the 
framework of reference now revolved around the question of the relationship 
between revelation and h i s t o r y ^ 8  the historical critics posing anew the 
questions of the relationship between the historical Figure of Jesus and the 
Christ of faith. Were they indeed one and the same person? Could the New 
Testament as historical - especially the synoptics - help the reconstruction of 
the historical figure of Jesus and thereby reveal one not unworthy to bear the 
claims which the Church made of its Lord and Head? This is the point made 
by McGrath when he says,
‘It must be emphasised that the new interest in the 
historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth who actually 
lived in first century Palestine through the means 
of the newly established historiographical methods 
was based upon the presupposition that this real 
historical figure had become obscured and 
distorted through the doctrinal presentation of him 
in the New Testament, the creeds and the 
Christian C h u r c h . ’^ 9
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The way to realise this objective according to many historical critics 
whose approaches began the so-called ‘Quest for the historical Jesus’ was by 
isolating the synoptic Jesus from the rest of the New Testament with the 
hope that this would lead to the recapture of the historical figure as the basis 
of faith - and thereby substitute the religion of Jesus with the apostolic faith. 
The problem as Weber shows in his tackling of this question is whether our 
faith should be based upon Jesus' teaching or whether we should try to 
reproduce his own personal faith. If our aim is to base our faith upon the 
teaching of Jesus, the question to be asked is whether this does not reduce 
Jesus to no more than a prophet and teacher of ‘truths’!
In Weber's own words ‘Jesus ‘can’ not have been something other 
than an admittedly very extraordinary religious figure or preacher of ethical 
demands. ’50 And so Anton Friedrichsen would rightly say,
‘Anyone following the slogan ‘Back to Jesus! ’ 
will therefore go further back than he intends. He 
will go past Jesus and land in the synagogue. He 
will simply take his stand on the sermon on the 
mount and the Parables, believing himself to be in 
the footsteps of Jesus. But even when preaching 
the sermon on the mount and relating his parables,
Jesus is on his way to Calvary and the glory of the 
Father... If we do not realise this, we are stuck in
an interpretatio Judaica of his words. 1
The same is true for the attempt to reproduce Jesus' own personal 
faith by similar methods of reconstruction with the objective of basing our 
faith on it. The end result of the exercise seems to do nothing more than 
reduce Jesus to no more than a saint who leaves to us the value of his inner
life. And thereby raiseseven greater problems for faith. For as it has been
pointed out, the immediate question that has to be faced is how to copy
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Jesus' private and intimate religion - the communion of the Father and Son - 
when our data for this relationship are so limited, and even the data we have 
are beyond us, ambiguous and silent on the central i s s u e s ? 5 2  in fact the 
whole process invites the shifting of faith from that authority of God's 
revelation in Jesus Christ which confronts us in the proclamation of the 
Gospel to the results of scientific historical research and the opinions of 
historical experts. And this turns our response to the Gospel to be one 
formed by historical sense rather than faith. It seems to me that there is 
justification in the point that has been made that ‘even if this method proved 
successful in its aspirations, an almost unbelievable folly that we can become 
certain of Christianity by historical means, the best that can result would be a 
religion of scholars, who in turn would become the ‘ a u t h o r i t y ’ .53 This is 
the underlying criticism of McGrath on Pannenberg’s pursuit of the question 
of historical Jesus. For while acknowledging that the analysis of the history 
of Jesus of Nazareth is the most appropriate and desirable method of 
reconstructing a Christology, the question is whether that method is still open 
to us today? We are primarily concerned with the question of how a 
Christology may be constructed, or an existing Christology or range of 
Christologies verified, here and now, twenty centuries after the history of 
Jesus of Nazareth has taken place. The only persons in a position to 
undertake such an analysis were the Apostles, and their conclusions - as both 
event and interpretation, inextricably linked - are encapsulated in the 
Kerygma - Pannenberg's method need only - and in fact does little more 
than - demonstrate that the content of the Kerygma is inherently p l a u s i b l e . 5 4
Our treatment of the Biblical witness to Jesus Christ in Chapter Four 
demonstrated that what we need to take into account is what was at the heart
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' of their witness. For theirs was a proclamation of the Gospel, not a
presentation of biographical material. The evangelist's story was history 
with a claim on men's lives; history seeking a verdict from their hearers. 
They made history preach: a story with a purpose. And any attempt on our 
part, it seems to me, which does not seek to exhibit this, but aims only at 
what may be the bringing of Jesus to our time as the moral ideal of religious 
teacher of timeless ideal of God, the true, beautiful, the immediacy and 
nearness of God, only repeats the negated tendencies of speculative 
theology.
Indeed, we encounter in the Gospel an historical event which has 
taken place in the realities of history. Exaggerated statements or material that 
may be there in the New Testament do not alter the fact that Jesus is a figure 
of history. The event witnessed to by history cannot be replaced by myth. 
What is even more significant is that what has survived history is not a myth 
but a person - the living Christ. And therefore, it is unbelief that hinders the 
recognition of him as the one through whom God has wrought salvation for 
us and not the lack of his testimony in history. Indeed, the growth and 
triumph of the Christian faith finds its valid explanation in no other place, 
except in his Lordship over it as the living Christ. It is too shallow a line of 
thought, therefore, for those belonging to the History of Religions School in 
Africa to attribute the triumph over religions in the continent to colonialism. 
For the rapid growth of the Churches after independence renders the 
argument questionable. And so I share the view of those who see the real 
answer lying in the nature of the Gospel. For it is therein that the 
absoluteness of Christianity is manifested.The inescapable reality one faces 
in dealing with the question of Jesus Christ is that the history of his person is
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inseparable from the witness of him as the Christ of faith. For it is through 
the achievement of his life, death and resurrection that his teaching is given 
worth. Otto Weber reminds us of what I see as particularly significant in this 
whole question of the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith. He states,
Faith does not live out of the fact that Christ has 
entered into our midst ‘in the flesh’. But it also 
could not live unless this did happen. The ‘Christ 
of faith’ is ‘outside of us’ (extra nos). And 
historicity is the decisive aspect for that assertion. 
But it is not the only aspect. That the ‘Christ of 
faith’ is disclosed to us only in our confrontation 
with each other is another aspect of it. And the 
eschatological aspect is a third one. They all 
belong together. The issue is that Jesus Christ
comes to us ... and not the securing of faith. *55
Contrary to what may be said of the testimony of the Apostles, their assertion 
that the risen and exalted Christ interpreted his work cannot be questioned. 
For it is from this particular context that the true significance of Christ's 
event is understood.
How is this given expression in the formulation of Christology in 
Africa’s contemporary theology? Christianity in Africa exemplifies the 
constant concern for truth that takes an holistic rather than fragmentary 
approach. And Christology is no exception. In fact, the modem search for 
the historical Jesus which we have already discussed, has not been met with 
bewilderment and a sense of loss because of its critical scientific orientation, 
but because of its tendency to create gaps between Christian faith and New 
Testament scholarship and consequently appearing as if to hinder rather than 
facilitate integration into the thought-world of the Bible. This is made even 
more critical by the fact that the thought world of Africa has been
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acknowledged as more akin to that of the Bible. For the question arises as to 
how it is appropriate to preoccupy oneself with what seems to be an 
endeavour to obtain factual consensus on the story of Jesus (as concerns of 
modem search for the historical Jesus show) while the African Christian’s 
holistic approach demands more than facts. Indeed the Gospel story does 
not only speak about the historicity of Jesus, but the fact that in Him, God’s 
salvific act for humanity has been and is being enacted. The question then, is 
not primarily one of creating a true picture of Jesus, but of how the crucified 
and risen Christ is a living reality in the thought of our time and in the lives 
of men and women of faith.56
It is in reckoning with this critical challenge to the task of Christology 
that observations have been made, of the need to distinguish between the 
common tendency to discuss Christology in metaphysical terms, due to our 
indebtedness to Greco-Roman culture, and the orientation of the Biblical 
faith. For whereas the former seemed to orient itself toward a kind of 
abstractionist framework, with the Christological task appearing as if it were 
a mere exercise in theoretical reflection, the latter exemplifies the expression 
of Christology in very functional terms such that there is that concrete 
emphasis on Jesus Christ as expressed in terms of his Activity. As John 
Pobee states57,
“The biblical approach is different: metaphysical 
speculations about the relations within the 
Godhead are absent. Even the Fourth Gospel, 
which declared ‘The Word was God’, nowhere 
speculates how the Word was. Indeed, it soon 
leaves the heavens and comes down to earth with 
the tremendous affirmation “The Word became 
flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth;
We beheld his glory”. (John 1:14 RSV) 58
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Indeed it is in recognition of this particular orientation toward concrete 
expression, that he does not only find a viable framework of articulation, but 
one that seems to be on the same wavelength with African thought, whose 
preference for concrete expression over against abstractions needs no 
stressing. Furthermore, if there was a need for some confirmation of the 
suitability of the functional approach for discussing Christology within the 
African setting, the use of Proverbs in serious discussions in Akan society is 
a fitting e x a m p l e . 5 9  What is clear to Pobee and to many African scholars, is 
the inappropriateness of the process of philosophical abstraction from the 
concrete biblical texts which has been the chief trend of Western theology. 
For as he says 'this is not terribly effective in Africa, at least if theology is 
to engage the Church as a whole and not just the initiates'.^
Inasmuch as this treatise affirms this view and the functional 
framework as one befitting the discussion of Christology, the question 
remains as to how this has been given expression in African scholarship, 
and in what ways do concepts employed to express impressions of Jesus 
depict him as the ground of faith, and therefore, religious authority?
An overview of recent attempts at the specific question of Christology 
in African Christianity show that besides the inherent variety of emphasis, 
two broad inclinations seem to stand out as dominant. The first is that which 
focuses on the functional representation of the Person of Jesus Christ in 
terms of his nature as truly human and divine. This is the approach pursued 
by John Pobee and a recent not so in depth discussion by Siggibo Dwane 
among others. The second is that which preoccupies itself with functional 
concepts attributed to Jesus Christ such as Christus Victor, Saviour,
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liberator, and the mediator or the Great Ancestor besides others, as 
demonstrated by John Mbiti, Kofi-Appiah-Kubi, Mercy Oduyoye and 
Charles Nyamiti among others.
Starting with the first line of approach, the embrace of the functional 
framework as demonstrated by John Pobee's Toward Christology in an 
African Theology, follows the New Testament emphasis of discussing the 
humanity and divinity of Jesus in terms of His activity rather than speculating 
about ‘His nature as human, or the metaphysical relationships within the 
Godhead in expounding His divinity. When it comes to the humanity, the 
basic thrust is that Jesus was a personality in history like any others. He as 
brought into the world by a woman like other men and with family relations 
and with traceable lineage through David (of the common knowledge of his 
mother, father, brothers and sisters as in Mark 6:3 RSV). He was of flesh 
and blood like any other man as is demonstrated by His subjection to all the 
limitations of all human beings, weak in flesh and potentially capable of 
sinning, limitation of His knowledge, and the loudest of all being His 
mortality. God does not die! Moreover, it is plain that He demonstrated His 
finitude by the fact that whatever power He wielded, He acknowledged as 
being derived from and dependent on God. And so we have Jesus' activity 
as man exemplifying that reality of life totally and solely dependent on God. 
The basic thrust of this point being that the biblical faith makes it plain in the 
humanity of Jesus that God has not dealt with human beings through a 
superbeing, but one truly of same kin and kith.61
The same is true even in the depiction of Jesus as divine. For the 
emphasis (as Pobee illustrates from John's Gospel) is not in speculating how
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the Word was in spite of its declaration that it was God. As he states, 'the 
most important issue is what the Word does, for that is, so to speak, a 
window onto His divinity. Jesus' divinity is sensed or deduced from His 
operations in the w o r l d ' .6 2  This is to say that to some extent, the divinity of 
Jesus is mirrored through His humanity, a factor that serves to demonstrate 
the emphasis as not being in His metaphysical status but on God's relation 
with man. And so Pobee would assert:
'In Jesus the disciples saw what man is meant to 
be, i.e. Jesus is the imago dei. The determinative 
theological moment came when the disciples were 
compelled to say: ‘What I see in this man 
commands my worship. What I see in him 
changes my concept of God. What I have seen in 
terms of his manhood I now recognise as
Divinity, My Lord and my God'. 63
This is indeed what terms like sinlessness serve to affirm. For at issue 
is not the qualitative distinction of His moral standing, but the fact that in 
Him was exhibited the meaning of a total devotion to God. The same is true 
for the authority and power He wielded - exhibited as divine power. The 
thrust of it all was the manifestation of the reign of God in the world. 
Furthermore, even the description of Him as creator seems to centre on the 
point that Jesus is the medium of revelation about God and about the 
meaning of existence. Hence the assertion of Him as not only the agent of 
creation but also the judge at the end. The same can be said for pre-existence 
and eternity. Siggibo Dwane affirms this same point though from a different 
perspective when he says:
'Jesus of Nazareth is man like ourselves, but from 
the beginning of His life He is the son of God. At 
creation, man is made God's companion and 
fellow worker.Jesus as the second Adam is the
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locus of the invisible dwelling and activity of 
God. In Him and through Him God tabernacles 
with man in such a unique fashion that we are able 
to say Immanuel, God with us. This man is 
God-receiving and God-bearing. His works are 
the works of God, and His passion the 
compassion of God. He is the God-man.'64
Turning to the second approach, the emphasis on the functional 
concepts attributed to Jesus Christ further exemplified the issue of 
Christology as that of God's relation to man> one that is not dealt with in 
metaphysical terms, but in concrete reality of the event of Jesus Christ. With 
the soteriological concern informing, but not determining the process of 
articulation, that which is enacted says as much of the act as it does the bearer 
of it. We have a fitting illustration in the conception of Jesus as Christus 
Victor in John Mbiti's treatment of it in Some African Concepts o f 
Christology. For as he shows, the special appeal that this conception for an 
African Christian seems to be rooted in an African World View that is so 
aligned to that of the Bible. In his words:
'Africa knows all too well that there are many 
forces at work in the world. These are both real 
and imaginory, but they include spiritual powers, 
spirits, witchcraft, sorcery, fear, anxiety, 
sickness, diseases, the power of evil, and the 
greatest of them all, d e a t h ' .6 5
But the problem is that in spite of all the rational explanations for 
misfortunes and other manifestations of evil (normally blaming any of the 
above as the cause) the ultimate remedy seems non-existent. In fact, many 
myths that tell of the origin of death and the subsequent loss of original 
immortality, resurrection and rejuvenation seem to impress on humanity the 
reality of an irreversible state that all that is left is the acceptance of the status 
quo as a fa it accompli. The Christian gospel's depiction of Jesus Christ as
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the one who fought victoriously the forces of evil, spirits, sickness, hatred, 
fear and death itself, and thus bringing about a radical turning around of the 
status quo, could only find full expression in Christus Victor. For what is 
said of His salvific act is not that of providing a temporary protection or 
refuge, but a once for all salvation, a complete alteration of the old world that 
was backward looking (others may have a circular rather than a theological 
orientation of life) with no futuristic dimension to one that is. This is a re­
orientation of the way of death to that of life, the way of the past that seems 
to belong to fate to the way that reorientates life towards the eschatological 
purpose of God in which all things will be made new. An act that can only be 
attributed to one who is of God and one who is God.
Closely related to the above is the conception of Jesus Christ as 
Saviour. And even though there are no parallels to its biblical representation 
in traditional African concepts as Mbiti has rightly argued, its depiction 
strikes the African world with such dynamic meaning because of its being the 
ultimate answer to the obvious gap stated above as existing in matters of life, 
death and reconciliation with God. This portrait of Jesus fits into the 
yearnings and longing of African peoples in fulfilling something for which 
there has been no other known means of fulfilment. In both the backward 
looking and circular world views which seem to have been dominant in 
African myths, the African is placed in a situation where he seems to be 
waiting in darkness not knowing that a Saviour would come. For 
generations myths of how paradise was lost, how immortality was lost, how 
death came about, and how God and human beings were separated have been 
handed out by word of mouth. But nobody knew how this loss could be
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repaired, how resurrection could be regained, how the gap between God and 
human beings could be bridged. In Jesus Christ, however, all this falls into 
place, it makes sense, it becomes a revelation, a hope, and a destiny to which
the Church and the Heilsgeschichte are m o v i n g . ^
Reckoning with this transforming reality of the salvific work of Jesus, 
therefore, it seems superfluous to reduce African Christian understanding 
and conception of it to a very superficial level of morals. In fact, to argue as 
Mbiti does, that physical concerns of survival are basic factors driving 
African Christians to embrace Jesus Christ as Saviour (physical rescuer and 
r e d e e m e r ) , 67 seems to be too narrow a depiction of their faith.
If the above was to be taken as the common understanding underlying 
the conception of Jesus as Saviour, then a lot of explaining has to be done in 
regard to what Jesus Christ meant to those who had to face martydom for their 
faith as in Uganda or persecution in refusing to take oaths as in Kenya in the 
1950s and 1970s.
Much that is said of the above conception of Jesus as Saviour can be 
said to be expressive of that firm belief in Him as liberator. For the salvific 
work of Jesus Christ which is not only confined to the human soul, but the 
totality of all that which belongs to human existence, can only be expressed 
in terms of liberation. And this is especially true in that liberation here is 
understood in that holistic sense of the removal of all that which keeps the 
African in bondage, all that makes him less than what God intended him to 
be. It connotes the total idea of liberation of life subject to fate, uncertainty, 
fear, evil powers and principalities subjecting one to spiritual bondage, and
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even domination and oppression in the physical s e n s e d  in this regard, 
Jesus does not only save, but sets free or rather restores that life of true 
freedom the Christian gospel declares as derived from God. Indeed, the 
prominent usage of passages, such as Luke 4:18-22, referred to as the 
“Manifesto" of Nazareth, and like 1: 46-55, the Magnificat, referred to as 
Mary’s Song of Revolution, serve to illustrate how this understanding of 
Jesus in terms of His work has struck African life with such meaning that a 
fitting description is none other than that of a liberator.69 Moreover, the 
emphasis of this biblical depiction is understood as not speaking of this 
liberation act as something distant in the future, but in the here and now of 
the Gospel proclamation. This is the point echoed by Desmond Tutu when 
he says,
Liberation is a serious preoccupation at the 
present time and it is not seen as being an 
alternative to personal salvation in Jesus Christ.
No, it is seen in Africa as the inescapable 
consequence of taking the gospel of Jesus Christ
seriously'.70
It is understood as more than a solace to the untold numbers in the 
Continent who are subjected to poverty by human creed and oppressive 
systems, captivity of oppression perpetuated by human self-interest, made 
refugees and displaced by those they looked upon as liberators from foreign 
domination. For it is a proclamation of judgement on that concrete reality of 
human beings' constant refusal to recognise the rule of God in human affairs 
and the declaration of what that recognition actually entails. This is to say 
that the embrace of Christian faith of Jesus Christ as saviour, and therefore, 
liberator, is to acknowledge this demand of His word in the concrete reality
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of human existence. This factor Edward Schillebeeckx also asserts when he 
says that Christianity does not merely throw light on man's existence, but 
aims above all to renew i t 7 1 This is the same point Otto Weber echoes 
when speaking of reconciliation in Christ by stating,
'Reconciliation finds its concrete form in the 
reconciliation of the Community. But it does not 
affect just the Community. God reconciled the 
world to himself, Paul says (2 Cor 5:19).
“World" for Paul is not merely the neutral totality 
of what is. “World" as “this World" is the 
epitome of all that contradicts and strives against 
God (cf. I Cor 1 : 2  of., 2 7 f f  - if we add I Cor 2 :  6 
ff. to this, then we see that “World" is nothing 
otherthan “this a g e " ) ' . 7 2
The conception of Jesus Christ as mediator commonly expressed in 
terms of the Great Ancestor has recently emerged as a dominant 
representation of functional Christology for African theologians; the leading 
work here being that of Charles Nyamiti - Christ as Our Ancestor: 
Christology from an African perspective.
Now, studies in African traditional religion have demonstrated the 
common understanding of Ancestors as not only the living dead who 
continue to be members of the community of the living, but mediators 
between it and the spirit world and especially the supreme being or God. In 
effecting this role, ancestors have not only been understood as mediators or 
the link through which a strained relation between God and human beings 
can be harmonised, but also that of executing judgement or p u n i s h m e n t . 7 3
The mediatorial role of Jesus Christ as depicted in the New Testament 
cannot be said to be dissimilar. For like the ancestors, His incarnation
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established that consanguineous relationship with us, especially in the 
emphasis of His Adamic origin. A relationship that is also grounded in His 
supernatural status acquired through His death and resurrection which linked 
His humanity more closely to the divine family.
Among other similarities adduced also is that of a model of behaviour 
or conduct, as well as a source of Christian tradition and its stability - just as 
the Ancestors are, for the living relatives as well as sources of tribal tradition 
and its stability.74
The differences, however, serve as a warning against easy equation of 
the mediatorial role of Jesus Christ as proclaimed in the Christian gospel and 
that of the Ancestors. For as Nyamiti acknowledges, it is true that like 
Ancestors, Christ’s relationship to us is linked with consanguinity on 
account of His Adamic origin.
But even though He is Adamic in character, Christ's brotherhood 
transcends all family, class, tribal or racial limitations. In fact, a more 
profound difference lies in the fact that Christ is God Man. By virtue of His 
hypostatic union, He has been established as our brother and mediator. The 
implication being that His relation or brotherhood to us is rooted not only in 
consanguineous ties but in the mystery of the trinity itself.
Furthermore, there is the radical distinction of His (Christ's) sonship 
to the Father in that while even as man, he is the natural Son and descendant 
of the Father, our Sonship and descent is by adoption.
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As already mentioned, Jesus Christ is the model of behaviour for His 
brother, and, therefore, the foundational authority for Christian tradition as 
Ancestors are to traditional life. But even here, the difference needs no 
stressing in that His divine status alone suffices as manifesting his
superiority.75
One view in this study is that the mediatory role of the Ancestors in 
traditional African religion provides the symbolism that can serve to express 
the mediatorial role of Jesus Christ in biblical faith in a way that is more 
homely for the African Christian. This is to say that unlike other terms and 
conceptions, here we have a depiction of a role that needs no translation or 
adaption, but the expression of its qualitative difference as stated by the New 
Testament. Indeed, this is the point made by J. Mutiso-Mubinda when he 
talks of Jesus Christ as Ancestor per excellence'76 and also John Pobee 
when he talks of 'the Great and Greatest A n c e s t o r ' . 7 7
Just as there is the contrast between the priestly mediatorial role in the 
Old Testament in that Jesus Christ is the o ^  for all great high priest, His 
depiction in terms of the above seems not only to express that qualitatively 
contrasting role, but its concrete representation too. For His mediation is not 
grounded anywhere else other than in His humanity. In fact, the biblical 
witness exemplifies His whole life from incarnation to resurrection, and 
ascension to the Father's right hand as one of the mediation. And His divine 
nature is not only to demonstrate the qualitative distinction of His role, but 
the reality of His Authority. In Pobee's words, 'He is superior to other 
Ancestors by virtue of being closest to God and as God. As Nana (or
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Greatest Ancestor) He has authority over not only the world of men but also 
of all spirit beings, namely the cosmic powers and the a n c e s t o r s ' . 7 8
Having outlined these two broad inclinations that have characterized 
the treatment of Christology in African Christianity, the basic thrust is the 
recognition of the question of Christology as that of our relationship with 
God. And the place where this can be understood in its true sense is in the 
salvific work of Jesus Christ. For it is here that the true understanding of 
God and the reality of our situation is manifested. This is a situation that has 
been acted upon and one which in acknowledgement of this effected salvific 
work of God experiences transformation.
As David Tracy has stated, though from a different perspective,
'Christ event lays hold upon an individual as a 
pure gift. Through that sense of giftedness, in the 
Christ event, the Christian rediscovers an 
experience of the whole which is, in fact, the 
experience of the Power of Judging, healing love 
who is G o d ' . 7 9
To know this in the Christian sense is to acknowledge in faith its 
challenge for personal life and for society. This is well summed up by the 
assertion that the memory of the one who preached the reign of God, who 
lived and ministered, who met the fate of crucifixion and was vindicated by 
God in resurrection-lives throughout Christian history as a Presence 
transforming all Christian experiences of the event into the living praxis of an 
imitatio christi%0
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PROSPECT FOR CONTEMPORARY ORIENTATION
In the preceding chapters, the dialogic characteristic of Christological 
discourse has been demonstrated. For therein we reckoned with the fact that 
no contemporary Christology begins completely anew. On the contrary, it is 
part of a grateful and critical dialogue with Christologies of predecessors and 
other contemporaries.* Decisive in this dialogic process, however, has been 
the recognition of the fact that the undertaking has never meant a mere act of 
affirming what has gone before or harmonising what may appear as the 
unbalanced antithesis of the one-sided emphasis at times exemplified in 
Christological discourse. Instead, there has been a demonstration of that 
constant ‘encounter* and ‘confrontation’ with the question of what the event 
of Jesus Christ means in our day and time.
It has been imperative to go back to the original event of Jesus Christ as 
testified to in the New Testament as the foundational framework of any 
Christological discourse. There has also been an exemplification of its 
representation in the succeeding centuries culminating in ‘classical 
Christology’ (cf Nicea and Chalcedon definitions) that has held sway in the 
Church through many centuries to this day. Above all, there has been the 
reckoning with how this carefully wrought structure characterising traditional 
Christology was hit by the tidal wave of the enlightenment (especially in 
Euro-American Christianity) as all that typified its framework of expression 
was cast in doubt. Indeed, the initial impetus may have been an angry 
outburst against the long story of intellectual o p p r e s s i o n . 2 But its 
consequential challenge going beyond the negative reaction, was the
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considered re-addressing of the question of Christology that began with 
Schleiermacher and culminated in Barth's emphasis of the whole activity as 
having its premise in faith. This is to say that amidst the prevailing concern 
with the truth of Christ's event within the concern for truth in the growth of 
human knowledge, the recognition and acknowledgement of that which was 
central to Christology meant that the given premise was the only adequate 
framework. Furthermore, the realisation that Christianity does not live by an 
idea, a Principle, or an axiom but an event and a person - Jesus Christ, meant 
that Christology could not be said to be true to its function if it did not 
exemplify that reality as being an account whose premise was a living faith 
in Jesus Christ. ^
But then the question that already arose in the preceding chapters and has 
to be faced is that of the form of appropriateness that can be said to render 
our speaking of this distinctive particularity of Christian faith relatively 
adequate amidst the realities of diversities and plural expression in 
Christology ?
To start with, traditional Christology's representation depicts a carefully 
wrought structure in its articulation and response to Christ's event. But even 
this does not smooth over the reality of the New Testament witness as an 
entity that is unified. In fact, Otto Weber's submission holds true when he 
says that the differences in the Church's Christology are rooted since the 
very beginning in the differences found in the New Testament, notable 
examples being the powerful tensions one encounters between the synoptics, 
Paul and John. Furthermore, the New Testament documents themselves 
were written in very different places, with their influence unevenly strong in 
various areas from the very beginning such that ‘the’ Church in the early
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period was just as differentiated as ‘the’ New Testament witness. This is to 
say that, what is ‘given’ in the beginning is neither the Church nor 
Christology, but the person of Jesus - not exhausted in the various New 
Testament texts nor in a dogma or dogmatics.^
It is the contention of this treatise, therefore, that inasmuch as it is 
imperative to recognise traditional Christology in the reality of its diversity, 
the primary lesson to be borne in mind is that Jesus rules their speaking and 
in no way is he held captive to the represented structure of their response.
If there was one major blind alley in the average Enlightenment theology, 
it was the inability to recognise the above due to the tendency to participate 
fully in the movement of the period to such an extent that what may have 
been a critical response to the traditional Christological statement turned into 
a total loss of the very theme expressed therein.^ And as already stated, it 
had to take such stormy experiences as those of the first World War for 
theology to recapture once again the unpredictable and incalculable aspect of
Jesus Christ*^
The issue here is not one of calling for a kind of return to the traditional 
Christological position as the answer to our stated question. For one only 
needs to look at the numerous criticisms of twentieth century theologians o 
Christological tradition to realise the nature of its representation as becoming 
the ammunition for self criticism. Ours is to reckon with the view of those 
who argue that the way forward seems to be in recognising the New 
Testament in the reality of its witness. And the same is true for subsequent 
representations of Christology.
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If the concern is to realise a depiction of Jesus Christ confessed by faith 
as a man of historical reality as has been the concern of the quest for 
historical Jesus school, then there has to be the understanding that the texts 
of the New Testament represent Him within a theological framework.^ 
Indeed they are interested in him as he was; but not only or primarily so. 
The documents seek to tell the truth that is not told apart from its theological 
framework. They do offer us a way to the historical Jesus. But for them the 
historical Jesus has already become without any loss of historical reality, also 
of suprahistorical significance.^ Reckoning with this reality as was 
demonstrated in chapter four, demands of the theologian's treatment of the 
New Testament, the need to understand the particular focus of the 
fundamental theological questions impelling each expression, and which 
have been disclosed as part of the world of meaning of the witness to Jesus 
Christ. David Tracy observes that inasmuch as there havtbeen major 
developments, corrections, refinements and significant challenges to our 
understanding of the biblical texts as a result of the recent inputs from form 
criticism, redaction criticism and literary criticism, the fundamental point that 
remains is the particularity of responses to Christ event shaped by the 
particular theological questions that led to distinctive Christological emphasis 
found in the New Testament (cf early Palestinian, Judaic-Helfcnistic, Gentile, 
Markan, Lukan, Matthean, Pauline, Johannine and apocalyptic 
expressions).^ This is the same point that Weber acknowledges to have 
been recognised by Barth when he successfully endeavoured to conceive of 
Christology in terms of the whole wealth of New Testament statements as he 
rejected any tendency to absorb the person of Jesus Christ into a given 
system of thought or structure. ^
In the light of the above, therefore, it seems proper to argue that the fuller 
truth of the New Testament and of contemporary Christology does not lie
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anywhere else other than in that interwoven complexity of the related forms 
of proclamation - narrative - image - symbol and reflective thought depicted 
in the New Testament itself. * * This is to say that inasmuch as it is important 
to reckon with the need to take into account the earliest witnesses as well as 
the full and diverse forms of Christological expressions of the New 
Testament, including later expressions such as those of classical Christology 
in understanding the full range of Christological responses, the above 
remains decisive for its fuller truth, and as the place with the surest clues a 
theologian can find to be relatively adequate in expressing the said event as 
disclosed in the texts. ^  For example, if it is a matter of demonstrating the 
here and now of the event, proclamation is never represented as a distant 
message but as one hurling at us in the here and now, often like a stone; 
unsettling, provoking as the word of address that upsets, shakes, questions 
and both judges and heals us. The narratives do not smooth over the story of 
Jesus Christ. On the contrary it exemplifies it in a manner faithful to our 
experience of the storyline character of life itself; full of tensions and 
surprises, shocks and achievements and disclosures of authentic and 
inauthentic life. To illustrate further, New Testament disclosures in the 
confessing narrations of this singular individual - show this strange, 
authoritative Jesus who proclaims God's reign in words that confront our 
ordinary modes of apprehension, who acts in word and deed with a freedom 
and a sometimes harsh, sometimes tender love that commands the attention 
of his contemporaries and of us; this Jesus who consorts with all, especially 
with the outcast - the privileged ones in his eyes whom the privileged in 
every age feel free to ignore or to crush with either violence or patronising 
contempt; whose story challenged the compulsions and temptations of his 
contemporaries to domesticate and control God through laws and doctrines 
as it challenges the contemporary Christian Church's temptation to do the
278
same, he who dies disgraced through death reserved for outcasts of society 
while the Pilates die in their beds, this Jesus who is yet raised by God and 
vindicated as the one who is God's own; who discloses what authentic life 
might be to all who hear that story, and in hearing join the plot in trusting 
hope to the non-end of this strange narrative’. ^
The same is true for those tensive symbols disclosed in the narratives.
For their focus on the meaning and truth of Christ event takes place in images
which disclose and transform it a new. The cross with its conflict and
contradiction as we find in Paul's language, hurls at all human attempts at
self-sufficiency and thereby breaking through our cherished defenses to
1h
disclose healing, judging, and graced scandal, the symbols of glorification - 
exaltation exemplified in resurrection, incarnation, and even the ‘lifting up’ 
of the cross expressed in the meditative releasement of John's theology, the 
reader is invited to sense the ‘already’ reality of God's own self in Jesus 
Christ. What is being said here, therefore, is that the fuller truth of 
Christology exemplified in the full complexity of these symbols and modes 
of thinking - incarnation - cross- resurrection - expressed in both dialectic (of 
Paul) and meditative thought (John) disclose the reality of an event which is 
here even now, which has always already been here, which is still not yet 
here. The dialectic of these symbols being the adverbial dialectic of an 
always-already which is yet a not-yet. ^
The danger of singling out one aspect of^hrist event at the expense of 
others always seems to lead to one sided emphasis or even a distortion of its 
true reality. One example is Otto Weber's criticism of traditional 
Christology's tendency to develop a Christology that solely regarded the 
Exalted One - the resurrected and ascended Lord of Glory as decisive to an
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inadmissible degree that both the incarnate and the Exalted One in his 
historical encounter was lost in favour of a kind of static reconstruction of the 
said event. ^
Since the scriptural representation is the framework of our articulation, it 
seems imperative to take our lead from the view that any adequacy that is 
sought in Christological expression, can only be found in the endeavour to 
conceive the subject in terms of the whole wealth of New Testament 
statements.^ For they are impelled by the dynamism of the event of Jesus 
Christ itself and its self-expression into the otherness of a wide range of 
responses or witnesses to it. The tendency to fit it within a given system is, 
therefore, bound to be a misrepresentation of the reality of the event rather 
than a genuine response that is exemplified by faith. Furthermore, the 
character of the New Testament as demonstrated by James Dunn in his 
treatment of Christ and Christologies offers us a diversity whose unity is 
grounded in the said single event of Jesus Christ witnessed to by early 
Christian communities, an event demanding response and encouraging all 
later Christian responses, and not one forced into the demand for a single 
ex p ression .^  After all, it seems inconsistent to talk of Christological 
expressions as personal, concrete and decisively rooted in the given situation 
of the encountered, if a unitary response is what is sought. The recognition 
of diversity as impelled by the dynamism of the events invites us to a 
framework of dialogue with the variety of responses as they are 
acknowledged to be new interpretations, bearing personal responses to the 
one foundational event that is the fundamental criterion of appropriateness.
But what does this mean in terms of our viewing of the various areas of 
emphasis in Christology? First, is the need to acknowledge the reality of the 
distinctive input expressed in the particular emphasis and which may not be
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given in others. Second, is to recognise the inter-relatedness of these 
particular areas of emphasis. For example, the various logos Christologies' 
emphasis on incarnation disclose a situation where wonder, fundamental 
trust in humanity, history and the created order live as the disclosure of the 
always-already reality of the gracious presence of the God of love who, 
though disclosed in the history of Israel, in other religions and in all authentic 
human searches for truth and life, is decisively disclosed for the Christian as 
that which has taken place in Jesus Christ. In these Christologies rooted in 
John, in Colossians and Ephesians, in Luke's Paul of the Aeropagus speech 
- the cross and its disclosure of negativity, conflict, contradiction and sin, 
tend to be transformed into the exaltation of a fundamental trust, a wonder at 
the giftedness of life itself, a radical universal and finally incomprehensible 
grace, a pervasive sense of a God of love who is never an ‘inference* but an 
always present reality to each and to a ll .^
The Christologies of the Cross as in Moltmann and Sobrino disclose a 
different situation where the concreteness and decisiveness of the event of 
Jesus Christ is seen in terms of the conflict, contradiction and the negativity 
of the Cross. In this regard, there is more on the pain, conflict and suffering 
at the heart of all individual repressions and all social and historical 
oppressions and alienations rather than the always already character of our 
graced state. Thus, we have the sense of our situation being charged with 
the prophetic, apocalyptic, eschatological sense of a great refusal to the 
present order of things, an exposure of all the rest as deceptive, and the 
treatment of the theology of glory associated with incarnation and 
resurrection Christologies with suspicion and as possible culprits of the 
dangers of ideological manipulation 20 (though the latter cannot be said to be 
free from it either).
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Yet there is also the reality of inter-relation impelled by the holistic nature 
of the Christ event as given witness to in the New Testament. This is to say 
that inasmuch as we have the given particularities of emphasis, each needs 
the other as a self-corrective moment in its own particular framework of 
emphasis. For example, the incarnation emphasis ofthe different logos 
Christologies from John through Nicea and Chalcedon through many 
Anglican, Orthodox, Catholic and liberal Protestant - Christological traditions 
to Maurice, Rahner, Ogden and Cobb in our period, cannot be said to be 
fully expressive of the holistic reality of Christ-event without the negations 
and the not-yet input of the cross as well as the hope and future orientations 
of the resurrection Christologies and vice versa. Similarly, the symbol- 
image expressions we find in the New Testament witness need the narratives 
of the ministry and message of Jesus, the passion resurrection accounts as 
well as the confessional proclamations of the original apostolic witness in 
order to exemplify what can be said to be an adequate representation of the 
said event. The issue here is not one of merely having an external corrective 
or reminder of other aspects of the whole, but the realisation that each needs 
a real, internal, self-exposing relationship of its thinking to those de­
emphasised by its own concentration.^* It is recognition of this 
inseparable inter-relatedness that makes a dialogic framework imperative in 
that through it one is able to assert the unifying factor of the event of Jesus 
Christ while taking into account the diverse responses to it. When dealing 
with theological orientations in African Christianity in Chapter Six we did 
reckon with the emphasis on particular situational contexts as an 
exemplification of vigorous interaction between the text as the Word of God 
and a specific human situation. And the same can be said here in regard to 
the above. For the decisive factor in the variety of responses that have come 
to characterise Christological articulation is that faith of the encountered
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believer, whose response as with New Testament Christians, is shaped by 
the decisiveness, the fullness and adequacy of the one event of Jesus Christ, 
one that is decisively true word and the manifestation of that which already 
happened, happens now, always happens, and will happen in the future of 
God.
The basic thesis here, therefore, is one of acknowledging that as with the 
New Testament depiction, contemporary Christology addresses itself to a 
diversity of expressions that belongs to the very nature of personal response. 
This can be dealt with in an enriching way through a dialogic framework that 
recognises the decisive and primary criterion as that single event of God's 
self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. For sure every theologian's way may have 
many turns as has been observed, but the above remains decisive if it has to 
be an undertaking that is to serve, inform, challenge Christian witness. 
Furthermore, what is being spoken of here is not something passed on from 
one generation to another, but an event evoking a faith response that is 
expressed in realised experience exemplifying the recognition of Christ event 
in the present. Leonardo Boff rightly reminds us that in Christology, it is not 
sufficient to know what others have known, but to reckon with the question 
of what it all means for us in our day.^2 For if Christology is a response to 
the Christ event, the imperative demand is an exemplification of that reality of 
encounter where Jesus Christ confronts the totality of our personal as well as 
the social, ecclesial and cultural life. This is to say that what emerges in our 
contact with Jesus Christ takes on that double function where in the first part, 
there is a critical judgemental function relative to whatever is not in accord 
with the criterion by which Christ lived, and secondly the critical refining 
saving function where the absolute reference point that we discover in Christ 
gives us a new impulse, an opportunity for conversion, and the certainty that 
with him we can achieve the goal. In this sense Christ is a permanent crisis
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in human existence, but a crisis that operates like a crucible that purifies,
refines, and s a v e s . ^ 3  And this is the point already made by Weber when he
talks of Jesus Christ as not just the object of our knowledge but the Giver of
New Life.24 Jesus in his identity, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, is
oriented towards life and not towards death. And this is why in this event of
his person and work we do not only speak of him as the One who brings
salvation, but demonstrates why he has the audacity to define himself in
terms of everything which symbolised life; e.g. bread of life; light of the
world; door to life; good shepherd; living word; resurrection and life; vine;
truth and life. And since the faith response of individual Christians to Jesus
Christ is at once highly personal and irrevocably communal, there is the
imperative challenge for a reflection of the above in daily living. Our
obedience to Jesus as Christians, demands that we are united to him in a
network of renewing relationships and the forming of a new community (1 
25
Cor. 6:15). ‘He who is united to the Lord becomes one spirit with Him’, 
affirms Paul (1 Cor. 6:17). The ethical imperative for the Christian 
community, therefore, emanates from this reality of what obedience to Christ 
does entail. For as Christians experience the event of Jesus Christ in the 
witness of the community of faith, the representation of it in word and 
sacrament, in individual and communal prayer and fellowship, there is also 
that aspect of its reflection in the daily living in community, in the struggle 
for justice and freedom, and that exemplification of God's resolving of those 
fundamental conflicts of life such as sin, hatred, any form of alienation and 
even death. Therein is a proclamation of a new reality found and displayed 
in this person and act of Jesus Christ.This is the claim that the response of 
faith does not remain an assertion of the Christian tradition, but becomes our 
own in that through our experience of this event we are made to realise the 
new meaning human life and reality in general has received. This is what
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finds eloquent expression albeit from a different perspective in Lesslie 
Newbigin when he says:
.the whole existing order of nature and history is 
confronted by a new reality that gives it a new meaning. It 
means a radical contradiction of this world as it is. But the 
affirmation that this is so can be made only by a community 
that is itself engaged in that contradiction, is actually pitting 
its life against the ‘ruler of this world’ and - in fellowship
with Jesus - is bearing the cost in its own life’. ^
The dilemma is that the Christian Church gifted from God as primary 
mediator of that new reality exemplified in the event of Jesus Christ has not 
always done so. In fact, through its sinfulness (human institution) it has 
always tended to compromise, act in duplicity and even betray that reality. 
And we only need to look back at Martin Luther's ninety five theses, 
Kierkegaard's protestation, the famous cry ‘Jesus, yes: the Church no’ of 
Tolstoy, and recent challenges of liberation theology to understand what is 
being said here.
The challenge for Christology in the contemporary period then goes 
beyond an academic concern if it is to serve its rightful purpose of 
challenging Christian witness in its task. This is not to say that there is any 
substitute for rigorous and disciplined scholarship. Already in Chapter 
Seven, it was emphasised that any tendency to shy away therefrom such 
concerns of critical scholarship, as is at times the case in African Christianity 
would eventually impair its effective witness.
Rather than looking at their input from a negative sense, the 
argumentation that the input of historical - critical scholarship and all other 
specialised fields like form, redaction and literary criticism performing their 
true function, should be expressions of the necessary reformatory impulse at
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the heart of the gospel and Christian tradition is, therefore, a welcome one 
that is shared by this treatise. For when historical - critical methods provide 
a modem and trustworthy way to interpret the earliest apostolic witnesses to 
the presence of Jesus - their confessing memories of His message, actions 
and fate - more clearly and cleanly (as they do), then the results of those 
methods also provide a modem, reformatory way to uncover the distortions 
in the tradition, to challenge its and our thought and life to radical fidelity to 
the actual, remembered Jesus who is the C hrist.^  In a more explicit way, 
literary-critical scholarship’s treatment of the parables of Jesus serve to 
illustrate what is being said here. For through these methods a new and 
critical corrective of traditional and present thought is given. For example, 
the interpreter learns through it to cease allegorising, moralising, and 
historising these parables, allowing them instead to confront us with their 
provocative disclosure of what the reign of God is like. In the parables, the 
reign of God is not an idea clothed in a dispensable story, not a moral point, 
not an allegory, not another occasion to search for the historical Jesus. 
Rather, as parable, in parable, the reign of God is confessed as like what 
happens in these stories. As remembered parable, the message of Jesus 
continues to confront and challenge every complacency, every attempt to 
disown and forget the radicality of his challenge to those who have ears to 
hear. And so they help the Christian of today to see that challenge, to hear it 
anew by honouring its form and refusing to allow the parable to become 
domesticated or replaced by some other traditional, more manageable, less 
troublesome form.28 The same can be said also of such challenging 
insights of Praxis-oriented Christologies of Metz, Moltmann, Sobrino, 
Cone, and Ruether among others. For the event of Jesus Christ in their 
exemplification confronts the ideologically inclined distortions of the 
Christian tradition as it offers new correctives upon its various temptations.
286
For example, where Christian tradition has had the tendency to sentimentalise 
love and appear to remove the reality of conflict present in that love 
witnessed in Jesus Christ, it has brought it to the fore. Amidst the 
temptation to endorse what amounts to fatalism in much official Christian 
preaching to the poor and the suffering, it proclaims the gift of the suffering 
love of Christ as empowering all persons, especially the oppressed, and 
indeed inspiring them in their struggle for justice elicited by the hope of all 
history revealed in Jesus Christ And as if to demonstrate in concrete terms 
this point, there is a pointer to the Christian Church's own testimony of 
Jesus' preference for the outcast in society. The climax is the negation of 
tendencies of existentialist individualism that seem to be blind to this event of 
God in Jesus Christ as embracing that non-mythological universal, historical, 
future oriented disclosure of resurrection as validating and vindicating Jesus 
and his power as the Christ and Risen Lord
The summary point from the above then is that it is only when 
Christology enters continually into these dialogues, highlighting this 
challenging and corrective insight from whatever approach that it can rightly 
inform, challenge, purify and indeed enhance the witness of the Christian 
Church. Central to it all remains the affirmation of Christ's event in the 
language of faith. For it is by doing so that we can speak of recognising 
who we are and who God is in it. Indeed it is the only context in which we 
can declare that in the experience of it, our deepest yearnings for wholeness 
in ourselves, our history, nature and the whole structure of reality has been 
m e t . This rightly stresses as Weber does that Christology is never just the 
knowledge of God the Redeemer but simultaneously the experience of 
turning around in our existence.31
287
Notes
1. cf Jurgen Moltmann: The Wav of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic 
Dimensions. SCM Press, London, 1990, p.39.
2. cf John Macquanie's reference to the work of Reimarus - the so-called 
Wolfenbuttel fragments as a fitting illustration in his Jesus Christ in
Modem Thought. SCM Press, London, 1990, p. 339.
3. cf David Tracy: Analogical Imagination , op cit. p. 317.
4. Otto Weber, op cit. Vol. 2, p. 143.
5. Ibid, p. 146.
6 . Op cit. p. 147.
7. cf Colin E. Gunton: Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in 
Christology. Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1983, p. 61.
8 . Ibid.
9. cf David Tracy op cit. p. 305. 
lO.Otto Weber, op cit. Vol. 2, p. 151.
11.cf David Tracy, op cit. p.307.
12.0/7 cit.
13.0/7 cit.
\A.Op city. cf. Van Austin Harvey: The Historian and the Believer. SCM 
Press, London, 1967, p. 273.
15.0/7 city  p. 308. See also James D.G. Dunn: Unitv and Diversity in the 
New Testament: An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest Christianity. SCM 
Press, London, 1977, p. 216-30.
16.0tto Weber, op cit. Vol.2, p. 156.
17.1bid, p .151.
18James D.G. Dunn op. cit. , p. 226-33.
19.cf David Tracy op cit. p. 311.
20.1bid, p. 312.
288
21 .Op cit. p. 314.
22.Leonardo Boff: Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology of our 
Time. Orbis Books, New York, 1986, p.229.
23.1bid.
24.0tto Weber, op cit. Vol.2, p. 163.
25.cf Masamba ma Mpolo's article ‘Jesus Christ - Word of Life’ in An 
African Call for Life. Ed. Masamba ma Mpolo, Reginald Stober and Evelyn 
V. Appiah, WCC, Geneva, 1983, p.37.
26.Lesslie Newbigin: Foolishness to the Greeks. WCC, Geneva, 1986, 
p.62f.
27.David Tracy, op cit. p.325.
28.1bid, p.325.
29.Op cit. p. 325.
30.Op cit. p.329.




In this undertaking, it has been our concern to show that amidst the 
problems of diversity and plurality in Christian witness and theology, the 
way of dialogue and critical discussion offers a framework through which 
we may construct a Christology that is expressive of that which is at the heart 
of the Christian faith. For as exemplified in Otto Weber whose thought 
seems to embody this search, the framework does not only provide a way 
that seeks to do justice to that inner dynamic in the Christian witness without 
concealing the reality of the divergent responses and theological approaches 
to it, but also that which retains the uniqueness of the Christian claim and 
faith without concealing the variety of its representation. Otto Weber took 
the Christian discourse for what it is; a response to that given activity of God 
in the person and event of Jesus Christ, an activity given testimony to in 
scripture, and doctrinal formulations of the Christian Church emerging 
thereof as consensus attempts to state its significance, wi{h theologies giving 
interpretation to those stated formulations. Indeed, it is in reckoning with 
this reality that Otto Weber made a distinction between the givenness of the 
event as the criterion on which Christian witness and theology is grounded, 
and the response to it. He tried to show that the uniqueness of faith is 
centered on the recognition of the former as an activity that is of God; a 
divine reality that when recognized as such involves the acknowledgement of 
the inadequacy of human words and logic in attempting of itself to speak of 
it. And yet because it was a response to a given event, it was in no way 
free from the demands of human quest for truth. His basic concern, as 
already demonstrated, is that this never takes place in isolation from what has 
gone before irrespective of how daring the undertaking may be. Indeed, it
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was his concern to show that the very recognition of Christ-event as the 
starting-point and terminus^heology makes it imperative to dialogue with the 
scripture as the prime source and testimony to it. And even so with the 
fathers and brethren who have sought to understand and give expression to 
it.
The story, for Weber, could not begin with the particular stage of our 
response. As in modem theology, the pressing questions may be those 
arising from the challenge of the enlightenment. But for these to be treated in 
the proper perspective of what is entailed in the Christological quesrion, it is 
imperative to go back to the source of the witness to Jesus Christ in the New 
Testament, and therefrom trace subsequent developments in a continuous 
critical engagement with insights derived thereof to this day. This is what 
makes the dialogic process imperative. And since it has to be true to its 
character, it cannot attempt to conceal the nature of that which is encountered 
in the process, if it is to remain true to its task: an insight that was very 
clear to Weber. Even his critics acknowledge that inasmuch as he was 
obedient to the norm of keeping visibly clear the criterion of the 
Christological starting point and terminus, it did not lead him to conceal the 
variety of response within the Christian tradition. Instead he brought them to 
the fore as he critically engaged with their formulations; many of its internal 
dialogues being heard. 1 What is significant for Weber is the understanding 
of these varieties as impelled by the dynamism of the event of Jesus Christ 
itself in the particularity of its encounter and confrontation with us. In fact, it 
is this that he sees as underlining that particularity inherent in the expression 
of faith, and one which is the basic uniting point of the Christian response 
itself even in the New Testament witness, as James Dunn has recently 
argued.2
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His Christian apologia was not one of working in isolation from the 
demands of reason and the human quest for knowledge. Instead, he 
demonstrated a synthesized approach in his definition of the theological task 
as a faith seeking understanding; a stance that met the challenge and 
demands of the human quest, while retaining the uniqueness of faith. The 
same is true when it came to theological formulations as interpretations of 
those significant insights arising from scriptural exegesis. For inasmuch as 
they arose from rigorous treatment of scripture, it was evident to him that at 
no time could this substitute the historicity and particularity of what is given 
in the scriptural texts. And this was evident in his confrontation with issues 
of culture and ideological formulations arising from philosophy. For 
inasmuch as they were descriptive of a predominant self-understanding in a 
given culture (cf. Cultural Ideologies of the Third Reich), the uniqueness of 
the Christian witness and faith was maintained when its grounding on the 
Word of God and the event of Jesus Christ remained acknowledged as given 
criterion. Indeed, his whole theology demonstrates this dual process, where 
on the one hand the demand of faith and Christian witness is held in tension 
with the concerns of reason, philosophy and culture- 4 reality that expresses 
the character of his protestant heritage as it does that of Western Christianity 
in general. His Christology may have exemplified so much that was 
expressive of this tradition, but his dialogical insight led him to see beyond 
the confines of his undertaking; a lesson that contemporary Christologies 
need to recapture.
Otto Weber’s contribution, however, lay in his basing of his entire 
theological thought upon the Biblical witness and the responses to it in 
Christian tradition? qnd the constant awareness that anything doctrinal or
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ethical that was to remain Christian could not be thought of otherwise than in 
the context of that given word. He never lost sight of the fact that Christian 
theology was by definition not ultimately an end in itself, but a servant of 
the Christian community. This is to say that it could not adequately serve 
that purpose if its sole preoccupation was meeting the concern of human 
quest, but reckoning with the imperative need to listen afresh to the word of 
God. Indeed, he saw no substitute to serious enquiry, but inasmuch as he 
did so, he reckoned this had to have its basis on faith that recognised its 
dependence on God’s continual address through his Word. And it was on 
this basis alone that he saw the theological task as meeting the challenge of 
serving the church in her task of presenting the claims of the Christian gospel 
in a way that had claim on people4s lives. This is a lesson that every 
theological undertaking that seeks to serve its rightful role in the church 
cannot afford to lose sight of.
Otto Weber’s Christology may not bear the sensitivity that arises from 
the demands of contextualization exhibited in liberation theology’s exposure 
of the problems of subjectivity in theology; the insistence that the self which 
constructs the world is not isolated or neutral as it does its work, but is 
profoundly influenced by its economic, political and cultural setting. 3 But 
his rendering of the Christological discourse as dialogical in character bears 
that imperative need of not only bearing in mind the insights from the past
SC;
and present, but is also an invitation to recogni its openness to the concerns 
of the particular, as well as those of universal nature,, cind thereby 
exemplifying a reality that characterises an approach that is not parochial. 
His concern which supercedes the demands of a particular context is the need 
to recognise the one who encounters and confronts us in our enquiry; the 
person of Jesus Christ who does not only make himself known, but declares
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his claim on us. Indeed, his work as a theologian and pastor exemplifies an 
insight that saw the theological endeavour as not only seeking to know, but 
as experiencing that turning around in our existence. And to follow his 
methodology even when seeking to write a Christology from an African 
perspective demonstrates that it is only when one reckons with the above that 
we can say of our endeavour; we have not only heard and known him who is 
the Christ, but experienced his transforming love.
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1. cf. Alan Lewis in his Review of Otto Weber: Foundations of
Dogmatics, Vol. 1, op.cit. in Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. 37. 
1984, ed. T.F. Torrance, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh.
2. cf. James D.G. Dunn: Unitv and Diversity in the New Testament, op. 
cit. p.230
3. cf. Sallie McFaque’s article, The Christian Paradigm* in Christian 
Theology, ed. Peter Hodgson, & Other, op. cit. p. 323.
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